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The Americans' Retreat from World Power
Bruce Russett

Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb: A Reinterpretation
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The next issue of the *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* will deal with attempts of the Congress to limit the president's powers in areas such as expenditures, foreign affairs, the use of armed forces overseas, the environment, and financing presidential campaigns. A conference will be held in New York City in late May. Programs will be mailed to all members of the Academy. The *Proceedings* will be published after the conference.

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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

BRUCE RUSSETT draws on a variety of evidence, from elite studies and public opinion surveys, to analyze changes in the way Americans think about foreign policy issues. He finds a shift toward political isolationism that is reinforced by generational and ideological changes in the population and that is likely for many years to complicate efforts to deal with the challenge of global poverty.

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN reinterprets the Roosevelt and Truman policies on the construction and use of atomic weapons. He concludes that FDR's decisions to treat the bomb as a legitimate weapon and to exclude the Soviets from a nuclear partnership prepared the way for the Truman administration's atomic bombing of Japan, the toughening of policy at Potsdam, and the postwar practice of atomic diplomacy.

LEON V. SIGAL explains that what frequently goes by the name of secrecy in Washington is often not secret at all, but only an "official secret." Sigal argues that restricting congressmen to obtaining information about "officially secret" programs through informal channels puts opponents of such programs at a disadvantage in their attempts to voice opposition.

PETER A. GOLDBERG tries to account for the violent overthrow of Chilean President Salvadore Allende. Goldberg particularly examines the paradox of such a coup d'etat occurring in a country noted for its history of stable and democratic institutions.

NELSON W. POLSBY reviews Anatolii A. Gromyko's *Through Russian Eyes: President Kennedy's 1036 Days*—the first publication in English of the U.S.A. Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Polsby reaches pessimistic conclusions concerning the state of political inquiry about America in the U.S.S.R. PIERS PLOUGHMAN, an anonymous commentator, agrees with Polsby that the Gromyko book is an unscholarly "potboiler." The commentator then goes on to explain why readers cannot expect Soviet writing on American politics to conform to American scholarly standards and argues that even so, a book like Gromyko's passes on some new information about American politics to Soviet readers. POLSBY "rejoins" that he thought it "gratuitously patronizing" simply to assume that scholarly standards are still inappropriate for judging Soviet writing on American politics.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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The Americans' Retreat from World Power

BRUCE RUSSETT

When Vice-President Lyndon Johnson returned from the first meeting of the Kennedy cabinet in January 1961, he was deeply impressed by the intellectual capacity of that group of men drawn from the worlds of government, business, finance, and academia. After he exclaimed about these qualities to Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, "Mr. Sam" replied skeptically, "Well Lyndon, you may be right and they may be every bit as intelligent as you say, but I'd feel a whole lot better about them if just one of them had run for sheriff once."[1]

Too many recommendations for United States foreign policy read as though they had been written by someone who had never even "run for sheriff once." Concerned with the "balance of power," or "America's responsibilities in the world," or meeting alleged threats to "vital interests," they seem to imagine that all the important variables affecting the country's foreign policy emanate from the international system itself. When pressed, of course, most commentators will acknowledge the limitations of such a view, but still may not take sufficient account of the constraints imposed by domestic politics.

This article will show that a very major shift in foreign policy beliefs and preferences has occurred among the American public—a marked

[1] Quoted in David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (London, 1972), p. 41.

BRUCE RUSSETT is professor of political science at Yale University and editor of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. His most recent book is *Power and Community in World Politics*. His book with Betty C. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen*, will be published later this year.

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shift away from acceptance of the political "responsibilities of world power." In this sense it is a shift in the direction of political "isolationism," though not nearly as severe as the kind of viewpoint historically connoted by the term, and it does not constitute any change from an expectation of continued and growing economic interdependence in the world. Furthermore, it is not a short-term phenomenon in reaction against the Vietnam disaster; rather it appears likely to be prevalent for a long period, probably more than a decade, and to be manifest in the very same influential circles of the American populace which formally supported the "internationalist," "globalist," "interventionist" (choose the word that suits your evaluation) American foreign policy of the cold war years.

This assessment is not a popular one among those Americans who would like to reassure the nation's allies about continued American support or who wish to retain an appearance of determination in the world. An American indifference to foreign affairs surely will make little contribution toward solving the many serious problems which face the nations of the world. But if the assessment presented here is correct, a change in policy will be manifest soon enough, and it is best to recognize openly what really are the new domestic conditions. A great deal of information can be brought forward to document this new mood. Several such pieces will be discussed, but it should be clear that they are only a few among many, merely illustrative of a great number of signs waiting to be read.

Opposition to Military Spending

There is, first, an indication of a drastic transformation in attitudes toward defense spending and the proper size of the American military establishment. Since 1937, almost at the beginning of scientific public opinion polling in the United States, nationwide surveys have regularly asked respondents whether they thought the country was spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on defense. The wording of the question has varied somewhat, but not enough to interfere with a clear interpretation.[2]

During almost the entire period those preferring lower levels of defense expenditure were in a small minority. Even in the "isolationist" 1930s, the figure began in 1937 at 20 percent and quickly fell to below

[2] The following data and discussion are drawn from Bruce M. Russett, "The Revolt of the Masses: Public Opinion on Military Expenditures," in John P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg (eds.), *New Civil-Military Relations: The Agonies of Adjustment to Post-Vietnam Realities* (New Brunswick, N. J., 1974).

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FIGURE 1

Percentage of Population Favoring Less *Defense Spending, 1937–1974*



10 percent. Following World War II opinion fluctuated for a while, but those favoring less defense spending always numbered under 35 percent of the population (and the only two surveys showing more than 30 percent in this category in fact used questions biased toward producing an antidefense response). By the early 1950s the oscillations had damped down, showing a steady figure of less than 20 percent of the population thinking military spending was too high. By contrast, the number favoring more defense was always higher than 20 percent, and often very much higher. (The remainder were satisfied with the existing level, or had no opinion.) Furthermore, those favoring cuts in defense spending were drawn disproportionately from low-income, low-status groups—those least likely to be politically influential. This situation remained in effect until the mid 1960s, at which point several years passed without the question appearing in a national survey, thus breaking the time-series.

When use of the question was resumed in December 1968, however, it became evident that a great change had occurred. Beginning with that date, ten different surveys have found the number favoring a cut in defense spending to be near, and sometimes even above, the 50 percent mark, with the number favoring heavier defense spending only about 10 percent. Eliminating the "don't know" responses, a clear majority with opinions therefore wanted a smaller military budget. And while the anti-military sentiment of several years ago may have been expressing opposition to the Vietnam war, it is remarkable that the latest survey, showing 44 percent in favor of a smaller arms budget, was taken in September 1974 after direct American participation in the war had ended. These results are shown in Figure 1.[8]

[8] Figure 1 is taken from ibid., p. 67, but updated with information from a survey by the Roper Organization, Inc., in October 1971 and surveys by the American Institute

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Just as striking is the turnaround in the kinds of people expressing such sentiments. Since 1968, those who want to see the defense budget cut are not those of low status, but rather are found disproportionately among professional groups, and those of high income and education. In other words, *antimilitary-spending attitudes are concentrated precisely among those most likely to take an interest in international affairs, to vote, to make campaign contributions, and otherwise to be politically active.* The same pattern shows up in surveys concerned with attitudes toward the military in general and, since 1968, in disapproval of the Vietnam war. Special surveys of elite groups also find these attitudes to be particularly strong.[4]

Professor Alan Barton and his associates at Columbia University interviewed over 500 top business executives, labor leaders, senior civil servants and political figures, leaders of major interest groups, and top media personnel: 64 percent of them, when asked the question about military spending, responded that the defense budget should be cut.[5] And in the author's own sample survey of almost 600 vice-presidents of the largest industrial and financial corporations in America—a group generally considered to be relatively conservative, at least among elites—51 percent gave the same answer.[6]

It is worth noting, too, that this tide of opinion against military spending has occurred simultaneously with a very significant decline in the proportion of national income that is in fact devoted to military purposes. Defense spending accounted for only 6.6 percent of American gross national product in 1973, the lowest percentage since 1950 and almost a full percentage point below the pre-Vietnam (1965) floor.[7] By many criteria defense spending may still be too high, and high by long-term pre-World War II standards. But the current opposition to it arises precisely at a time when the proportionate military burden nevertheless is low by cold war standards.

A great deal of similar material is available to document attitudes of this sort. Again from our survey of corporate vice-presidents in 1973, we

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for Public Opinion in August 1972, February 1973, September 1973, and September 1974.

[4] Ibid., p. 78.

[5] Allen Barton, "The Limits of Consensus Among American Leaders," mimeo. (New York, 1972).

[6] Bruce M. Russett and Betty C. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen* (San Francisco, forthcoming) presents in detail the evidence concerning the following material on attitudes among businessmen and military officers.

[7] Russett, "Revolt of the Masses," supplemented by material from *Survey of Current Business.*

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asked whether they favored an increase, a decrease, or maintenance at the present level for both foreign economic assistance and military aid. Fully 54 percent declared that they wanted a decrease in economic aid, and 71 percent desired a cut in military aid. There once was a time when military aid for foreign countries was a more popular item among Americans than was foreign economic assistance, and when the largely "internationalist" corporate elite tended to favor both. That time is gone. Moreover, 91 percent now want to see a cut of some sort in the number of United States troops in Europe. Most—59 percent—prefer to make that cut contingent on a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction accord with the Soviet Union, but as many as 12 percent choose "total withdrawal" as the option which best describes their views.

Vietnam and Military Intervention

If there was ever any enthusiasm for the Vietnam war among the business executives surveyed, it is hard to find it now. When we asked, "Do you personally think it was correct for the United States to send ground combat troops to Vietnam?" only 37 percent replied "yes," while 53 percent said "no," and another 10 percent still could not decide. Of those who said it was not correct, only 40 percent indicated that they had held the same view since the beginning of the war. As many as 22 percent remembered themselves as having changed their opinion in 1967 or 1968. This confirms other evidence we have about when sentiment in the business and financial community shifted decisively against the war. We found that share prices on the New York Stock Exchange reacted essentially randomly to Vietnam war events before 1967, but from that time on fell into a predictable pattern of a rise in stock prices in response to peace moves by either side.[8]

The great majority of executives, whether on balance they approve or disapprove of American participation in the war, agree that it was very costly to the United States. No less than 86 percent believed that the war was "bad" for American social and political institutions, and 77 percent made a similar evaluation of the war's effects on the economy. Furthermore, over half of those think they would have retained that negative evaluation even "if inflation had been controlled."

Having been burned once, they are not anxious to undertake another war which might have similar consequences. That is evident from re-

[8] Betty C. Hanson and Bruce M. Russett, "Testing Some Economic Interpretations of American Intervention: Korea, Indochina, and the Stock Market," in Steven Rosen (ed.), *Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex* (Lexington, Mass., 1973).

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sponses to questions about American intervention on behalf of other governments. We posed this problem:

> In the event that one of the following nations is attacked by foreign communist forces and requests U. S. help, there are three courses of action the U. S. might take:
>
> 1. Use military force to extend all needed help.
> 2. Provide help, but short of U. S. military involvement.
> 3. Stay out.
>
> Please indicate the course of action you think the U. S. should take for each nation.

We then listed seven countries: Brazil, India, Japan, Mexico, Thailand, West Germany, and Yugoslavia. For only two of these states, Mexico and West Germany, were a majority—and only a bare majority in the case of Germany—prepared to recommend United States military action. As for India and Yugoslavia, a majority checked the "stay out" option, sometimes with comments like, "Are you kidding?" A national survey of the entire American public in 1970 showed an even more extreme situation—a majority were ready to use American military forces in *none* of these cases.

This skepticism about military action on behalf of allies and neutrals becomes even greater when we substitute, in place of attack by foreign communist forces, "a serious insurgency problem led by an indigenous communist movement." Then there is no longer a majority of businessmen prepared to use military force on behalf of the governments of *any* of these countries; moreover Thailand joins India and Yugoslavia as nations where a clear majority of the executives would stay out entirely. All this despite the fact that we deliberately labeled the attacking or insurgent forces as "communist."

The same questions were put to a similar sample of senior military officers—more than 600 colonel and lieutenant-colonel level officers of all services attending the war colleges, usually en route to highly responsible staff and command positions. A majority of them were ready to add Brazil, Japan, and Thailand to the list of countries they would defend by force from communist invasion. But still they would use American military forces against communist insurgents only in Mexico.

Now of course these are highly abstract, hypothetical situations, and the choice among the three options is hardly more than a parody of the enormously complex set of options that would in fact be at the disposal of a policy maker in a real world situation. Faced with the reality of an attack or insurgency against an important United States ally the respondents might be much more prepared to approve the use of force. Their statements in the abstract ought not to be used as though they

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were predictive. Nevertheless, the apparent reluctance to be drawn into an overseas war is striking. All these results, but especially those for the business executives, seem very strange coming from a formerly "internationalist" elite. Nor do they fit very well with neo-Marxist theories about imperialism.

Even those business executives who do not advocate substantial cuts in the defense budget seem unconvinced that such reductions really would have important deleterious effects on the United States. We offered several options as to possible increases or decreases in defense spending: only 15 percent chose the rather extreme "25 percent or more" cut option. But when we asked "Do you think a 25 percent reduction in defense spending would have an adverse effect on American security vis-à-vis other nations?" only 52 percent answered "yes" (as compared with 85 percent who favored smaller cuts, or none). Just 33 percent thought such a large cut "would have an adverse effect upon the American economy," and only 38 percent thought "a retrenchment of U. S. foreign policy commitments would have a negative effect on U. S. economic expansion abroad."

This last response is terribly important to a balanced understanding of what has been happening in the minds of American corporate executives. Certainly there is evidence of a massive decline of enthusiasm for American *political* and *military* commitments abroad. But their interest in, and expectation of, expanding *economic* activities in foreign countries remains. We asked three questions about expectations for American business expansion overseas in the next decade. In response to these questions 83 percent anticipated an increase in American involvement in foreign markets and foreign investment; 98 percent expected American business transactions with Russia and China to increase substantially; and 62 percent thought that American sales and investments in the less developed countries would increase relative to similar activities in developed countries. Expectations were a little more tempered when we substituted "your own firm" for "American business transactions" generally; the numbers then fell off to 85 percent, 60 percent, and 54 percent respectively for executives from the "Fortune 500" industrial corporations—not really a substantial drop.

Just as vital to understanding this world view is the executives' image of trade as contributing to peaceful political relations. We asked them to choose, from a fairly long list of possibilities (including, among others, strengthening international institutions, military superiority, a balance of power, and arms control) what they considered to be "the most important approach to world peace." Almost 62 percent chose the category "trade, technical cooperation, economic interdependence." Conversely, only 19 percent chose, as the most important cause of *war*,

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the category "economics (scarcity, drive for profits, technical dynamism)." Many executives were especially enthusiastic about the broader international implications of greatly expanded commerce with Russia, Eastern Europe, and China. They see the globe as economically interdependent, ultimately with beneficial political effects. This is a retreat from power, but no simple "isolationist" turning away from the world.

The Sense of Threat: Past and Present

What is apparent here is that Americans in general, and elites in particular, see international affairs as less threatening than they once did. When asked, "Do you think the external threat of communism to U. S. security has increased, decreased, or remained the same over the last decade?" only 15 percent of the businessmen perceived an increase, and 58 percent saw a decline. Almost half thought American involvement in war during the next decade was "improbable" or "highly improbable," and just 30 percent put the odds at 50–50. Only 19 percent regarded it as "probable" or "highly probable." Less than 10 percent thought that any war that might arise would involve use of nuclear weapons.

Finally, we asked them to choose from a list of "major problems facing the United States today." The percentage naming each of the five as "the most serious" follows:

Domestic order and stability	37%
Social and racial disparities within the United States	20
World ecological problems: Pollution and population pressures	18
National and socialist movements in less developed countries	15
Military and technological advances of China and Russia	9

"Traditional" cold war concerns came in last. The highest ranking international issue was the new set of environmental problems, and even it ranked behind domestic problems of order and justice. And the particular content of a person's foreign-policy preferences makes little difference to this ranking. Those who remain hawks, as well as those who are doves, agree in rating foreign policy problems as the least important.

The cold war sense of urgent threat is gone from most Americans' political consciousness. One may or may not be surprised, given the searing effects of Vietnam on American politics. In some ways it is surprising that the change of mood was so long delayed. In 1950 Gabriel Almond published his perceptive book, *The American People and Foreign Policy*.[9] He argued that Americans' interest in foreign policy was highly susceptible to changes of mood, that a sense of threat might be rapidly

[9] Rev. ed. (New York, 1960).

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followed by a sense of complacency, and that these fluctuations in public opinion severely endangered efforts to build a stable foreign policy upon a realistic assessment of long-term risks to the nation's security. He, and many other academics as well as government officials, felt that this tendency to instability demanded a substantial effort to educate the American public about the complexity of international affairs and the abiding nature of America's problems. In light of experience during the "isolationist" 1920s and 1930s this was an altogether understandable assessment. It was reasoning like this that led Senator Vandenberg, in declaring that he supported Harry Truman's 1947 proposals for aid to Greece and Turkey, to urge the president to "go and scare hell out of the country." Only by determined efforts could a stable political base for an internationalist foreign policy be secured.

In fact that base was secured, as the data on approval of defense spending in Figure 1 illustrate. Subsequent research on Americans' foreign policy attitudes led to the conclusion that mood swings were not large during the cold war period.[10] The oscillations were soon damped, and stability was the rule. Quite the opposite of violent mood swings, many analysts of the period conclude that the "educational" campaign to awaken Americans to their external responsibilities and dangers succeeded all too well. This is evident, for example, in several interpretations of the Vietnam discussions as revealed in the Pentagon papers.

According to this view, American policy makers became imprisoned by popular anticommunism even though, in most cases, the policy makers themselves were too sophisticated really to share the popular perspective. The "loss" of China to the communists in 1948 was exploited heavily by the Republicans for political purposes. In the wake of anticommunist sentiment deliberately set in motion by political leaders of both parties, McCarthyite hysteria began to take hold in wide sectors of the populace, and to be felt especially keenly by politicians. Almost every political figure with any kind of liberal background or inclinations felt vulnerable to witch-hunting accusations that he was "soft on communism," or worse. In the words of former Senator Sam Ervin as he recalled the days of Joseph McCarthy, "You can't believe the terror that man spread among politicians."[11]

Thus politicians feared to loose still further a popular anticommunism which would punish them for foreign policy defeats, and became constrained by anticommunism even when they did not accept its premises. Believing that the people would not tolerate the "loss" of Vietnam, senior

[10] William R. Caspary, "The Mood Theory: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, 64, no. 2 (June 1970), 536–547.

[11] Seminar at Yale University, February 13, 1974.

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elected and appointed officials in Washington therefore resolved that Vietnam would not be lost—at least during their own terms in office. They would hang on, and escalate where necessary to avoid defeat, even though they knew the long-term prospects for holding the country were poor. They could hope to postpone the day of reckoning to a time when they themselves would not be held responsible, and perhaps to a time when the mood of the country would change so that the defeat would not be turned into a major threat to free institutions in America. Meanwhile they could hope, against the evidence available to them, that events might break favorably so that the ultimate outcome would not be disastrous. By some interpretations this kind of thinking can be found in every administration from Truman to Nixon.[12]

If this view is correct—and it rings true to many observers as at least a partial explanation of why American foreign policy went wrong, if not as *the* explanation—the new fact is simply that the situation has now changed enormously. The great backlog of popular anticommunism and determination to fight just no longer exists. Some hawks of course remain, but many are gone (dead, retired, or converted) and those who are left speak less often and less vigorously. The point is not whether their assessment of the external dangers to America in the 1950s was correct, or whether the current assessment of greatly diminished (or never serious) dangers is correct. Rather it is that people's beliefs are very different now, and that the constraints on policy makers are thus different. Many observers have held further that the sense of external threat during the cold war years became a force delaying reforms in American domestic society. Often foreign policy hawks and domestic policy conservatives were the same, or at least in alliance. When external events seemed to strengthen the political position of the hawks, the conservatives also waxed. In an atmosphere of external danger, questioning about whether American institutions really were serving fundamental American values was suppressed. It was not a time to encourage domestic experimentation, and in any case resources seemed too scarce. Priority went to military expenditures, often drawn directly from funds that would otherwise have gone to investment or to public civil programs for health, education, or urban development.[13] It may now become possible to try once again to meet some of these needs.

[12] This seems basically to be the interpretation of Daniel Ellsberg, "The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine," *Public Policy*, 19, no. 2 (Spring 1972), 217–274. See also Leslie Gelb, "Vietnam: The System Worked," *Foreign Policy*, no. 3 (Summer 1971), and Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest*.

[13] Evidence for this is in Bruce M. Russett, *What Price Vigilance? The Burdens of National Defense* (New Haven, Conn., 1970), chap. 5.

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A Passing Generation

The end of cold war ideology in American life can be attributed to a combination of change of minds and change of bodies. For the latter, we now have in the electorate a whole generation of voters with no adult memory of American participation in World War II or even of the beginnings of the cold war. For those who took part in it, World War II was a glorious crusade against a force of undoubted evil. Its success set some mental precedents for American acts on the world stage under circumstances where the danger was more ambiguous and the prospects for success less certain. Nevertheless these attitudes did carry over into the cold war period for the containment of communism, and again were reinforced by the substantial success of these policies in the early years. Thus a whole generation was imprinted with beliefs about the power and responsibilities of the United States in the world arena. Now we have a new cohort of voters who not only do not share this imprinting, but instead are imprinted by the Vietnam tragedy and its entirely opposite "lessons." This new cohort is far less ready to accept the standard arguments for an interventionist foreign policy or the need for large armed forces.

Some data may illustrate what has happened. In the September 1970 survey about military spending, 60 percent of voters under thirty wanted to reduce military spending, whereas only 46 percent of those thirty and over gave such an answer. Similarly, an analysis of behavior in Congress has shown that representatives born after 1920 (which made them relatively young in the Congress of 1970) or first elected *after* the McCarthy years are markedly more dovish and more skeptical of military spending than are their older colleagues.[14] Many of these younger, more dovish, congressmen are relatively new to the Capitol; others have changed their views from a hawkish position while in Congress. As many of the older members die, retire from office, or are defeated for reelection the shift in the center of gravity of foreign policy position in Congress is almost certain to continue. Certainly not all old congressmen are hawks nor are all young ones doves—some of the exceptions, like former Senator Fulbright, are prominent enough—but this characterization holds in general.

Generational attitudinal changes are well-known phenomena in social science, and there is good evidence for their persistence long after the immediate stimuli have passed.[15] An explanation based on generational

[14] H. Wayne Moyer, "House Voting on Defense: An Ideological Explanation," in Bruce M. Russett and Alfred Stepan (eds.), *Military Force and American Society* (New York, 1973).

[15] See Davis Bobrow and Neal E. Cutler, "Time-Oriented Explanation of Na-

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effects helps to make sense of the now quite famous data presented by Frank Klingberg, and which have been updated here to 1974.[16] Figure 2 shows the percentage of annual presidential messages, since 1790, devoted to foreign affairs. The annual data have been smoothed out into ten-year averages (except for the most recent, shorter period) so as to clarify the main characteristics. What is evident is a roughly forty-year cycle from trough to trough, with the cycle for the latter half of the nineteenth century somewhat foreshortened and the following one lengthened accordingly. Certainly these data should not be treated mechanically for an exercise in curve-fitting; the time-span is much too short to allow us to be very confident in any cyclical interpretation or prediction. But the other evidence available on generational changes provides a theoretically plausible interpretation for the Klingberg data.

However, it is not *only* a generational phenomenon that has occurred. In the September 1970 survey discussed above, we noted that even of those more than thirty years old, 46 percent wanted to see the military budget cut. In addition to the imprinting or conversion of the young, many of the not-so-young have changed their minds—and it is important to know what kinds of people the latter are. For the most part, it is typically the liberal on domestic policy, especially on matters of income distribution, civil rights, and civil liberties. In the 1950s there was little association of domestic liberalism with the point of view we would now term dovish. A large number of liberals in fact took pride in being identified as liberal internationalists or globalists, a posture which in its foreign policy component included foreign aid, alliance commitments for the defense of other states in the Free World, and high levels of military preparedness. Samuel Huntington reports that in Congress, northern Democrats were as likely to support higher defense expenditures as were either Republicans or southern Democrats.[17] John Kennedy could in 1960 campaign both as a liberal and against failures of the Republican

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tional Security Beliefs: Cohort, Life Stage, and Situation," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers*, 8 (1967), 31–37, and Neal E. Cutler, "Generational Succession as a Source of Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1 (1970), 33–47. The classic paper is Karl Manheim, "The Problem of Generation," in his *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1959). An excellent review of work is to be found in Alan B. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem of Generations," *American Historical Review*, 755 (December 1973), 1353–1385.

[16] Frank Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, 4, no. 2 (January 1952), 252–253. See also the excellent article by Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms," *Political Science Quarterly*, 89, no. 3 (Fall 1974), 563–588. Note that the Klingberg data as presented here coincide almost perfectly with the alternating periods Roskin describes: 1890s–1919 intervention, 1920s and 1930s isolation, etc.

[17] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York, 1961), pp. 254–259.

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FIGURE 2

Percentage of President's Annual Messages Devoted to Foreign Affairs, Ten-Year Averages, 1790–1974



administration to keep up the nation's military guard and to prevent emergence of the alleged (and illusory) "missile gap." Many liberals today recall in rather embarrassed silence the "internationalist" rhetoric of Kennedy's inaugural address.

Liberals nevertheless saw themselves, and in large degree rightly so, as moderates on these foreign policy issues, desirous of an active American role in making the world safer, richer, and more democratic while avoiding what they termed hysterical anticommunism and military "pactomania" on the one hand and isolationist withdrawal on the other. Liberals were prominent in the arms control movement, "realistically" dismissing the "utopian" hopes of general disarmament but working arduously for limited measures to tame and stabilize the balance of terror through negotiation with the Soviet Union and lesser reliance on nuclear weapons, especially the threat of massive retaliation, to deter all kinds of attacks everywhere. This is the context in which the enthusiasm for built-up capabilities for conventional and counterinsurgency wars should be seen. In the same vein Andre Modigliani found, rather than

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an isolationist-internationalist dimension, that foreign policy attitudes during the Korean war could better be characterized as in one of three quite distinct directions: supporters of the administration's limited war policy; those who wanted more vigorous military effort to bring victory, *à la* Douglas MacArthur; and those who wanted the United States to withdraw rapidly without much regard for the consequences.[18] The first generally fit the image of liberal internationalists, the second and the third were different kinds of "conservatives."

This middle-of-the-road international image of the liberals fits with most of the quantitative evidence available for the period. For example, Leroy Rieselbach, and others before him, found essentially no systematic relations between congressmen's voting on domestic and foreign policy issues.[19] As for members of the public at large, Norman Nie found really no correlation (actually an average of —.05) between foreign policy attitudes and a liberal position on several domestic policy items ("integration," "black welfare," and "social welfare" issues).[20]

As we all know, however, that situation has by now changed dramatically. A basic divergence of beliefs on ends as well as on the means of American foreign policy has emerged, and divergences on this matter frequently coincide with divergences on domestic policy. In Nie's examination of the major public opinion surveys, the correlation between liberal attitudes on various domestic issues and "dovish" ones on cold war international issues jumped to .25 in 1964—before Vietnam—and remained at essentially that level in the 1968 and 1971 surveys. The same kind of change occurred among elites, though possibly it took place a bit later. For example, the present author found in the ninetieth Congress (1967–1968) quite a substantial correlation between Senate voting on defense and foreign policy issues on the one hand, and civil rights and urban affairs on the other. This is a new finding, not present in the analysis made of the Eighty-seventh Congress (1961–1962) or in those made by previous scholars. More relevant still are Moyer's data on the House of Representatives.[21] He found a strong (.82) correlation

[18] Andre Modigliani, "Hawks and Doves, Isolationism and Political Distrust: An Analysis of Public Opinion on Military Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI, no. 3 (September 1972), 960–978.

[19] Leroy N. Rieselbach, *The Roots of Isolationism* (Indianapolis, Ind., 1966), and Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958).

[20] Norman Nie, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *Journal of Politics*, XXXVI, no. 3 (August 1974), 540–591.

[21] Russett, *What Price Vigilance?* chap. 2, and Moyer, "House Voting on Defense." See also Robert A. Bernstein and William W. Anthony, "The ABM Issue in the Senate, 1967–1970: The Importance of Ideology," *American Political Science Review*, LXVIII, no. 3 (September 1974), 1198–1206.

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in 1967–1968 between dovish votes on cold war foreign policy issues and a liberal position on civil liberties, as well as weaker correlations between a cold war scale and favorable attitudes toward government spending and also a generally liberal position on domestic politics. In the Ninety-first Congress (1969–1970) voting on a defense or "preparedness" scale also correlated very highly (.87) with scales for urban and race affairs, government spending, and domestic liberalism in general. Thus by 1969 and 1970 congressmen saw all these issues as closely interrelated, in a way that they had not only a few years before. The reason seems obvious enough. Liberals saw the heavy costs, in terms of their preferred domestic policies, being imposed by an activist foreign policy in general and by the Vietnam experience in particular: alienation, police repression, and especially demotion of spending priorities for health, urban affairs, and education because of military commitments. By the 1970s there are few liberal hawks showing the kind of "liberal messianism" associated with some members of the Kennedy administration.

Similar evidence emerges from our survey of business executives, confirming this view that foreign policy issues were brought into line with domestic policy preferences. Of the businessmen who thought it had been a mistake to get into the Vietnam war, 38 percent gave damage to American social and political institutions as the reason—more citing this than any other single reason and far more (7 percent) than those citing damage to the American economy. We asked the businessmen whether they considered themselves better or worse off as a result of the war and why. Of those who said "worse" and indicated a reason, economic reasons were cited frequently (by 42 percent), but the number listing some version of damage to American political institutions or diversion of resources away from social priorities was still greater (over 46 percent). A few quotations illustrate how executives linked these issues in their minds. Among the war's opponents:

> The most important ill effect of the Vietnam War on the United States has been on the level of morality, the becoming inured to "kill ratios," mass killing of civilians along with military disregard for human life. These have been accompanied by erosion of individual rights and privacy in the United States.

> It brought out the worst kind of actions on the part of our government officials—using any means, such as lying to the people and to Congress, that they thought justified by the end: trickery, sacrificing great virtue in our system.

Still another lamented "the pain of conscience, the shame and guilt of a racist war, the setback to social and economic progress." Among the en-

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tire samples of businessmen and military officers, by far the best "predictor" of hawk-dove *foreign* policy preference was conservative-liberal position on *domestic* issues, which was much better than information on life experience or economic interests.

The pervasiveness and the relative recency of this particular consistency of domestic and foreign policy beliefs may surprise us, but the fact that people often impose some such consistency should not. The literature on ideology, how people order their thoughts and information so as to interpret new facts, is massive. Ole Holsti states the general view well when he calls a "belief system"

> . . . a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics. . . . In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behavior, the belief system has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences.[22]

More recently, social scientists have turned with great interest to theories of "cognitive processing," stressing the deductive elements of an ideology, the "decision calculus" whereby new items are interpreted, usually in a way that makes sense of the new without importantly modifying the old beliefs. Analogizing from the past, as well as overt deduction, also is a common mechanism. Thus one may equally evoke the memory of Munich as a "guide" to negotiation with an adversary as deduce an orderly set of propositions leading from general rules to the specific situation. All the literature on cognitive dissonance, and its resolution, is in some degree also relevant here.

We know that basic policy attitudes do not change drastically in response to single events, even dramatic ones. Any way one looks at the matter, it takes repeated, and deep, shocks to the effectiveness of old beliefs before they shift markedly. The first reaction is typically to deny that a new piece of information is really accurate, or to deny its importance if accurate. Or old views may be shifted temporarily, but reassert themselves when the new piece of information is no longer salient. But repeated prominent events, all supplying stimuli in the same direction, do have the ability to change attitudes in a substantial part of the population.[23] The Vietnam war, composed actually of many traumatic political events spread over almost a ten-year period and supplemented by

[22] Ole R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI, no. 3 (September 1967), 245.

[23] See Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in Herbert Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis* (New York, 1965).

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detente, the American rapprochement with China, and other such developments, could produce such changes. Even after Vietnam is no longer prominent in conscious memory, the effects of the past decade will remain in people's minds, carrying through most of their remaining political lives. In this way it affects many people of all ages, not only those of a young and impressionable political generation. Together, this imprinting of a new generation and the conversion of many in the older one give us good reason to believe that a *long-term* change in American foreign policy interest and attitudes has occurred, and that it will be some *years before it is effectively reversed.*

To the extent that this interpretation is correct, the current and recent American debates over detente should be seen in a new light. Since the Yom Kippur war and renewed difficulties in negotiating strategic arms agreements with the Soviet Union, detente seems to have lost some of its thrust, further efforts to cut the defense budget have failed, and trade agreements with the Soviet Union have languished. Some of the old hawks have been joined, in partial coalition, by people who are uneasy about the consequences of a new tilt to American policy in the Middle East. Further progress in East-West relations has been slow. Yet if the above thesis is accepted, then these recent resistances should be seen primarily as minor fluctuations, akin to quite small year-to-year variations in economic activity over the longer and much more pronounced ups and downs of the long-term business cycle. Popular desires for a retreat from world power will remain strong for quite a while, and those dependent on American foreign policy might as well come to grips with the implications of those desires.

It is important, while recognizing the likelihood that generational phenomena are relevant, not to exaggerate the similarities between the 1970s and the years between the two great wars. A full return to the isolationism of that period is unimaginable. American economic and political involvement in the world is too great to permit it, popular attitudes have not gone that far, and responsible political leaders surely would not allow it. Nor are we seeing a revolution in attitudes like that which, in reverse, produced the outward thrust of internationalism in the 1940s. To make such an extreme argument would merely be to parody the view expressed here.

By the same token, only a Nostradamus could predict specific policy changes to follow from the attitudinal change. Surely it will become progressively harder to maintain the full American troop presence in Western Europe, to keep up what remains of the credibility of the deterrent umbrella for America's allies, and to sustain the level of military spending at even the current share of gross national product. Former President Nixon tried to do all these things, probably with greater deter-

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mination and greater success than his successor is likely to do. Even "Scoop" Jackson as president would be constrained by this new public mood. A round of belligerence by the major Communist states would make a difference, but would probably have to be both dramatic and sustained to make a very great difference.

Why Public Opinion Matters

We should recognize too that we have been discussing material about public opinion, or rather the opinion of various publics—mass, attentive, and elites—and not the beliefs and attitudes at the very top of the foreign policy decision-making system. More than in domestic policy, foreign policy makers do have some latitude to act independently of public opinion. Despite the constraints, they may persist for a while even if general opinion lags behind, and they may work to educate the public and bring it along to accept the policies the decision makers believe are right. We have good evidence of the decision latitude for a long time available to American presidents on Vietnam, when there was a potential majority available to be mobilized either for moderate escalation or moderate withdrawal, according to the direction in which the president chose to lead.[24] Also, the "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon of crisis behavior is well known.[25]

The effects of flag rallying are nevertheless short-term ones, and the period of its relevance becomes ever shorter the more frequently it is invoked. And many kinds of foreign policy behavior are not suitable for rallying the populace as in a crisis. The year-in, year-out maintenance of troop levels and weapons capabilities requires congressional approval under circumstances where the tradeoffs in terms of domestic welfare can become vividly apparent. A credible plan for any military action short of all-out nuclear war demands a public prepared to make sacrifices for a sustained military effort. It is one thing for a commander-in-chief to be able to order troops into a conflict without seeking prior approval; it is quite another to keep those troops there for months or years in light of the new assertion of congressional prerogatives in this area.

It also has been said that it is not public opinion that matters, but what decision makers *think* is public opinion. By this reasoning, policy makers will implement the new mood only if they perceive it in its depth and breadth. To the extent they are isolated from it they will go on as before. Such a belief assumes, however, that decision makers are not subject

[24] Sidney Verba et al., "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *American Political Science Review*, 61, no. 2 (June 1967), 317–333.

[25] See John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York, 1973).

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to effective sanctions when they seriously misperceive public opinion over long periods. Whatever may be the case in some political systems, I doubt that is true in the American democracy. Politicians have very effective ways, certainly not limited to public opinion polling, to discover what their constituents want and how strongly they want it. The penalties for consistent misperception are simple enough—loss of office. Two former presidents could readily enough testify to those penalties. Then, too, we have been discussing the climate of opinion in which policy makers themselves form their own ideas; no man is an intellectual island, and surely no politician is. Top policy makers typically are somewhat older than the average of their countrymen, members of an earlier generation and in any case are subject to the particular formative experiences of their political roles. Therefore they by no means simply reflect their countrymen like a perfect mirror. But the differences can easily be exaggerated. Moreover, the people in powerful positions immediately below the chief, placing upon him the dual constraints constituted by intelligence sources and policy executers in any hierarchy, are rapidly being infiltrated by the new generation. Already the generation that knows Vietnam but not World War II is forty years old.[26]

America's Real Interests in the World

Finally, we should say some small thing about the implications of this basic attitude change for the pursuit of a foreign policy compatible with "real" American "interests." Obviously there are myriad "national interests," with as many assessments as assessors. Any such evaluation is bound to be subjective, reflecting the writer's own prejudices. If we were to limit the discussion to East-West superpower relations, I think I would find myself not very disturbed, and might even be heartened, by the new attitudes. It seems to me that cold war anticommunism has long outlived whatever usefulness it had. Renewed efforts for detente are essential and to be welcomed, and the shift in mood makes them easier and perhaps even imperative for American leaders. This does indeed imply some relaxed assessments about the degree to which the Communist powers are able, or rather unable, to mount really serious threats to really serious American interests in the next decade or two. If one is more pessimistic about those threats over a longer period, then one can take con-

[26] Even Bernard Cohen, at the end of a book highly critical (and appropriately so) of many assertions about the importance of public opinion as an actual constraint on decision makers, concludes with "the paradox that a policy making system which has mastered all the modes of resistance to outside opinion nevertheless seems, from a long-run perspective, to accommodate to it." *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston, 1973), p. 205.

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solation from the possible upturn in "internationalism" with the next turn of the foreign policy cycle as the current generation too passes by around 2000 A.D.

But a focus merely on great power relations is myopic. It seems to me that the truly grave problems of international politics concern not relations among the "haves"—America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and even in some respects China—but rather relations between the rich and the poor. We live in a world of rising frustration as development efforts falter while images of rich people living well in their Northern Hemisphere citadels are diffused ever more widely across the globe. Modern communications have come to the poor world not in sufficient force to bring substantial economic development, but enough to bring information about how well a rich minority is managing. With the crumbling of traditional religious beliefs and acknowledgment of authority, these rising frustrations are accompanied by a falling threshold of tolerance for frustration. The weapons of destruction come increasingly into the hands of those ready to use them. Sometimes those hands control governments, more often now they control nongovernmental or transnational organizations quite prepared to take actions for which they cannot effectively be held responsible. The IRA, the Palestinian guerrillas, the Tupamaros are portents of things to come, with grievances deeply felt and often widely acknowledged as just. Many transnational actors, and even some governments of poor states, may be quite ready to go out with a nuclear bang if their frustrations cannot be assuaged. At the moment the world political anarchy is hardly prepared to cope either with the violent symptoms or with the basic human needs which underlie them.[27] Nor are standard military procedures likely to be effective.

An America turning away from the world, in a political if not an economic sense, will hardly make a sufficient contribution to meeting these problems. The current disillusionment with foreign aid is illustrative. By wide agreement the foreign economic assistance program failed to achieve either the goals it set itself or the goals which it should have set itself. As a result its political backing—always tenuous at best—has evaporated, and economic aid as a proportion of gross national product has fallen from a peak of 1.6 percent in the Marshall Plan years, or even .5 percent in 1962, to less than .2 percent now.[28] Perhaps that in itself is just as well, perhaps it was a misguided effort which could not treat the true causes of international poverty and inequality. But the tragedy is that nothing very much is coming up to replace it.

[27] These problems are discussed in Bruce Russett, *Power and Community in World Politics* (San Francisco, 1974), chap. 9.

[28] U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973* (Washington, D.C., 1973), p. 775.

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An American retreat from world action will do little to solve these basic problems. In some respects it may be better that the United States do nothing rather than continue some of the wrong things it has been doing, but that cessation alone would constitute a pretty minimal achievement. It is doubtful that the world's peoples will wait patiently for Americans to come naturally to their next period of looking outward.

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Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

Ever since the publication in 1965 of Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy*, scholars and laymen have developed a new interest in the relationship of the atomic bomb to wartime and postwar diplomacy and to the origins of the Cold War. This bold book revived and sometimes recast old themes and thereby sparked renewed interest in questions that once seemed settled: Why was the atomic bomb dropped on Japan? Why weren't other alternatives vigorously pursued? How did the bomb influence American policy before and after Hiroshima? Did the dropping of the bomb and postwar American atomic policies contribute to the cold war?[1]

Unfortunately many studies of these questions have focused exclusively on the Truman period and thereby neglected the Roosevelt administration, which bequeathed to Truman a legacy of assumptions, options, and fears. Acting on the assumption that the bomb was a legitimate weapon, Roosevelt initially defined the relationship of American diplomacy and

[1] Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York, 1965); Gar Alperovitz, *Cold War Essays* (New York, 1970), pp. 51–73. For a critical discussion of the literature, see Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb and American Foreign Policy, 1941–1945: An Historiographical Controversy," *Peace and Change*, II (Spring 1974), 1–16.

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN is associate professor of history at Stanford University and a Hoover Peace Fellow. He has edited, and contributed to, *Towards a New Past* and *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*. A volume on the 1952 presidential election and a short study of the atomic bomb, *Hiroshima Reconsidered*, will appear in 1975.

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the atomic bomb. He decided to build the bomb, to establish a partnership on atomic energy with Britain, to bar the Soviet Union from knowledge of the project, and to block any effort at international control of atomic energy. These policies constituted Truman's inheritance—one he neither wished to abandon nor could easily escape. He was restricted politically, psychologically, and institutionally from critically reassessing this legacy.

Like Roosevelt, Truman assumed that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and also understood that it could serve as a bargaining lever, a military counterweight, a threat, or a combat weapon in dealing with the Soviet Union in the postwar world. In addition to speeding the end of the war, the combat use of the bomb, the Truman administration understood, offered the United States great advantages in the postwar world. Policy makers assumed that use of the bomb would help shape the world in a desirable mold: The bomb would impress the Soviets and make them more tractable. Contrary to some contentions, this consideration about the postwar world was not the controlling reason why the United States used the bomb. Rather, it was an additional reason reinforcing an earlier analysis. Ending the war speedily was the primary purpose; impressing the Soviet Union was secondary. This secondary aim did constitute a subtle deterrent to reconsidering combat use of the bomb and to searching for alternative means of ending the war. Had the use of the bomb threatened to impair, rather than advance, American aims for the postwar peace, policy makers would have been likely to reassess their assumptions and perhaps to choose other alternatives.

Roosevelt and the Bomb

America's policies on atomic energy began in the Roosevelt administration. In October 1941, nearly two months before Pearl Harbor, he sanctioned a major research project to investigate whether, and at what cost, the United States could build an atomic bomb. Vannevar Bush, scientific adviser to the president and chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, had already counseled Roosevelt that it could be a decisive instrument capable of winning the war and shaping the peace. If it could be constructed, he wrote, "it would be a thousand times more powerful than existing explosives, and its use might be determining."[2] Even allowing for Bush's possible exaggerations, Roosevelt undoubtedly thought that the bomb could be significant in war and in diplomacy, for he certainly understood that powerful weapons could speed the end of

[2] Bush to Roosevelt, July 16, 1941, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), Bush Folder, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library (hereafter FDRL), Hyde Park, N. Y.

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the war, strengthen American power, and influence the shape of the peace.

From the beginning, Roosevelt insisted upon great secrecy for the bomb project. The security apparatus was directed at Germany, our imminent enemy, and also at Russia, our potential ally.[3] The Grand Alliance, as Roosevelt understood, was conceived in necessity and based upon mutual need, not mutual trust. It was not even a trial marriage, simply an arrangement of convenience. While Roosevelt was prepared to assist the Soviet Union in defeating the Axis menace, and he hoped for an enduring postwar settlement with the Soviet Union, he seldom assumed that the postwar peace would be easy or that Russia would comfortably accede to America's design for a world of peace and prosperity based on self-determination and an economic open door.[4]

As the war dragged on, he began, reluctantly, to grant the Soviet Union a freer hand in Eastern Europe, but he acted not out of naiveté or enthusiasm but because the United States then lacked the power to block Soviet efforts. In 1943, he told Francis Cardinal Spellman that the postwar world might be divided into spheres of influence; and in 1944–1945, by signing the armistice agreements for the Balkan states and then by endorsing an empty, but noble-sounding Declaration of Liberated Europe at the Yalta conference, the president acceded to the establishment of a Soviet sphere in the Balkans. Yielding to exigency, Roosevelt temporarily retreated from his goals and accepted a world that he did not want: a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe with a closed economic and political door. But he also held in reserve great power—economic aid and probably atomic energy—that might allow him in the future to modify or reverse arrangements and to create an open-door world.[5]

For Roosevelt, the *specific* role of the bomb in achieving this ideal world remains unclear, and certainly the evidence is skimpy. But it is clear that by late 1942, if not earlier, he regarded the bomb as very useful, perhaps even as potentially dominant, in shaping the postwar world.[6] The future

[3] Bush to James Conant, October 9, 1941, Atomic Energy Commission (hereafter AEC), Doc. 17, Atomic Energy Commission Archives; Groves in U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, Transcript of Hearings Before Personnel Security Board* (Washington, 1954), p. 174; Leslie Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (New York, 1962), p. 141; Bush to Rudolph Forster, March 16, 1942, and Roosevelt to Bush, March 16, 1942, PSF, Bush Folder, FDRL.

[4] Barton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in Barton J. Bernstein (ed.), *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago, 1970), pp. 17–22. Also see: William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1962), pp. 204–218; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War, 1943–1945* (New York, 1968), pp. 1–388; cf. Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy, passim.*

[5] Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy," pp. 19–22, 30–31.

[6] Bush to president, March 9, 1942, and reply, March 11, 1942, AEC Docs. 30 and 32,

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role of the bomb, of course, would depend, among other matters, upon its actual power—whether it was ten, a hundred, or even a thousand times more powerful than earlier weapons. Also, whether the bomb would be used as a bargaining lever, military counterweight, threat, or weapon would depend upon Soviet resistance and American tactics.

In December 1942, Roosevelt acted to restrict scientific interchange on nuclear research with Britain, even at the risk of slowing down the bomb project, partly because he concluded—incorrectly—that an Anglo-Soviet treaty required Britain to share American nuclear secrets with the Soviets.[7] He relaxed this policy in July–August 1943 after Prime Minister Winston Churchill assured him that Britain would neither pass nuclear secrets to the Soviet Union nor even inform the Soviets of the fact of nuclear research.[8]

Roosevelt's policies of moving into a closer Anglo-American alliance on the bomb confronted opposition within the administration from Vannevar Bush and James B. Conant, Bush's deputy. They well understood and counseled the president on the diplomatic-international importance of the bomb: It could be a decisive weapon in shaping the peace. Because they did not want to share the fruits of America's nuclear research with Britain, which was contributing little to the partnership, they felt free to oppose an Anglo-American alliance on atomic energy and objected to Roosevelt's seeming willingness to strengthen it. They wanted America to be free to determine her own future policy on atomic energy and feared that an alliance with Britain would impair future relations with Russia by making international control impossible. They correctly concluded that Churchill would oppose any approach to the Soviet Union and that he wanted to use the bomb to deal with the Soviet Union in the postwar world.[9]

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also available in "S–1 Historical File B," Records of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (hereafter OSRD), box 3030, RG 277, National Archives; Bush to Roosevelt, December 16, 1942, in ibid.; and Bush to Roosevelt, June 17, 1942, Harrison-Bundy Files (hereafter H-B) 58, Records of the Manhattan Engineering District (hereafter MED), RG 77, National Archives.

[7] Military Policy Committee, "Report to the President," December 15, 1942, "S–1 Historical File B," OSRD; Stimson Diary, December 27, 1945, Stimson Papers, Yale University; Roosevelt to Bush, December 28, 1942, "S–1 Historical File B," OSRD; Richard Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, Vol. I, *The New World, 1939–1946* (University Park, Pa., 1962), pp. 267–268 (hereafter *New World*).

[8] Churchill to Hopkins, February 24 and 27, 1943; Bush to Hopkins, March 31, 1943; Churchill to Hopkins, June 10, 1943; Roosevelt to Churchill, July 20, 1943; Hopkins to president, July 20, 1943; all in Hopkins Papers, FDRL; Bush to Harvey Bundy, August 6, 1943, AEC Doc. 169; Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp. 273–280.

[9] Bush to Roosevelt, June 19, 1942, and Bush to Hopkins, March 31, 1943, Hopkins

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In August 1943, despite the opposition of Bush and Conant, Roosevelt moved to cement the alliance with Britain on atomic energy. At Quebec in August, Roosevelt signed an executive agreement providing, among other terms, that their two nations would "never use the bomb against each other," that they would "not use it against third parties without each other's consent," and that they would not "communicate any information [about it] . . . except by mutual consent." They had promised not to do what Roosevelt had foolishly once feared Churchill might do: give atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. It was an agreement, in summary, that had two key effects: It brought Britain and the United States closer together on atomic energy and excluded the Soviet Union from participation in an enterprise that, according to Churchill, Bush, Conant, and others, could produce a weapon that might dominate the postwar world.[10]

Some might contend that this agreement to exclude Russia did not express Roosevelt's own wishes and that he was innocent and naive, that he was swept along by the persuasive Churchill, or that the president did not understand the implications of the agreement. This "innocent-naive" interpretation can be faulted on various grounds—especially because Roosevelt had been tutored on the value of the bomb and because the agreement to exclude Russia confirmed Roosevelt's policy and actions of 1942 and was confirmed again in 1944 by two Anglo-American agreements. "Both Roosevelt and Churchill knew," concludes the official Atomic Energy Commission history, "that the stake of their diplomacy was a technological breakthrough so revolutionary that it transcended in importance even the bloody work of carrying the war to the heartland of the Nazi foe."[11]

In June 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill signed an agreement that their two nations would cooperate in seeking control of the ores (uranium and thorium) thought necessary for an atomic bomb. That meant an Anglo-American monopoly and, in effect, barred the Soviet Union. In September 1944, in the Hyde Park agreement, Roosevelt reaffirmed the exclusion of the Soviet Union. He and Churchill rejected "the suggestion that the world should be informed regarding . . . [the bomb project], with a view

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Papers; Conant to Bush, December 14, 1942, AEC Doc. 149; Bush to Conant, December 22, 1942; AEC Doc. 150; Bush, "Memorandum of Conference with President," June 24, 1943, AEC Doc. 133; Conant to Bush, July 30, 1943, "British Liaison Special," OSRD, box 3031; Bush, "Memorandum to File," August 4, 1943, AEC Doc. 168; Bush to Harvey Bundy, August 6, 1943; Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp. 273–280.

[10] "Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy," August 19, 1943, reprinted in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at Washington and Quebec* (Washington, 1970), pp. 1117–1118 (hereafter cited as *FRUS*, year and volume).

[11] Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, p. 280; see Richard Hewlett, "Comments on Martin Sherwin's Paper" (unpublished manuscript, AHA 1971 Convention), pp. 2–3.

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to an international agreement regarding its control and use." Primarily at Churchill's behest, they also decided that Niels Bohr, the Danish nuclear physicist who had pleaded with both leaders for international control, should be watched "to ensure" that he did not leak atomic secrets to the Soviets.[12]

Is there any evidence that Roosevelt was not following a consistent policy of excluding the Soviet Union? On possibly four occasions in 1944, three times with Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Roosevelt's old friend and administration gadfly, and once with Niels Bohr, the president apparently said he would move *toward* international control of atomic energy with the Soviet Union. Frankfurter, who learned independently about the secret bomb project, had first met privately with Bohr, who persuaded the justice that there were only two likely postwar alternatives—a nuclear arms race, which was undesirable, or some form of international control. In April, Frankfurter informed Roosevelt of this meeting and explained Bohr's fears that a nuclear arms race might result unless the United States informed Russia of the bomb research and sought an arrangement with the Soviets for controlling atomic energy. If the United States tried to maintain the secret, both Bohr and Frankfurter believed that postwar Soviet-American relations would be hopelessly embittered. Bohr, the Supreme Court justice explained, concluded that the Russians could independently build atomic weapons, so an approach to the Soviet Union was the only way of avoiding an arms race. Frankfurter, after discussing these issues for an hour and a half, left assured that Roosevelt was "plainly impressed by my account of the matter." The president even authorized Frankfurter to inform Bohr that he might tell "our friends in London that the President was most eager to explore the proper safeguards in relation to X [the atomic bomb]." According to Frankfurter, Roosevelt said that the problem of the bomb "worried him to death"[13] and, in the words of the British historian on atomic energy, "agreed that a solution of this problem might be more important than all the schemes for a world organization."[14]

In May, Bohr was rudely rebuffed by a suspicious and evasive Churchill,[15] but Frankfurter, who apparently discussed these issues on two

[12] For the agreement of June 13 and the aide-memoire of September 19, 1944, "Diplomatic History of the Manhattan Project," annexes 22a and 28, H-B 110. These documents are reprinted in various places, including Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945* (London, 1964), pp. 44–47.

[13] On the Frankfurter-Bohr meeting and the Frankfurter-Roosevelt meeting, Frankfurter to Lord Halifax, April 18, 1945, J. Robert Oppenheimer Papers (hereafter JROP), box 34, Library of Congress.

[14] Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy*, p. 350; Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp. 326–328.

[15] Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy*, pp. 351–358; Hewlett and Anderson, *New*

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other occasions with Roosevelt that summer, arranged for Bohr to see the president in August. On August 26, Bohr went to the White House to outline his fears and hopes, to warn against efforts to conceal the bomb from the Soviet Union and to maintain a nuclear monopoly, and to urge international cooperation and international control of atomic energy. At the end of their conversation, Roosevelt indicated that he agreed with the scientist, and Bohr departed happily believing that he had changed the course of policy and contributed to the cause of peace.[16]

How does one assess this evidence? Both Bohr, on one occasion, and Frankfurter, at least three times, concluded that Roosevelt agreed with Bohr's strategy. We may ask a series of questions to determine whether Roosevelt on these occasions was simply lulling and deceiving visitors, as was often his mode, or whether he was sincere. Did he take any action on the basis of these conversations to change policy? Is there any evidence that he even pursued with associates this proposed reversal of policy? No. Or did he move in the opposite direction from Bohr's program? Yes. The answers strongly suggest that Roosevelt was following his frequent practice of genial deception. He never took any action to implement Bohr's program, never discussed it with interest with any associate, but instead called for an investigation to determine how Frankfurter had learned about the bomb project,[17] supported Churchill's demand for surveillance of Bohr, in June and July moved closer to Britain on atomic energy, and in September agreed to exclude the Soviet Union and to strengthen the Anglo-American partnership. "If," as Martin J. Sherwin shrewdly notes, "Roosevelt was indeed worried to death about the effect the atomic bomb could have on Soviet-American postwar relations, he took no action to remove the potential danger, nor did he make any effort to explore the possibility of encouraging the Soviet postwar cooperation on the problem."[18] Instead, he was closing off or at least seriously delaying this matter, presumably in order to keep open other options—of us-

World, p. 326. Max Freedman (ed.), *Roosevelt and Frankfurter: Their Correspondence, 1928–1945* (New York, 1968), pp. 724–728 implies that there were three Frankfurter-FDR meetings on atomic energy.

[16] Aage Bohr, "The War Years and the Prospects Raised by Atomic Weapons," in Stefan Rozental (ed.), *Niels Bohr* (New York, 1967), pp. 206–207. In preparation for his meeting with Roosevelt, Bohr prepared a nine-page memorandum (Bohr "Memorandum," July 3, 1944, JROP), which Frankfurter summarized and introduced for FDR. See Frankfurter to Roosevelt, July 10, 1944, in Freedman, *Roosevelt and Frankfurter*, p. 738. Also see Bohr to Roosevelt, September 7, 1944, JROP, box 34 in which he again urged Roosevelt to approach the Soviets, for "the present moment [is] most favorable."

[17] Bush, "Memorandum of Conference," September 22, 1944, AEC Doc. 185.

[18] Martin Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U. S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941–1945," *American Historical Review*, LXXVIII (October 1973), 959; see also pp. 954–970 for an interpretation similar to mine. Also see Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and In-

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ing the bomb in a still undefined way to gain concessions from the Soviet Union. The president evidently thought, Bush complained after the Hyde Park agreement, that "he could join with Churchill in bringing about a US-UK post-war agreement . . . by which [the bomb] . . . would be held closely and presumably to control the peace of the world. . . ."[19]

Running through the tangled skein of America's wartime policy on atomic energy is the persistent evidence of concern about the Soviet Union. Roosevelt knew that the Soviets were gathering information about the bomb project, and on September 9, 1943, Henry L. Stimson, the secretary of war, informed the president that spies "are already getting information about vital secrets and sending them to Russia."[20] In late December 1944, at two sessions, they again discussed these issues. On December 31, Roosevelt told Stimson that he, too, was worried about how much the Soviets might know about the project, and they briefly discussed trading information for substantial Soviet concessions. As Stimson later summarized the conversation in his diary:

> I told him . . . that I knew they [Russia] were spying on our work but that they had not yet gotten any real knowledge of it and that, while I was troubled by the possible effect of keeping from them even now that work, I believed that it was essential not to take them into our confidence until we were sure to get a real quid pro quo from our frankness. I said I had no illusions as to the possibility of keeping permanently such a secret but that I did think that it was not yet time to share it with Russia. He said he thought he agreed with me.

They did not discuss the specific nature of the concessions, and perhaps Stimson and the president would not have agreed on how to use the bomb as a bargaining lever and what to demand from the Soviet Union. Whatever their unexplored differences on these issues, they did agree to continue for a period the same policy: exclusion of the Soviets.[21] "It was

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ternational Control of Atomic Energy, 1942–1946," *Journal of American History*, LX (March 1974), 1007–1009. Cf. Hewlett, "Comments on Sherwin."

[19] Bush, "Memorandum for Doctor Conant," September 25, 1944, AEC Doc. 280. Some historians interpret the September agreement as a *volte-face* and believe Roosevelt was sincere in his earlier dealings with Bohr and Frankfurter. But these historians ignore or minimize that the 1944 agreement *continued* Roosevelt's policy of excluding Russia. What requires explanation is his occasional, but only verbal, deviations from policy when he spoke with these two men. See James M. Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York, 1970), pp. 458–459; Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy*, pp. 358–359.

[20] Stimson Diary, September 9, 1943; USAEC, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, pp. 171–173, 259–265; and Groves (draft) to Roosevelt, August 23, 1943, misc. file 2, Top Secret Documents of Interest to Groves (hereafter TSDGroves), MED Records.

[21] Stimson Diary, December 31 and 30, 1944.

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quite clear," recorded General Leslie Groves, commanding general of the Manhattan Project, "that no one present was interested in bringing Russia into the picture, at least at this time."[22] It is less clear why Roosevelt and Stimson, faced with the realization that the Soviet Union knew about the American research, still did not want formally to notify the Soviets about the bomb project. There is no direct evidence on this subject, but probably they feared that formal disclosure would lead to explicit Soviet inquiries and then to demands for participation that American leaders were not prepared to handle. As long as the United States technically kept the project secret, the Soviets could never raise issues about the bomb without admitting their espionage.

On March 15, 1945, at their last meeting together, Stimson and Roosevelt again discussed atomic energy. Roosevelt acknowledged that he would have to choose between (1) continuing the policy of secrecy and the Anglo-American partnership that barred the Soviets or (2) moving to international control with a sharing of information. Under Roosevelt, there was no further resolution of these issues.[23] When he died in April, American policy had not advanced beyond the point where it had been in December.

Had Roosevelt lived, perhaps he would ultimately have reversed the policy of secrecy and decided to move toward international control in return for a *quid pro quo*—perhaps on Eastern Europe which he had "ceded" at Yalta to the Soviet Union. Any consideration of what "might have happened" is, of course, a matter of speculation, since the evidence is skimpy and oblique on what Roosevelt might have done. What is clear is that he had maintained the strategy of excluding the Soviets from knowledge of the bomb and of reserving the options of using it in the future as a bargaining lever, threat, military counterweight, or even a weapon against the Soviets.

It was not that he lacked opportunities to reverse his policy. He did not

[22] Groves, "Memorandum," December 30, 1944, Top Secret Manhattan Engineering District Files (hereafter TSMEDF), folder 24, MED Records. Groves's statement, of course, was technically about the meeting of December 30 but properly summarizes the prevailing sentiment of all three men.

[23] Stimson Diary, March 15, 1945. Also see J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, *The Mackenzie King Record* (Toronto, 1968), II, pp. 326–327, for Roosevelt told the Canadian prime minister on March 9, 1945, in King's words, "the time had come to tell them [the Soviets] how far the [atomic research] developments had gone" and implied, so King understood, that Churchill was blocking this overture because he was concerned about later commercial use. Actually, Churchill had often stressed that he cared primarily about the military power, not the commercial advantages, of atomic energy. Moreover, according to the Quebec agreement the president could restrict Britain's rights in the commercial and industrial area. Either King misunderstood Roosevelt or the president was disingenuous or confused, and the last is unlikely.

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want to change policy—at least not up to April. At Yalta, in February, for example, Roosevelt might have approached Stalin on the bomb, but the president neither discussed this subject nor the loan that the Soviets wanted, and thereby he simply kept open the options for the future of using economic leverage and the bomb to secure concessions.[24] His position, then, made possible the future strategy of "atomic diplomacy"—of using the bomb as an implied or explicit threat to influence negotiations and to compel concessions from the Soviets. Would he have practiced "atomic diplomacy"? Probably. But that answer is speculative and rests principally upon the theory that he would not have wasted the options he was jealously guarding.

Roosevelt and his advisers had more clearly defined another issue: the combat use of the bomb. From the inception of the project, when it was directed primarily against Germany, they usually assumed, and most policy makers never questioned, that the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used in combat. This assumption was phrased as policy on a number of occasions. In October 1942, for example, Stimson had directed Groves that the mission is "to produce [the bomb] at the earliest possible date so as to bring the war to a conclusion." Any time "that a single day could be saved," the general should save that day.[25] In 1944, policy makers were also talking comfortably about "*after* S–1 [the bomb] is used."[26] "At no time," Stimson later wrote, "did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in war."[27]

Actually there is some spotty evidence that Roosevelt was mulling over the possibilities of not using the bomb in combat or of using it only after a warning or demonstration. In the Hyde Park agreement of 1944, there is a brief passage that suggests that Roosevelt might have been unsure about using the bomb: "when a 'bomb' is finally available, it *might perhaps*, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they

[24] On the loan, see John M. Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries, 1941–1945* (Boston, 1967), III, p. 305.

[25] Quoted in Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: The Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (Boston, 1960), p. 621.

[26] See, for example, Harvey Bundy, "Memorandum to the Secretary," December 16 (emphasis added) and December 9, 1944, H-B 108; Derry to Groves, January 9, 1945, TSMEDF, Folder 4; Groves to J. Robert Oppenheimer, January 6, 1944, JROP. Also see FDR as reported in: Stimson Diary, October 29, 1942; Bush, "Memorandum of Conference with the President," June 24, 1943, AEC Doc. 133; Pickersgill and Forster, *Mackenzie King*, II, p. 326; Grace Tully, *F.D.R., My Boss* (New York, 1949), pp. 265–266. Also see *FRUS: Yalta* (1955), p. 384.

[27] Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Harper's*, February 1947, p. 98. (Hereafter Stimson, "Decision.")

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surrender."[28] Three days later, in a conference with Bush, Admiral William Leahy, and a British representative on atomic energy, the president, as Bush recorded then, briefly expressed some doubts:

> [T]he President raised the question of whether . . . [the bomb] should actually be used against the Japanese or whether it should be used only as a threat with full-scale experimentation [noncombat demonstration?] in this country. He did so, I believe, in connection with Bohr's apparent urging that a threat be employed against Germany, which would of course, I think, be futile. I stated that there were many sides to this question, that fortunately we did not need to approach it for some time, for certainly it would be inadvisable to make a threat unless we were distinctly in a position to follow it up if necessary. . . . [T]his [subject] could be postponed for quite a time, and the President agreed that the matter did not now need to be discussed.[29]

For ten weeks Roosevelt apparently let the matter slip from his mind, or at least there is no evidence that he discussed it with anyone—especially Stimson and Bush, who kept careful records on the subject. In early December, according to Dr. Alexander Sachs, a financier and gadfly whose testimony is not fully reliable, he discussed the bomb with the president. Roosevelt agreed with Sachs upon a test and warning before using the bomb against an enemy area, from which humans and animals would be evacuated.[30]

Because of certain clear errors in Sachs's testimony, analysts must exercise caution in using it. The Hyde Park agreement and Bush's memorandum, despite some troubling ambiguities, are reliable. But their significance is less clear. For even though Roosevelt had some doubts and apparently contemplated a warning or noncombat demonstration, he never discussed these subjects with anyone else in his last four months in the White House. Nor did anyone, even Bush, later recall this fleeting discussion or conclude that Roosevelt had serious doubts about whether the bomb was a legitimate weapon. Those who knew about the bomb at this

[28] (Emphasis added.) American officials did not know of these terms or even see the document until late June, for the agreement, because of code ("Tube Alloys"), was misfiled. After the British informed the United States of its terms and provided a copy, there is no evidence that anyone even noticed, much less stressed, the subjunctive phrasing (Stimson Diary, June 25, 1945). That phrasing had no influence on Truman's policy.

[29] Bush to Conant, September 23, 1944, AEC Doc. 186. William Leahy, *I Was There* (New York, 1950), p. 269 omits this discussion.

[30] Finney, "How FDR Planned to Use the A-Bomb," *Look*, March 14, 1950, p. 23, uncritically relates the tale of the alleged influence of Alexander Sachs on FDR and Sachs's December 1944 suggestion of "rehearsal demonstration" for Allied countries and a warning to the enemy before combat use—proposals Sachs later alleged FDR endorsed. Also see Henry Wallace diary, October 24, 1945, in John M. Blum (ed.), *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946* (Boston, 1973), pp. 499–500.

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time, and usually the president himself, believed that it was a legitimate weapon. Under Roosevelt, policy was conducted on that basis.[31]

Truman and the Bomb

When Harry S. Truman became president on April 12, 1945, he was only dimly aware of the existence of the Manhattan Project and unaware that it was an atomic-bomb project.[32] Left uninformed of foreign affairs and generally ignored by Roosevelt in the three months since the inaugural, the new president inherited a set of policies and a group of advisers from his predecessor. While Truman was legally free to reverse Roosevelt's foreign policies and to choose new advisers on foreign policy, in fact he was quite restricted for personal and political reasons. Because Truman was following a very prestigious president whom he, like a great many Americans, loved and admired, the new president was not free psychologically or politically to strike out on a clearly new course. Only a bolder man, with more self-confidence, might have tried critically to assess the legacy and to act independently. But Truman lacked the confidence and the incentive. When, in fact, he did modify policy—for example, on Eastern Europe—he still believed sincerely, as some advisers told him, that he was adhering to his predecessor's agreements and wishes. When seeking counsel on foreign affairs, he usually did not choose new advisers but simply drew more heavily upon those members of Roosevelt's staff who were more anti-Soviet and relied less upon those who were more friendly to the Soviet Union. Even in this strategy, he believed that he was adhering to the policies of his predecessor, who, in his last weeks, Truman stressed, had become more suspicious of Stalin, more distressed by Soviet action in Eastern Europe, and more committed to resisting Soviet encroachments.[33]

In the case of the international-diplomatic policy on the bomb, Truman was even more restricted by Roosevelt's decisions, for the new president inherited a set of reasonably clear wartime policies. Because Roosevelt had already decided to exclude the Soviets from a partnership on the bomb, his successor could not *comfortably* reverse this policy during the war—unless the late president's advisers pleaded for such a reversal or

[31] On September 30, 1944, perhaps in response to FDR's conversation eight days before, Bush and Conant briefly mentioned to Stimson the possibility of a demonstration and warning before combat use of the bomb. (Bush and Conant to Stimson, September 30, 1944, AEC Doc. 282.)

[32] Truman, *Memoirs: Year of Decisions* (New York, 1955), pp. 10 and 87; Stimson Diary, April 24 and 25, 1945.

[33] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 70–82; Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy," pp. 25–30.

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claimed that he had been about to change his policy. They did neither. Consider, then, the massive personal and political deterrents that blocked Truman from even reassessing this legacy. What price might he have paid at home[34] if Americans learned later that he had reversed Roosevelt's policy and had launched a bold new departure of sharing with the Soviets a great weapon that cost the United States $2 billion? Truman, in fact, was careful to follow Roosevelt's strategy of concealing from Congress even the dimensions of the secret partnership on atomic energy with Britain.[35]

Truman, depending as he did upon Roosevelt's advisers, could not easily reassess the prevailing assumption that the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used in combat against Japan. Truman lacked the will and the incentive to reexamine this assumption, and his dependence upon Roosevelt's advisers and the momentum of the project confirmed this tendency. Only one close adviser, Admiral William Leahy, may have later challenged the use of the bomb, but he was an old "war horse," an expert on explosives of another era, who had often proclaimed that the bomb would not work, that the scientists were duping the administration, and that they were squandering $2 billion.[36] His counsel could not outweigh the continuing legacy of assumptions and commitments, of advisers and advice, that Truman had inherited from Roosevelt. It was a subtle legacy, one that infiltrated decisions and shaped actions, so that Truman accepted it as part of his unquestioned inheritance. For Truman, the question would never be how openly to challenge this legacy, only how to fulfill it, how to remain true to it.

During his first weeks in office, Truman learned about the project from Stimson and from James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt's former director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion who was to become Truman's secretary of state. Byrnes, despite his recent suspicions that the project might be a scientific boondoggle, told Truman, in the president's words, that "the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war."[37] On April 25, Stimson discussed issues

[34] Because of the recent enthusiasm by some historians for arguing that Truman could not have avoided the polices leading to the Cold War since he was restrained by American public opinion, let me stress that I am presenting a different position: He did *not want* to alter the policy of excluding the Soviets from a wartime partnership, *and* public and congressional opinion *helped* deter him. See John L. Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York, 1972), esp. pp. 352–361; and Barton J. Bernstein, "Cold War Orthodoxy Restated," *Reviews in American History*, I (December 1973), 459–461.

[35] Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp. 456–459, 289–290.

[36] Leahy, *I Was There* p. 441.

[37] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 87. For Byrnes's recent doubts, see Byrnes to Roosevelt, March 3, 1945, TSMEDF 24.

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about the bomb more fully with Truman, especially the "political aspects of the S–1 [atomic bomb's] performance." The bomb, the secretary of war explained in a substantial memorandum, would probably be ready in four months and "would be the most terrible weapon ever known in human history [for it] . . . could destroy a whole city." In the future, he warned, other nations would be able to make atomic bombs, thereby endangering the peace and threatening the world. The bomb could be either a threat to or a guarantor of peace. "[I]n the light of our present position with reference to this weapon, the question of sharing it with other nations and, if so shared, upon what terms, becomes a primary question of our foreign relations," Stimson lectured the president. If "the problem of the proper use of this weapon can be solved, we would have the opportunity to bring the world into a pattern in which the peace of the world and our civilization can be saved."[38]

The entire discussion, judging from Stimson's diary record and Groves's memorandum, assumed that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that it would be used against Japan. The questions they discussed were not *whether* to use the bomb, but its relationship to the Soviet Union and the need to establish postwar atomic policies.[39] Neither Stimson nor Truman sought then to resolve these outstanding issues, and Truman agreed to his secretary's proposal for the establishment of a high-level committee to recommend "action to the executive and legislative branches of our government when secrecy is no longer in full effect."[40] At no time did they conclude that the committee would also consider the issue of whether to use the bomb as a combat weapon. For policy makers, that was not a question; it was an operating assumption.

Nor did Stimson, in his own charge to the Interim Committee, ever *raise* this issue. Throughout the committee's meetings, as various members later noted,[41] all operated on the assumption that the bomb would

[38] Stimson, "Memorandum for the President," April 25, 1945, and reprinted in Stimson, "Decision," pp. 99–100.

[39] Stimson Diary, April 25, 1945; Groves, "Memorandum to the Files . . . ," April 25, 1945, TSMEDF folder 24.

[40] Stimson, "Memorandum for the President," April 25, 1945. Stimson's invitation to committee members was similarly limited and did not include among specified committee responsibilities the question of whether the nation should use the bomb. (Stimson to Bush, May 4, 1945, H-B 77; also see Bush to Bundy, February 1, 1945, and Bundy to Stimson, May 1, 1945, H-B 77; and Harrison to Stimson, May 1, 1945, H-B 69.) Harrison's memo, for example, spoke of the need to solve problems in "the short time available *before actual military use.*" (Emphasis added.)

[41] Gordon Arneson, "Notes of an Informal Meeting of the Interim Committee, May 9, 1945, H-B 100; Arneson, "Memorandum for the Files," May 24, 1946, H-B 76; Bundy to Stimson, May 30, 1945, with enclosure, H-B 100; Arthur H. Compton, *Atomic Quest* (New York, 1956), p. 238. Minutes of the meetings are available in H-B 100. In his

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be used against Japan. They talked, for example, about drafting public statements that would be issued after the bomb's use. They did not discuss *whether* but how to use it. Only one member ultimately endorsed an explicit advance warning to Japan, and none was prepared to suggest that the administration should take any serious risks to avoid using the bomb.[42] At lunch between the two formal meetings on May 31, some members, perhaps only at one table, briefly discussed the possibility of a noncombat demonstration as a warning to Japan but rejected the tactic on the grounds that the bomb might not explode and the failure might stiffen Japanese resistance, or that Japan might move prisoners of war to the target area.[43]

What impact would the bomb have on Japan? At the May 31 meeting, the Interim Committee, joined by its four-member scientific advisory panel, discussed this question. Some felt, according to the minutes, that "an atomic bomb on an arsenal would not be much different in effect" from present bombing attacks. J. Robert Oppenheimer, the eminent physicist and member of the scientific panel, expecting that the bomb would have an explosive force of between 2,000 and 20,000 tons of TNT, stressed its visual effects ("a brilliant luminescence which would run to a height of 10,000 to 20,000 feet") and its deadly power ("dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile"). Oppenheimer's predictions did not answer the question. There were too many unknowns—about the bomb and Japan. According to the official minutes, Stimson concluded, with unanimous support: "that we could not concentrate on a civilian area; but we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible." At Conant's suggestion, "the Secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses."[44] ("I felt," Stimson later explained, "that

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essay-defense of the dropping of the bomb, Stimson falsely implied that the Interim Committee carefully considered the question of whether to use the bomb ("Decision," pp. 100–102).

[42] Ralph Bard, "Memorandum on the Use of the S–1 Bomb," June 27, 1945; and Harrison to Stimson, June 28, 1945, H-B 77. Bard, with the possible exception of Will Clayton, assistant secretary of state, was the only member who did not know about the bomb prior to appointment. He was, therefore, more able to be critical of earlier assumptions, and he was not committed by earlier actions to the bomb project.

[43] Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp. 357–359; Compton, *Atomic Quest*, pp. 238–239; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York, 1947), pp. 261–262, and James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, 1958), p. 285. Lewis Strauss, an assistant to Secretary Forrestal, endorsed a noncombat demonstration; Lewis Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (New York, 1962), pp. 192–193.

[44] Arneson, "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting . . . , 31 May 1945," H-B 100. On June 1, the committee, on Byrnes's recommendation, approved that "the bomb

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to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock . . . proof of our power to destroy the empire.")[45] The Interim Committee ruled out the strategy of several atomic strikes at one time, for, according to Groves, the United States would lose the benefit of additional knowledge from each successive bombing, would have to rush in assembling bombs and court error, and also would risk the possibility that multiple nuclear attacks "would not be sufficiently distinct from our regular Air Force bombing program."[46]

Two weeks later, after the Franck Committee recommended a noncombat demonstration,[47] Stimson's assistant submitted this proposal to the four-member scientific advisory panel for advice. The panel promptly rejected the Franck Committee proposal: "we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use."[48] Had the four scientists known that an invasion was not scheduled until November, or had they even offered their judgment after the unexpectedly impressive Alamogordo test on July 16, perhaps they would have given different counsel. But in June, they were not sure that the bomb explosion would be so dramatic, and, like many others in government, they were wary of pushing for a change in tactics if they might be held responsible for the failure of those tactics —especially if that failure could mean the loss of American lives.[49]

A few days after the panel's report, the issue of giving Japan an advance warning about the bomb was raised at a White House meeting with the president, the military chiefs, and the civilian secretaries. On June 18, after they agreed upon a two-stage invasion of Japan, beginning on about November 1, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy became clearly troubled by the omission of the bomb from the discussion and planning. When Truman invited him to speak, the assistant secretary

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should be used against Japan as soon as possible . . : on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes . . . /and/ without prior notice." (Ibid., June 1) He reported these conclusions to Truman.

[45] Stimson, "Decision," p. 101.

[46] "Notes of Interim Committee Meeting . . . , 31 May 1945."

[47] The Franck report is reprinted, with some deletions and minor errors, in "A Report to the Secretary of War—June, 1945," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, I (May 1946), 2–4, 16. The entire report, "Social and Political Problems," is in H-B 76, with covering letter from Arthur H. Compton to Stimson, June 12, 1945.

[48] Scientific Advisory Panel to Harrison, June 16, 1945, H-B 76.

[49] Oppenheimer later characterized the assignment of considering a demonstration as "quite slight." (US AEC, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, p. 34.) In the betting pool for the Alamogordo test, Oppenheimer predicted the device would be equal to only 300 tons of TNT; Lansing Lamont, interview with William L. Laurence, Lamont Papers, box 1, Harry S. Truman Library (hereafter HSTL), Independence, Mo.

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argued that the bomb would make the invasion unnecessary. Why not warn the emperor that the United States had the bomb and would use it unless Japan surrendered? "McCloy's suggestion had appeal," the official history of the AEC later recorded, "but a strong objection developed" to warning Japan in advance, "which no one could refute—there was no assurance the bomb would work." Presumably, like the Interim Committee, they too feared that a warning, followed by a "dud," might stiffen Japan's morale. There was no reason, policy makers concluded, to take this risk.[50]

Leaving Open the Options for Atomic Diplomacy

Though the Interim Committee and high administration officials found no reason not to use the bomb against Japan, many were concerned about the bomb's impact, and its later value, in Soviet-American relations. "[I]t was already apparent," Stimson later wrote, "that the critical questions in American policy toward atomic energy would be directly connected with Soviet Russia."[51] At a few meetings of the Interim Committee, for example, members discussed informing the Soviets of the bomb before its use against Japan. When the issue first arose, Bush and Conant estimated that the Soviet Union could develop the bomb in about four years and argued for informing the Soviets before combat use as a preliminary to moving toward international control and thereby avoiding a postwar nuclear arms race. Conant and Bush had been promoting this strategy since the preceding September. Even though Roosevelt had cast them to the side in 1943, when he cemented the Anglo-American alliance, the two scientist-administrators had not abandoned hope for their notions. They even circulated to the Interim Committee one of their memoranda on the subject. But at the meetings of May 18 and 31 they again met defeat. General Groves, assuming that America was far more advanced technologically and scientifically and also that the Soviet Union lacked uranium, argued that the Soviets could not build a bomb for about twenty years. He contributed to the appealing "myth" of the atomic secret—that there was a secret and it would long remain America's monopoly. James Byrnes, with special authority as secretary of state-designate and Truman's representative on the committee, accepted Groves's analysis and argued for maintaining the policy of secrecy—which the

[50] Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, p. 364. Also see: James Forrestal Diary, March 8, 1947, Forrestal Papers, Princeton University, also reprinted in Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), pp. 71–72; and John J. McCloy, *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 40–44.

[51] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948), p. 636.

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committee endorsed.[52] Byrnes was apparently very pleased, and Stimson agreed, as he told Truman on June 6, "There should be no revelation to Russia or anyone else of our work on S–1 [the atomic bomb] until the first bomb has been laid successfully on Japan."[53]

At a later meeting on June 21, the Interim Committee, including Byrnes, reversed itself. Yielding to the pleas of Bush and Conant, who were strengthened by the scientific panel's recommendations, the Interim Committee advised Truman to inform the Soviets about the bomb before using it in combat. Like the Franck Committee, the Interim Committee concluded (as the minutes record):

> In the hope of securing effective future control and in view of the fact that general information concerning the project would be made public shortly after the [Potsdam] conference, the Committee *agreed* that there would be considerable advantage, if suitable opportunity arose, in having the President advise the Russians that we were working on this weapon with every prospect of success and that we expected to use it against Japan.
>
> The President might say further that he hoped this matter might be discussed some time in the future in terms of insuring that the weapon would become an aid to peace.[54]

Because of this recommendation, and perhaps also because of the continuing prodding of Bush and Conant, Stimson reversed his own position. He concluded that if the United States dropped the bomb on Japan without first informing the Soviet Union, that act might gravely strain Soviet-American relations. Explaining the committee's position to Truman, Stimson proposed that if the president "thought that Stalin was on good terms with him" at the forthcoming Potsdam conference, he would inform Stalin that the United States had developed the bomb, planned to use it against Japan, knew the Soviets were working on the bomb, and looked forward to discussing international control later. This approach left open the option of "atomic diplomacy"[55]

[52] Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, p. 354 on May 18; "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting . . . 31 May 1945." At the May 31 meeting, according to the minutes, "Byrnes expressed the fear that if information were given to the Russians even in general terms, Stalin would ask to be brought into the partnership. He felt this to be particularly likely in view of our commitments and pledges of co-operation with the British . . . [and asserted] that the most desirable program would be to push ahead as fast as possible in production and research to make certain we stay ahead and at the same time better our political relations with Russia." Also see ibid., June 1.

[53] Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945.

[54] "Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting . . . 21 June 1945," H-B 100.

[55] Stimson Diary, July 3, 1945. For advice on this matter, also see Conant and Bush to Harrison, June 22, 1945, and Harrison to Stimson, June 28, 1945, H-B 77. Roger Makins, the British representative, preferred a policy of greater evasion in dealing with the Soviets. (Memorandum, ca. June 22, 1945, H-B 37.)

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The issues of the bomb and the Soviet Union had already intruded in other ways upon policy and planning. Awaiting the bomb, Truman had postponed the Potsdam conference, delayed negotiations with Russia, and hoped that atomic energy would pry some concessions from Russia. Truman explained in late May to Joseph Davies, an advocate of Soviet-American friendship, and in early June to Stimson that he was delaying the forthcoming Potsdam conference until the Alamogordo test, when he would know whether the United States had a workable atomic bomb—what Stimson repeatedly called the "master card." Truman also told some associates that he was delaying because he wanted to work out budget matters, but it is unlikely that the budget was the controlling reason. Certainly, there was no reason that he should have told Davies, who, unlike Stimson, was not counseling delay of the conference, that he was waiting for the bomb.[56] Stimson's counsel of caution, offered on May 15, had apparently triumphed: it would be "a terrible thing to gamble with such high stakes in diplomacy without having your master card in your hand. . . . Over [the] tangled wave of problems the S–1 secret would be dominant." This was not the counsel for a "delayed showdown," as some have wrongly argued, but for no showdown and for delaying some negotiations until the bomb test so that policy makers could determine whether they would have to make concessions to the Soviet Union.[57]

For the administration, the atomic bomb, if it worked, had great potential value. It could reduce the importance of early Soviet entry into the war and make American concessions unnecessary. It could also be a lever for extracting concessions from the Soviet Union. On June 6, for example, Stimson discussed with Truman "quid pro quos which should be established for our taking them [Russia] into [a nuclear] partnership. He [Truman] said that he had been thinking of the same things that I was thinking of, namely the settlement of the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslav-

[56] Joseph Davies Diary, May 21, 1945, Davies Papers, box 17, Library of Congress; Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945; Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, Stimson Papers. Truman already knew that atomic bombs could not be laid on Japan until early August, so he was not delaying the conference until the bomb could be publicly unveiled in combat. (Stimson, memorandum, April 25, 1945.) In early March, the Alamogordo test was scheduled for July 4, but on June 9 it was postponed until July 13, and on June 30 until July 16. (Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, p. 376.) On May 15, Truman cited domestic matters, especially the budget, for delaying the meeting; *FRUS: Conference of Berlin* (Potsdam), (Washington, 1960, 2 vols.), I, p. 13 (hereafter *Potsdam Papers*).

[57] Stimson Diary, May 15, 1945. Also see ibid., May 14, 1945, and Stimson to Truman May 16, 1945. Cf., Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, esp. p. 58, who finds a carefully calibrated, elaborate "strategy of delay [of confrontation]," allegedly advanced by Stimson on or about April 25—though there is no evidence of such counsel then in available records. (Stimson Diary, April 25, 1945; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 87.)

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ian, and Manchurian problems." There is no evidence that they were planning explicitly to threaten the Soviets to gain these concessions, but, obviously, they realized that the Soviets would regard an American nuclear monopoly as threatening and would yield on some issues in order to terminate that monopoly and thereby reduce, or eliminate, the threat. Neither Stimson nor Truman discussed brandishing the bomb or using it explicitly as a threat to compel concessions.[58] "Atomic diplomacy," as a conception, advanced no further than the notion of possibly trading in the future an atomic partnership, which was still undefined, for Soviet concessions.

The Bomb and Dealing with the Soviets

For policy makers, the atomic weapons scheduled for combat use against Japan were intimately connected with the problem of Russia. In recent years some historians have focused on this relationship and raised troubling questions: Did the bomb, for policy makers, constitute an alternative to Soviet intervention in the Pacific war? Did they delay or even try to prevent Soviet entry because the bomb made it unnecessary? If so, did they do this in order to use the bomb? Was the bomb dropped on Japan primarily to influence Russia? Did the bomb influence American policy at Potsdam?[59]

At Yalta, Roosevelt had granted the Soviet Union concessions in China in order to secure Soviet entry into the Pacific war, which Stalin promised, within two to three months after V-E Day (May 8). Stalin made it clear that Soviet entry would await a Sino-Soviet pact ratifying these concessions.[60] At the time of Yalta, American military planners were counting on a Soviet attack in Manchuria to pin down the Kwantung army there and hence stop Japan from shifting these forces to her homeland to meet an American invasion.[61]

But by April, war conditions changed and military planners revised their analysis: Japan no longer controlled the seas and therefore could not shift her army, so Soviet entry was not essential.[62] In May, the State Department asked Stimson whether Soviet participation "at the earliest possible moment" was so necessary that the United States should abide by

[58] Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945.

[59] See Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb . . . Historiographical Controversy, pp. 1–6, 9–16; Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy, passim.*

[60] *FRUS: Yalta*, pp. 369–379, 384, 834–840.

[61] Department of Defense, *The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945* (Washington, 1955), p. 43 (hereafter *Entry of Soviet Union*).

[62] Ibid., pp. 61–68.

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the Far East section of the Yalta agreement.[63] Stimson concluded that the Soviets would enter the war for their own reasons, at their schedule, and with little regard to any American action, that the Yalta concessions would be largely within the grasp of Soviet military power, and that Soviet assistance would be useful, but not essential, if an American invasion was necessary. If there is an invasion, "Russian entry," he wrote, "will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives."[64] But if the bomb worked, he implied in other discussions, then an invasion would probably not be necessary and Soviet help would be less important.[65] As a result, he urged a delay in settling matters with Russia on the Far East until after the Alamogordo test, and the president apparently followed this counsel.

On June 18, when the joint chiefs of staff, the civilian secretaries, and the president discussed plans for an American invasion of Kyushu on about November 1 and of Honshu during the following March, the issue of Soviet intervention again received attention. General George Marshall, the army chief of staff and the military leader Truman most admired, presented as his own views a JCS memorandum:

> It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of Russian entry into the war.
>
> With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs [sic] in Manchuria (and Korea). . . .
>
> An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese *may well be the decisive action* levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter *if* we land in Japan. [Emphasis added.]

Marshall's counsel was ambiguous and should have raised questions at this meeting. In one place, he said that Soviet entry, when combined with an invasion and other continued destruction, might lead to Japan's capitulation. In another place, he suggested that Soviet entry alone, or followed by an American invasion, might lead to Japan's capitulation. And he

[63] Joseph Grew to Stimson and James Forrestal, May 12, 1945, Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, and reprinted in *Entry of Soviet Union*, pp. 69–70.

[64] Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945, and reprinted in *Entry of Soviet Union*, pp. 70–71. Forrestal concurred. (Ibid, p. 71.)

[65] Stimson Diary, May 15 and 14, 1945.

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was unclear whether Russia's "clean-up of the Asiatic mainland" was necessary if Japan surrendered without an invasion.[66]

None apparently noted the ambiguities or raised questions about Marshall's meaning. After the group approved plans for an invasion of Kyushu on about November 1, with possibly 30,000 casualties in the first thirty days, Truman indicated that one of his "objectives [at Potsdam] . . . would be to get from Russia all the assistance in the war that was possible." Admiral Ernest L. King, chief of Naval Operations, pointed out, according to the minutes, that the Soviets "were not indispensable and he did not think we should go as far as to beg them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we should handle it alone. . . . [R]ealization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand" at Potsdam.[67] Admiral Leahy also expressed a "jaundiced view" of the need for Soviet participation.[68]

Truman claimed that he went to Potsdam to secure Soviet entry and that he never changed his position.[69] The first part of that claim is correct, but the second part is dubious, for Truman did nothing substantive at Potsdam to encourage Soviet intervention and much to delay or prevent it. The successful test at Alamogordo emphasized to policy makers that prompt Soviet entry was no longer necessary and that the United States might even be able to end the war without Soviet entry. After the unexpectedly glowing report of the test, Truman wanted to know whether Marshall considered Soviet entry necessary. "Marshall felt," Stimson recorded, "that now with our new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan."[70] "The bomb as a merely probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but the bomb as a colossal reality was very different," Stimson later ex-

[66] *Potsdam Papers*, I, pp. 904–905.

[67] Ibid., pp. 903–910.

[68] Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 385.

[69] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 411; cf., Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 297. Kolko, *Politics of War*, pp. 556–563 claims that there was a clear split between Byrnes and Truman on the matter of Soviet entry and that the president, along with his other associates, continued to want and never sought to delay Soviet entry. But on pp. 560–561 Kolko briefly wavers. Also see Walter Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny* (Athens, Ohio, 1969), pp. 219–221.

[70] Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945; Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 637: "The news from Alamogordo . . . made it clear to the Americans that further diplomatic efforts to bring the Russians into the Pacific war were largely pointless." Stimson had reached the position, Bundy recalled more than a decade later, "I hope to hell he [Stalin] doesn't come in." (Bundy oral history memoir, oral history collection, Columbia University.) For the opposite recollection, see Herbert Feis, "Talk with Mr. Harvey Bundy," July 30, 1958, Feis Papers, box 65, Library of Congress.

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plained.[71] From Potsdam on July 23, Churchill cabled London: "It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan."[72] The bomb had eliminated the importance of Russia's prompt entry, since the planned American invasion no longer seemed necessary. Invasion and the bomb were the likely alternatives. As a result, Truman had no reason to offer concessions to secure early Soviet entry.

Could the United States keep the Soviet Union out of the war? Did policy makers try to do this? In mid-July Soviet troops were stationed on the Manchurian border and would soon be ready to intervene. Marshall concluded that even if Japan surrendered on American terms before Soviet entry, Russia could still march into Manchuria and take virtually whatever she wanted there in the surrender terms.[73] Truman, if he believed Marshall's analysis, had nothing to gain politically from deterring Soviet entry, unless he feared, as did Stimson, that the Soviets might try to reach the Japanese homeland and put in a "claim to occupy and help rule it."[74] Perhaps Truman followed the counsel of Stimson and Byrnes, who, for slightly different reasons, were eager to restrain the Soviets.

Byrnes, unlike Stimson, was sometimes naively optimistic. Part of the

[71] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 637. The quote cited in n. 70 directly precedes this sentence.

[72] Churchill, in John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy* (London, 1956), p. 292, Vol. VI in *History of the Second World War*. Churchill reached this conclusion when he learned from Byrnes that the secretary was not pushing for a Sino-Soviet settlement.

[73] Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945. Strangely, in view of Churchill's own judgment that Soviet entry was neither necessary nor desirable and of Marshall's counsel, Truman and Churchill approved on July 24 a military plan that included, "Encourage Russian entry. . . ." The JCS in this report also noted that the defeat of Japan's armies in her homeland, and her subsequent surrender, still left the "possibility" that her armies on the mainland might not surrender. Presumably, this meant that the military thought that Soviet entry might be necessary. (*Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 1462–1463; *Entry of Soviet Union*, p. 90. Also see Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 292–295. Bundy in his oral history, p. 262, also recollected that the military still wanted Soviet entry.) By August 10, Truman intended to demand complete surrender, including that of the Kwantung army on the mainland. ("Statement of Cong. Mike Mansfield," August 10, 1945, OF, 197B, HSTL.) On August 3, Truman told associates, in Walter Brown's words, "that we did not need the Russians" to enter the war. ("W.B.'s Notes," August 3, 1945, James F. Byrnes Papers, folder 602, Robert Muldrow Cooper Library, Clemson University.)

[74] Stimson Diary, August 10, 1945. In his memo of July 16 to Truman, Stimson was willing to countenance a "token role for the Soviets in the occupation if they provided "creditable participation in the conquest of Japan." (Stimson Papers.) It is reasonable to conclude that he preferred, if possible, to exclude them from the occupation. For a substantiating recollection, see H. Bundy, "Notes on the Use by the United States of the Atomic Bomb," September 25, 1946, TSMEDF 20. Cf., Stimson, "Conference with Stalin . . . ," July 25, 1945, in Stimson Diary.

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time he hoped to keep the Soviet Union out of the war, and not simply delay her entry, in order to protect China. On July 28, he explained to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal (in Forrestal's words): "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur."[75] These were the areas that both Stimson and Marshall acknowledged the Soviets could seize. Walter Brown, the friend who accompanied the secretary to Potsdam, recorded in his diary notes for July 20 Byrnes's strategy: "JFB determined to outmaneuver Stalin on China. Hopes Soong [the Chinese foreign minister] will stand firm and then Russians will not go in war. Then he feels Japan will surrender before Russia goes to war and this will save China." On July 24, four days later, Brown noted that Byrnes was linking the bomb and Japan's surrender but was less optimistic about excluding Russia: "JFB still hoping for time, believing after atomic bombing Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby [not] being in a position to press for claims against China."[76]

Byrnes purposely impeded Sino-Soviet negotiations in order to *prevent* the Soviets from entering the war. Did Truman support Byrnes for the *same* reasons?—as Byrnes claimed[77] later and as Truman obliquely denied.[78] Perhaps. But, more likely, Truman supported his secretary's strategy for a different reason: the early entry of the Soviets was no longer important and, therefore, Truman did not want Chiang to make the required concessions, which could later weaken Chiang's government. In addition, Truman *may* have concluded that Russia's delayed entry would weaken her possible claims for a role in the postwar occupation government in Japan.

Why didn't Truman invite Stalin to sign the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26 calling for Japan's surrender?[79] Some analysts argued later that

[75] Forrestal Diary, July 28, 1945, also reprinted in Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 78.

[76] "W. B.'s Notes," July 20 and 24, 1945, folder 602. Also see Warren Austin, memorandum (on discussion with Byrnes), August 20, 1945, Austin Papers, University of Vermont Library, called to my attention by Thomas G. Paterson.

[77] Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, pp. 297–298, 291; Feis, "HF mtg w/Byrnes 2/27/58," Feis Papers, box 68. On July 17, according to Leahy, Byrnes and Truman agreed that "Stalin would enter the war whether or not such Chinese concessions are made, and will thereafter satisfy Soviet demands regardless of . . . the Chinese attitude. . . ." (Leahy Diary, July 17, 1945, Leahy Papers, Library of Congress.) On impeding the settlement, see messages of July 23, 28, 29, 1945 in *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 1241, 1245.

[78] Feis, "Talk with Mr. Harvey Bundy," in which Feis mentions that Truman, in an earlier interview, denied that Byrnes had ever conveyed this purpose.

[79] For a lame explanation, see Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, pp. 296–299; "W. B.'s Notes," July 27, 1945, folder 54; *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 449–450. For later evasions

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this omission was part of a devious strategy: that Truman wanted to use the bomb and feared that Stalin's signature, tantamount to a declaration of war, might catapult Japan to surrender, thereby making a nuclear attack impossible.[80] The major difficulty with this interpretation is that it exaggerates occasional, sometimes ambiguous, statements about the *possible* impact of Soviet entry and ignores the fact that this possible shock was not a persistent or important theme in American planning.[81] Truman did not exclude the Soviets from the Proclamation in order to use the bomb. The skimpy, often oblique evidence *suggests* a different, more plausible explanation and a less devious pattern: he wanted to avoid requesting favors from the Soviets. As a result, he did not try this one possible, but not very likely, way of ending the war without using atomic weapons.

At Potsdam, on July 24, Truman told Stalin casually that the United States had developed "a new weapon of unusual destructive force" for use against Japan but did not specify an atomic weapon.[82] Why didn't Truman explicitly inform Stalin about the atomic bomb? Was Truman, as some have suggested, afraid that the news would prompt Stalin to hasten Soviet intervention and therefore end the war and make combat use of the bomb impossible? Did Truman simply want to delay Soviet entry and did he, like Byrnes, fear that his news would have the opposite effect? Did Truman think that the destruction wrought by the bomb would

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when Stalin asked the United States to request Soviet entry formally, see Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 444; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 208–209; *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 1333–1334.

[80] Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 178–182.

[81] For occasional evidence on this theme, see: Marshall in meeting of June 18, 1945, in *Potsdam Papers*, I, pp. 904–910, esp. pp. 904–905; Combined Intelligence Committee, "Estimate of the Enemy Situation," July 8, 1945, in *Entry of Soviet Union*, pp. 86–88. This report concluded: "An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat" and presumably lead to surrender if the unconditional surrender terms, especially to allow continuation of the Imperial institution, were modified (p. 87). See Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 290–292, who concludes that Soviet entry was seen as "insurance and not as a solution in itself." On earlier expectation about Soviet entry, see Forrestal Diary, December 7, 1944, and for contemporary estimates, see Minutes of July 23, 1945, in Minutes of the General Council, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, vol. for July–September 1945, Feis Papers, box 67. Also see Stimson Diary, June 19, 1945.

[82] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 416; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 263; Leahy, *I Was There*, p. 429; Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), pp. 669–670. Byrnes thought that Stalin did not understand Truman's meaning "but by tomorrow," according to Brown, the secretary "thinks the importance of what Truman told Stalin will sink in . . ." ("W.B.'s Notes," July 24, 1945, folder 54). Stalin apparently did understand. Georgii Zhukov, *The Memoirs of Marshall Zhukov* (London, 1971), p. 675.

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not impress the Soviets as forcefully if they were informed in advance? Why did Truman reject the counsel of the Interim Committee, of Stimson, and even of Churchill, who, after the flowing news of the Alamogordo test, "was not worried about giving the Russians information on the matter but was rather inclined to use it as an argument in our favor in the negotiations"?[83]

Many of these questions cannot be definitively answered on the basis of the presently available evidence, but there is enough evidence to refute one popular interpretation: that Truman's tactic was part of an elaborate strategy to prevent or retard Soviet entry *in order* to delay Japan's surrender and *thereby* make combat use of the bomb possible. That interpretation claims too much. Only the first part can be supported by some, albeit indirect, evidence: that he was probably seeking to delay or prevent Soviet entry. Byrnes later said that he feared that Stalin would order an immediate Soviet declaration of war if he realized the importance of this "new weapon"[84]—advice Truman dubiously claimed he never received.[85] Truman was not trying to postpone Japan's surrender *in order* to use the bomb. In addition to the reasonable theory that he was seeking to prevent or retard Soviet entry, there are two other plausible, complementary interpretations of Truman's behavior. First, he believed, as had some of his advisers earlier, that a combat demonstration would be more impressive to Russia without an advance warning[86] and therefore he concealed the news. Second, he was also ill-prepared to discuss atomic energy with Stalin, for the president had not made a decision about postwar atomic

[83] Stimson Diary, July 23, 1945, paraphrases Churchill, who had reversed his position of July 17, as quoted in *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 637, and cited in Stimson Diary, July 17, 1945.

[84] Feis, "HF mtg w/Byrnes 2/27/58," Feis Papers, and copy in Byrnes Papers, folder 92; Feis, "Talk with Former Secretary of State . . . Byrnes (c. November 25, 1957)," Feis Papers.

[85] Interview with Truman, January 14, 1962; Feis, "Talk with Mr. Harvey Bundy," July 30, 1958.

[86] Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945. In 1949, Leo Szilard, the nuclear physicist, recalled his meeting of May 28, 1945, in which "Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. . . . Byrnes's view [was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe. . . ." Leo Szilard, "A Personal History of the Atomic Bomb," University of Chicago *Roundtable*, no. 601 (September 25, 1949), pp. 13–14. Note that Byrnes was not claiming, according to Szilard, that the United States could end the war *as speedily* without using the bomb. In fact, Szilard, in this recollection, said that policy makers in late May "knew that . . . we could win the war in another six months" without the bomb. Byrnes allegedly later denied Szilard's recollection about their conversation. George Curry, "James F. Byrnes," in *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, XIV (New York, 1965), p. 344, n. 11. In 1960, Szilard slightly, but significantly, revised his earlier recollection: "Byrnes thought that the possession of the bomb would make the Russians more manageable in Europe." Leo Szilard, in "Was A-Bomb on Ja-

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policy and how to exploit the bomb, and probably did not want to be pressed by Stalin about sharing nuclear secrets.[87] Perhaps all three theories collectively explain Truman's evasive tactics.

Even without explicit disclosure, the bomb strengthened American policy at Potsdam. The Alamogordo test stiffened Truman's resolve, as Churchill told Stimson after the meeting of the Big Three on July 22: "Truman was evidently much fortified . . . and . . . he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have."[88] Probably, also, the bomb explains why Truman pushed more forcefully at Potsdam for the Soviets to open up Eastern Europe.[89] It is less clear whether the bomb changed the substance of American policy at Potsdam. Probably Byrnes endorsed a reparations policy allowing the division of Germany because the bomb replaced Germany as a potential counterweight to possible Soviet expansion.[90]

Not only did the bomb strengthen American resolve in dealing with the Soviets, but Stimson and Truman linked the bomb and the Soviet Union in another way: the selection of targets for atomic attacks. Kyoto, a city of religious shrines, was originally on the list, but Stimson removed it, with Truman's approval. Truman "was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion," Stimson wrote, because

> the bitterness . . . caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely, a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria.[91]

Alternatives to the Use of the Bomb

Scholars and laymen have criticized the combat use of the atomic bomb.

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pan a Mistake?" *U.S. News and World Report*, August 15, 1960, p. 69. In this statement, the emphasis was possession, not use.

[87] See Bernstein, "Quest," pp. 1016–1022.

[88] Stimson Diary, July 22, 1945. Also see ibid., July 21, 1945 for Truman's comment, according to Stimson, that the bomb "gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence." Bundy, oral history, p. 262, also reported that Truman's approach "hardened." Jonathan Daniels, an associate of Truman, reported Truman's words on the way to Potsdam: "If it explodes, as I think it will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys (Russia as well as the Japs)." Daniels Papers, HSTL.

[89] *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 371–372; Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 150–175; cf., Lisle Rose, *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York, 1972), pp. 47–49, 79.

[90] *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 277–281, 428–431, 490–491, 877–885, 900–901; Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 165–173.

[91] Stimson Diary, July 24, 1945.

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They have contended, among other points, that the bombs were not necessary to end the war, that the administration knew or should have known this, that the administration knew that Japan was on the verge of defeat and *therefore* close to surrender, and that the administration was either short-sighted or had other controlling international-political motives (besides ending the war) for using the bomb. These varying contentions usually focus on the alleged failure of the United States to pursue five alternatives, individually or in combination, in order to achieve Japanese surrender before using the bomb: (1) awaiting Soviet entry, a declaration of war, or a public statement of intent (already discussed); (2) providing a warning and/or a noncombat demonstration (already discussed); (3) redefining unconditional surrender to guarantee the Imperial institution; (4) pursuing Japan's "peace feelers"; or (5) relying upon conventional warfare for a longer period. These contentions assume that policy makers were trying, or should have tried, to avoid using atomic bombs—precisely what they were not trying to do.

In examining these contentions, analysts must carefully distinguish between those writers (like Alperovitz)[92] who maintain that there were ulterior motives for rejecting alternatives and those (like Hanson Baldwin)[93] who regard policy makers as dangerously short sighted but without ulterior motives. It is logically possible to agree with Alperovitz and not Baldwin, or vice versa; but it is impossible logically to endorse both positions.

There were powerful reasons why the fifth alternative—the use of conventional weapons for a longer period *before* using atomic bombs—seemed undesirable to policy makers. The loss of American lives, while perhaps not great, would have been unconscionable and politically risky. How could policy makers have justified to themselves or to other Americans delaying the use of this great weapon and squandering American lives?[94] Consider the potential political cost at home. In contrast, few Americans were then troubled by the mass killing of enemy citizens, especially if they were yellow. The firebombings of Tokyo, of other Japanese cities, and even of Dresden had produced few cries of outrage in the United States. There was no evidence that most citizens would care that

[92] Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy* and *Cold War Essays*, chap. V; P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War, and the Bomb* (New York, 1949), pp. 127–142; Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," *Saturday Review of Literature*, XXIX (June 15, 1946), 7–9.

[93] Hanson Baldwin, *Great Mistakes of the War* (New York, 1950), pp. 88–107; Ellis M. Zacharias, "The A-Bomb Was Not Needed," *United Nations World*, III (August 1949), 25–29.

[94] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 628–633; Bundy, "Notes on the Use . . . of the Atomic Bomb."

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the atomic bomb was as lethal as the raids on Dresden or Tokyo. It was unlikely that there would be popular support for relying upon conventional warfare and not using the atomic bomb. For citizens and policy makers, there were few, if any, moral restraints on what weapons were acceptable in war.[95]

Nor were there any powerful advocates within the high councils of the administration who wanted to delay or not use the bomb and rely instead upon conventional warfare—a naval blockade, continued aerial bombings, or both. The advocates of conventional warfare were not powerful, and they did not directly oppose the use of the bomb. Admiral Ernest L. King, chief of Naval Operations, did believe that the invasion and the atomic bomb were not the only alternative tactics likely to achieve unconditional surrender. A naval blockade, he insisted, would be successful. The army, however, he complained, had little faith in sea power and, hence, Truman did not accept his proposal.[96] Leahy had serious doubts about using the bomb, but as an old explosives expert who had long claimed that the bomb would never work, he carried little weight on this matter. Surprisingly, perhaps, he did not forcefully press his doubts on the president.[97] Had Marshall plumped for the strategy of stepping up conventional warfare and delaying or not using the bomb, he might have been able to compel a reassessment. He had the respect and admiration of the president and could command attention for his views. But Marshall had no incentive to avoid the use of the bomb, prolong the war, and expend American lives. For him, nuclear weapons and invasion were likely alternatives, and he wanted to avoid invasion.[98] If the bomb was used as quickly as possible, the invasion might be unnecessary and American lives would be saved.

[95] Robert Batchelder, *The Irreversible Decision, 1939–1950* (New York, 1961), pp. 170–189, 246.

[96] Ernest J. King and Walter M. Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King* (New York, 1952), p. 621.

[97] Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945; Leahy, *I Was There*, pp. 245, 259, 269, 384–385, 441. Gen. Henry H. Arnold of the army air forces found the atomic bombing of Japan attractive because it allowed the United States to "experiment." Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York, 1949), pp. 492, 598. Arnold, partly on the basis of Gen. Curtis LeMay's judgment, concluded in June 1945 that the United States could win the war by conventional bombing and without the full-scale invasion scheduled for about April 1946 (Ibid., pp. 566–568). The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey later concluded that Japan would have surrendered "certainly prior to 31 December . . . and in all *probability* prior to 1 November 1945" without the atomic bombings, Soviet entry, or an invasion (emphasis added). *Summary Report* (Washington, 1946), p. 26.

[98] Marshall later concluded that the bombs "precipitated the surrender by months." J. P. Sutherland, "The Story Gen. Marshall Told Me," *U.S. News and World Report*, November 2, 1959, p. 52.

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For policy makers, the danger was not simply the loss of a few hundred American lives *prior* to the slightly delayed use of the bombs if the United States relied upon conventional warfare for a few more weeks. Rather the risk was that, if the nuclear attacks were even slightly delayed, the scheduled invasion of Kyushu, with perhaps 30,000 casualties in the first month, would be necessary. After the war, it became fashionable to assume that policy makers clearly foresaw and comfortably expected that an atomic bomb or two would shock Japan into a speedy surrender. But the evidence does not support this view. "The abrupt surrender of Japan came more or less as a surprise," Henry H. Arnold, commanding general of the air force, later explained.[99] Policy makers were planning, if necessary, to drop at least three atomic bombs in August, with the last on about August 24, and more in September.[100] Before Hiroshima, only occasionally did some policy makers imply (but never state explicitly) that one bomb or a few bombs might shock Japan into a prompt surrender: capitulation within a few days or weeks.[101] Usually they were less optimistic, sometimes even pessimistic. They often assumed that the war might drag on after the nuclear attacks. Faced with this prospect, policy makers were unprepared to take risks and delay using the bombs. So unsure was Truman of the likelihood of a speedy surrender after the first atomic attack that he left domestic officials unprepared for the surrender and thereby seriously weakened his stabilization program and lost political support at home.[102] Because policy makers feared that the attack on Hiroshima might not speedily end the war, they continued conventional bombing[103] and also dropped the second bomb.[104] Their aim was to end the war without a costly invasion of Kyushu. According to their analysis,

[99] Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 598; Groves to Oppenheimer, July 19, 1945, TSMDF 5B; Groves, in US AEC, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, p. 167; Stimson Diary, August 9, 1945. Allegedly Marshall told Maxwell Taylor on July 28 that two atomic bombs, if both exploded, would force Japan's surrender. Maxwell Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1960), p. 3.

[100] Groves to Oppenheimer, July 19, 1945; Sutherland, "The Story Gen. Marshall Told Me," p. 53; entry of June 12, 1947, in David Lilienthal, *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal* (New York, 1964), II, pp. 198–199.

[101] "W.B.'s Notes," July 20, and 25, 1945; Warren Austin, memorandum (on discussion with Byrnes), August 20, 1945.

[102] Bernstein, "The Truman Administration and the Politics of Inflation," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, esp. chaps. ii–v; Robert P. Patterson to George Harrison, August 2, 1945, and reply, August 8, 1945, H-B 8; Patterson to Samuel Rosenman, August 9, 1945, Rosenman Papers, box 3, HSTL.

[103] C.C.S. 880/7, in Cabinet Papers 99/39, cat. 1015, Public Records Office, London; Forrestal Diary, August 13, 1945.

[104] Stimson, "Decision," pp. 105–106. The third bomb would have been ready after August 17 or 18, but could not have been used without Truman's express approval. (Groves to Marshall, August 10, 1945, TSMEDF 25Q.) There would have been three

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atomic weapons, if employed promptly and combined with conventional attacks, were likely to achieve that goal. Delay was unconscionable, as Stimson later explained.[105]

There have also been criticisms of the administration for failing to pursue two other alleged opportunities: (1) redefining the unconditional surrender demands before Hiroshima to guarantee the Imperial institution; and (2) responding to Japan's "peace feelers," which stressed the need for this guarantee. Byrnes and apparently Truman, however, were fearful at times that concessions might strengthen, not weaken, the Japanese military and thereby prolong, not shorten, the war. Some critics imply that Byrnes and Truman were not sincere in presenting this analysis and that they rejected concessions consciously in order to use the bomb.[106] That is incorrect. Other critics believe that these policy makers were sincere but disagree with their assessment[107]—especially since some intelligence studies implied the need for concessions on peace terms to shorten the war. Probably the administration was wrong, and these latter critics right, but either policy involved risks and some were very unattractive to Truman.

Truman, as a new president, was not comfortable in openly challenging Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender and modifying the terms.[108] That was risky. It could fail and politically injure him at home. Demanding unconditional surrender meant fewer risks at home and, according to his most trusted advisers at times, fewer risks in ending the war speedily. Had his most powerful and trusted advisers pushed for a change in policy, perhaps he might have found reason and will to modify Roosevelt's policy well before Hiroshima. But most of Truman's closest advisers first counseled delay and then some moved into opposition. As a result, he too shifted from delay to opposition. At Potsdam, when Stimson pushed unsuccessfully for providing the guarantee in the Proclamation, Truman refused but told Stimson that he would carefully watch Japan's reactions on this issue and implied that he would yield if it seemed to be the only impediment to surrender.[109] After August 10,

more ready in September and possibly "seven or more" additional bombs in December. (Harrison to Stimson, July 23, 1945, H-B 64.)

[105] Stimson, "Decision," pp. 106–107.

[106] Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 227–237; David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1971), chap. iii. Alperovitz also implies the contrary (pp. 12–14).

[107] Baldwin, *Great Mistakes*, esp. pp. 92–102.

[108] See also Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny*, pp. 81–82, 94–95. On April 16, 1945, in his speech to Congress, Truman reaffirmed the demand for "unconditional surrender." *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman* (Washington, 1961), 1945, p. 2 (hereafter *Truman Papers*).

[109] Stimson Diary, July 24, 1945.

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when Japan made the guarantee the only additional condition, Truman yielded on the issue. He deemed it a tactical problem, not a substantative one. But even then, Byrnes was wary of offering this concession, despite evidence that it would probably end the war promptly—precisely what he wanted in order to forestall Soviet gains in the Far East.[110]

Within the administration, the issue of redefining the terms of surrender was a subject of discussion for some months before Hiroshima. Since at least April, Joseph Grew, undersecretary of state and at times acting secretary of state, urged the administration to redefine unconditional surrender to permit a guarantee of the Imperial institution. He argued that these moderate terms would speed Japan's surrender and perhaps make an invasion unnecessary.[111] Within the Department of State, he met opposition from some high-ranking officials, including Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish, both assistant secretaries, who regarded the emperor as the bulwark of Japan's feudal-military tradition, which all wanted to destroy, and who feared that the American press and public opinion would be enraged by Grew's proposed concession. Hirohito, Japan's emperor, like Hitler and Mussolini, had become a wartime symbol of a hated enemy, of depravity, of tyranny, and of inhumanity.[112]

On May 28, President Truman, perhaps then sympathetic to Grew's proposal, told him to discuss it with Stimson, Forrestal, Marshall, and King.[113] Unlike Acheson and MacLeish, these military leaders approved the principle but apparently agreed with Marshall that publication of softened terms at that time would be premature. Grew later explained, "for certain military reasons, not divulged, it was considered inadvisable for the President to make such a statement just now. The question of timing was the nub of the whole matter according to the views of those present." Though Grew knew about the atomic bomb, its connection with the delay never seemed to occur to him, and he thought that Mar-

[110] Forrestal Diary, August 10, 1945; Stimson Diary, August 10, 1945; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 426–428; Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 209, and *All in One Lifetime*, p. 305.

[111] Grew to Randall Gould, April 14, 1945, and Grew, memorandum of conference, May 28, 1945, Grew Papers. For similar views in some sectors of military intelligence, see: Ellis Zacharias, *Secret Missions* (New York, 1946), pp. 342–350; Alexander Leighton, *Human Relations in a Changing World* (New York, 1949), pp. 60, 93, 227–291; and Ray Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division* (Washington, 1951), pp. 341–345.

[112] Minutes, Secretary's Staff Committee, July 7 and 4, 1945, Edward Stettinius Papers, University of Virginia; *Potsdam Papers*, I, pp. 895–897; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations*, 82 Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 728–729.

[113] Grew, memorandum of conference, May 28, 1945; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 416–417.

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shall and others were concerned *only* about the impact of the announcement on the fighting on Okinawa.[114] In his diary, Stimson explained the opposition more fully: "It was an awkward meeting because there were people present . . . [before] whom I could not discuss the real features which would govern the whole situation, namely S–1 [the atomic bomb]." Stimson never revealed this to Grew,[115] who reported to Truman that they decided to postpone the statement—a position that the president endorsed.

Some analysts have argued, wrongly, that this evidence indicates that Stimson and the others blocked the statement *because* they wanted to use the bomb and did not want to risk a peace before the bomb could be used.[116] That is incorrect. In view of Stimson's frequent judgments that the United States would issue a warning *after* the atomic bombing but before the scheduled attack on Kyushu, his objection was what Grew reported—an issue of timing.[117] On July 2, for example, when Stimson proposed as part of the warning a guarantee of the Imperial institution, he was apparently assuming, as he stated explicitly a week earlier, that he hoped "to get Japan to surrender by giving her a warning after she had been sufficiently *pounded possibly with S–1*."[118] Not until July 16, when Stimson learned of "the recent news of attempted approaches" by Japan for peace did he shift and call for a prompt warning *before* the atomic attacks.[119]

"There was a pretty strong feeling" by mid-June, Stimson wrote in his diary, "that it would be deplorable if we have to go through [with] the

[114] Grew, memorandum of conference, May 29, 1945, Grew Papers. Grew later quoted the same phrase in his letter to Stimson, February 12, 1947, Grew Papers.

[115] Stimson Diary, May 29, 1945. For reference only to Okinawa as the reason, see Stimson to Grew, June 19, 1947, Grew Papers. For fears of appearing weak, see Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 628.

[116] Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, p. 110.

[117] Stimson Diary, June 19, June 26, July 2, 1945; *Potsdam Papers*, I, pp. 887–888. See Stimson Diary, June 19, 1945 and Forrestal Diary, June 19, 1945, for differing estimates by Stimson and Grew on Truman's willingness to provide a guarantee. Also see the State Department briefing paper of July 3, 1945, that concluded that a guarantee might well speed surrender (*Potsdam Papers*, I, p. 886). Forrestal and Grew were both eager to have Japan as a possible postwar counterweight to Soviet power in the Far East.

[118] Stimson, memorandum, July 2, 1945, Stimson Papers, reprinted in Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 620–624. Stimson suggested allowing a "constitutional monarchy," presumably with retention of the emperor, and the War Department added the provision: Japan might be permitted "a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression." (*Potsdam Papers*, I, pp. 893–894.) See Stimson Diary, June 26, 1945 for quote in text (emphasis added) and need for "every effort . . . to shorten the war."

[119] Stimson, memorandum for the president, July 16, 1945, Stimson Papers.

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military program with all its stubborn fighting to a finish."[120] On June 18, Grew again went to Truman with his proposal, and the president told him, in Grew's words, that he "liked the idea [but] he had decided to hold this up until it could be discussed at the Big Three meeting" starting on July 16. Grew properly lamented that the government was missing an opportunity but did not speculate on whether the president had ulterior motives.[121] Truman did not. A few hours later, he uneasily told associates that he, too, thought the requirement of unconditional surrender might drag out the war; that with "that thought in mind . . . [he] had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action . . . [but] he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter."[122] Truman, apparently uneasy about departing from Roosevelt's policy, later explained that he delayed the guarantee until what he regarded as a more propitious time—the Potsdam conference, when the allies, by signing the proclamation, could forcefully demonstrate their "united purpose."[123]

Had Cordell Hull, former secretary of state, Byrnes, and the JCS not intervened, Truman probably would have included in the Potsdam Proclamation a provision guaranteeing the Imperial institution. The provision was in early drafts. But Byrnes deleted it when Hull warned that it might stiffen Japan's resistance, and, if it failed, it could create serious political problems for the administration at home.[124] The military chiefs, perhaps independently, also moved to delete the provision. Unlike Hull, they feared, among other problems, that the "guarantee would make it difficult or impossible to utilize the authority of the Emperor to direct a surrender of the Japanese forces in the outlying areas as well as in Japan proper."[125] The guarantee, then, was not removed for ulterior purposes

[120] Stimson Diary, June 19, 1945.

[121] Grew, memorandum of conference, June 18, 1945, Grew Papers. Also see ibid., June 15 and 16, 1945.

[122] *Potsdam Papers*, I, p. 909; cf., McCloy in Forrestal Diary, March 8, 1947, who claimed to recall that Truman endorsed "a political offensive" to inform Japan that she could retain the emperor.

[123] Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 417, simply said "Allies" and did not explicitly include or exclude Russia. The draft proclamation included the possibility of Russia. Had Truman been eager to issue the proclamation in mid-June, he could have approached Chiang and Churchill then and not waited more than five weeks.

[124] Hull, in Grew to Byrnes, July 16, and reply, July 17, 1945, *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 1267–1268. Ironically, Grew worried on July 6 that some people around Truman would remove the guarantee because they opposed any effort, in Forrestal's words, "to get the Japanese war over with before Russia has an opportunity to enter." (Forrestal Diary, July 6, 1945.)

[125] *Potsdam Papers*, II, p. 1269; I, p. 40. The JCS proposed: "Subject to suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government" (p. 1269). See *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 36–37 for a

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(because the administration wanted to use the bomb) but because advisers, with more power than Stimson and Grew, triumphed. Neither of these older men was close to Truman. Grew was headed for a quick retirement and was left behind in Washington when the president and top policy makers journeyed to Potsdam. Stimson, also headed for retirement, had so little influence by July that he was compelled to beg and scheme to attend the Potsdam conference and, while there, he was shunted to the side and seldom informed of negotiations.[126]

Grew long maintained that America could have achieved peace without using atomic bombs if the United States had modified its demands and guaranteed the Imperial institution.[127] In 1948, Stimson provided some support for this position: "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war. Only on this question did [Stimson] . . . later believe," he wrote in his "autobiography," "that history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war." By implication, he was also criticizing the wartime fear—that he sometimes shared with Byrnes and most military advisers—that conciliatory offers would be interpreted in Japan "as an indication of [American] weakness" and thereby prolong the war.[128] Probably policy makers were wrong in not acting earlier.

Let us look at the remaining, but connected, alternative—pursuing Japan's "peace feelers." Japan's so-called peace feelers were primarily a series of messages from the foreign minister to his nation's ambassador in Moscow, who was asked to investigate the possibility of having the Soviets serve as intermediaries in negotiating a peace.[129] American intelligence intercepted and decoded all the messages. Most, if not all, were sent on to Potsdam, where Truman and Byrnes had access to them.[130]

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discussion of the July 8, 1945, intelligence estimate that a guarantee of the Imperial institution might produce a surrender.

[126] Stimson Diary, July 3, 2, 19, 1945. Some analysts, in using the diary, have erred seriously by treating it as an accurate record portraying Truman's beliefs and commitments, and have not understood that Truman sometimes agreed politely with the aged secretary and them moved in another, even in the opposite, direction.

[127] Grew to Stimson, February 12, 1947; Eugene Dooman to Stimson, June 30, 1947, both in Grew Papers; Grew, *Turbulent Era* (Boston, 1952, 2 vols.), II, pp. 1417–1442.

[128] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 628–629.

[129] The messages are reprinted in *Potsdam Papers*, I, pp. 874–883; II, pp. 1248–1264, 1291–1298. Also see *FRUS*, 1945, VI, pp. 475–496 on other "peace feelers," and Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, p. 308, for the message of August 2.

[130] It is difficult to determine whether all were sent to Potsdam and what messages Byrnes and Truman read. See *Potsdam Papers*, I, p. 873; *Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 74–77; Forrestal Diary, July 13, 15, 28, 1945; "W.B.'s Notes," July 24, 1945, folder 54; Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime*, p. 297.

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Both men showed little interest in them, and may not even have read all of them, apparently because the proposed concessions were insufficient to meet American demands and because Truman and Byrnes had already decided that the peace party in Japan could not succeed until American attacks—including atomic bombs—crushed the military's hopes. The intercepted and decoded messages fell short of American expectations. Not only did Japan's foreign minister want to retain the Imperial institution, which was acceptable to some policy makers, but he also wanted a peace that would maintain his nation's "honor and existence," a phrase that remained vague.[131] As late as July 27, the day after the Potsdam Proclamation, when Japan's foreign minister was planning a special peace mission to Russia, he was still unwilling or unable to present a "concrete proposal" for negotiations.[132] What emerges from his decoded correspondence is a willingness by some elements in Japan's government to move toward peace, their fear of opposition from the military, and their inability to be specific about terms. Strangely, perhaps, though they feared that Stalin might be on the verge of entering the war, they never approached the United States directly to negotiate a peace settlement. For Truman and Byrnes, Japan was near defeat but not near surrender when the three powers issued the Potsdam Proclamation on July 26. When Japan's premier seemed to reject it,[133] the president and secretary of state could find confirmation for their belief that the peace party could not triumph in Japan without more American "aid"—including nuclear attacks.[134]

Given the later difficulties of Japan's peace party, even after the atomic bombings, after Soviet entry, and after more large-scale conventional bombings, top American policy makers could find evidence in the ambiguous record for their assessment that Japan's leaders were not ready

[131] See *Potsdam Papers*, II, pp. 1249 and 1258 for "honor and existence," and see p. 1261 for the foreign minister's proposal that Japan would accept a peace based upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter—terms outlined by Capt. Ellis Zacharias, whom Forrestal had appointed to broadcast peace terms.

[132] *Potsdam Papers*, II, p. 1291.

[133] See *Potsdam Papers*, II, p. 1293 for a translation of the prime minister's response to the proclamation. And see ibid., n. 2, for the controversy about the meaning of *mokusatsu* in his reply.

[134] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 626, 628; Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, p. 308. At a meeting of the staff committee of the secretary of state on July 25, 1945, MacLeish complained that "public discussion [in America] of Japanese surrender terms . . . [is being used by] the Japanese . . . to prove that the United States is war-weary . . ."—a position endorsed by others present. (Secretary's Staff Committee minutes, July 25, 1945, Notter Files, box 304, Department of State Records, RG 59, National Archives.)

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to surrender before Hiroshima.[135] More troubling were American policy makers' wartime convictions that any concessions or pursuit of unsure "peace feelers" might stiffen resistance. Most American leaders were fearful of softening demands. War had bred an attitude that any efforts at compromise might indicate to the enemy America's flaccidity of spirit and weakness of will. Toughness, for most policy makers, seemed to promise success.

Looking back upon these years, Americans may well lament the unwillingness of their leaders to make some concessions at this time and to rely upon negotiations before using the bombs. That lament, however, is logically separable from the unfounded charges that policy makers consciously avoided the "peace feelers" *because* they wanted to drop the bombs in order to intimidate the Soviets. It is true that American leaders did not cast policy in order to avoid using the atomic bombs. Given their analysis, they had no reason to avoid using these weapons. As a result, their analysis provokes ethical revulsion among many critics, who believe that policy makers should have been reluctant to use atomic weapons and should have sought, perhaps even at some cost in American lives, to avoid using them.

Why the Bomb Was Used

Truman inherited the assumption that the bomb was a legitimate weapon to use to end the war. No policy maker ever effectively challenged this conception. If the combat use of the bomb deeply troubled policy makers morally or politically, they might have been likely to reconsider their assumption and to search ardently for other alternatives. But they were generally inured to the mass killing of civilians[136] and much preferred

[135] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, p. 628; Samuel E. Morison, "Why Japan Surrendered," *Atlantic Monthly*, CCVI (October 1960), 43–47; Byrnes, in "Was A-Bomb on Japan a Mistake," pp. 65–66. For intelligent but too brief speculation on the possibility of United States concessions producing an earlier surrender without awaiting atomic bombings, see Robert J. C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, Calif., 1954), pp. 230–232.

[136] See Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945 for the secretary's hopes that the air force would practice "precision bombing" because he did not want the United States to "get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities" *and* because he wanted substantial undamaged areas left so that "the new weapon would have a fair background to show its strength." Also see "Notes of the Interim Committee . . . ," May 31 and June 1, 1945. For earlier concern about United States attacks on enemy civilians, see Stimson Diary, March 5, May 16, June 1, 1945. For United States attitudes, see Batchelder, *Irreversible Decision*, pp. 170–189; W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate (eds.), *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1953, 5 vols.), V, pp. 608–644; Kolko, *Politics of War*, pp. 539–540.

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to sacrifice the lives of Japanese civilians to those of American soldiers.[137] As a result, they were committed to using the bomb *as soon as possible* to end the war. "The dominant objective was victory," Stimson later explained. "If victory could be speeded by using the bomb, it should be used; if victory must be delayed in order to use the bomb, it should *not* be used. So far as . . . [I] knew, this general view was fully shared by the President and his associates."[138] The morality of war confirmed the dictates of policy and reinforced the legacy that Truman had inherited. Bureaucratic momentum added weight to that legacy, and the relatively closed structure of decision making served also to inhibit dissent and to ratify the dominant assumption.

Had policy makers concluded that the use of the bomb would impair Soviet-American relations and make the Soviets intransigent, they might have reconsidered their assumption. But their analysis indicated that the use of the bomb would aid, not injure, their efforts to secure concessions from the Soviets. The bomb offered a bonus. The promise of these likely advantages probably constituted a subtle deterrent to any reconsideration of the use of the atomic bomb. Policy makers rejected the competing analysis advanced by the Franck Committee:

> Russia, and even allied countries which bear less mistrust of our ways and intentions, as well as neutral countries, will be deeply shocked. It will be very difficult to persuade the world that a nation which was capable of secretly preparing and suddenly releasing . . . [the bomb] is to be trusted in its proclaimed desire of having such weapons abolished by international agreement.[139]

Instead, policy makers had come to assume that a combat demonstration would advance, not impair, the interests of peace—a position shared by Conant, Oppenheimer, Arthur H. Compton, Nobel laureate and director of the Chicago Metallurgical Laboratory, and Edward Teller, the physicist and future father of the hydrogen bomb.[140] In explaining the

[137] Bush to John Tate, August 23, 1945, OSRD, box 164; Byrnes to B. S. Prince, August 21, 1945, Byrnes Papers, folder 497(2).

[138] Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 628–629.

[139] "Political and Social Problems." The version in Alice K. Smith, *A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945–47* (Chicago, 1965), p. 566, uses "may" in both cases where the verb in the original document is "will."

[140] On Conant, see Stimson to Raymond Gram Swing, February 4, 1947, Stimson Papers. On Compton, Compton to Stimson, June 12, 1945, H-B 76, and *Atomic Quest*, p. 236. On Teller, Teller to Szilard, July 2, 1945, JROP, box 71. Compton, for example, wrote: "without a military demonstration it may be impossible to impress the world with the need for national sacrifices in order to gain lasting security." (Compton to Stimson, June 12.) In May, an engineer on the Manhattan Project submitted a similar statement, which greatly impressed Stimson, who sent it to Marshall. (O. C. Brewster to Truman, May 24, 1945; Stimson to Marshall, May 30, 1945, H-B 77.)

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thinking of the scientific advisory panel in recommending combat use of the bomb, Oppenheimer later said that one of the two "overriding considerations . . . [was] the effect of our actions on the stability . . . of the postwar world."[141] Stimson's assistant, Harvey H. Bundy, wrote in 1946, that some thought "that unless the bomb were used it would be impossible to persuade the world that the saving of civilization in the future would depend on a proper international control of atomic energy."[142] The bomb, in short, would impress the Soviets.

In addition, there was another possible advantage to using the bomb: retribution against Japan. A few days after Nagasaki, Truman hinted at this theme in a private letter justifying the combat use of the bombs:

> Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am but I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. The only language they seem to understand is the one that we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true.[143]

In this letter, one can detect strains of the quest for retribution (the reference to Pearl Harbor), and some might even find subtle strains of racism (Japan was "a beast"). The enemy was a beast and deserved to be destroyed. War, as some critics would stress, dehumanized victors and vanquished, and justified inhumanity in the name of nationalism, of justice, and even of humanity.

In assessing the administration's failure to challenge the assumption that the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used against Japan, we may conclude that Truman found no reason to reconsider, that it would have been difficult for him to challenge the assumption, and that there were also various likely benefits deterring a reassessment. For the administration, in short, there was no reason to avoid using the bomb and many reasons making it feasible and even attractive. The bomb was used primarily to end the war *promptly* and thereby to save American lives. There were other ways to end the war, but none of them seemed as effective. They would not produce victory as promptly and seemed to have greater

[141] Oppenheimer, in USAEC, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, p. 34. The other consideration, he explained, was "the saving of [American] lives."

[142] Bundy, "Notes on the Use . . . of the Atomic Bomb," September 25, 1946.

[143] Truman to Samuel McCrea Cavert, August 11, 1945, OF 596A, HSTL. Truman, in Byrnes's words, said in early June that use of the bomb was "regrettable" but necessary and that he was "reluctant to use this weapon . . . [but] saw no way of avoiding it." Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, pp. 261–262, and *All in One Lifetime*, p. 286. These comments, if made, were ritualistic and did not express serious doubts or reservations —as other sources establish. (Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945; Churchill's notes for July 18, 1945, in Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, pp. 302–303; Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 548; Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 419.)

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risks. Even if Russia had not existed, the bombs would have been used in the same way. How could Truman, in the absence of overriding contrary reasons, justify not using the bombs, or even delaying their use, and thereby prolonging the war and sacrificing American lives?

Some who have searched for the causes of Truman's decision to use atomic weapons have made the error of assuming that the question was ever open, that the administration ever carefully faced the problem of *whether* to use the bombs. It was not a carefully weighed decision but the implementation of an assumption. The administration devoted thought to how, not whether, to use them. As Churchill later wrote, "the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue."[144]

Atomic Diplomacy after Hiroshima

In examining American policy for the few months after Hiroshima, scholars have disagreed on whether the United States practiced "atomic diplomacy."[145] Simply defined, this term means the use of nuclear weapons as threats or as bargaining levers to secure advantages from the Soviet Union. Since there were no *explicit* threats, some scholars have dubiously disposed of the problem by comfortably declaring that there was no "atomic diplomacy"—which they define too narrowly by excluding *implicit* threats.[146] That is too simple and avoids important issues. A full investigation of the complex problem of atomic diplomacy requires detailed attention to a number of questions: Did the United States threaten, or seem to threaten, the Soviet Union? Did observers think so? How did the Soviets react and how did observers interpret their reactions? The following analysis discusses some of the available evidence and briefly indicates answers to these important questions. Because of limitations of space, this section does not prove, but only sketches, an analysis.

[144] Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 639. Also see Truman, *Year of Decisions*, p. 419; and Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 265. Truman's "decision was one of noninterference—basically, a decision not to upset the existing plans," wrote Groves (p. 265). There is even considerable doubt about when, and under what circumstances, Truman formally approved the use of the bomb. He later recalled a meeting with associates on July 16 but most do not recall that meeting. Will Hillman (ed.), *Mr. President* (New York, 1952), p. 248; cf., Stimson Diary, July 16–17; "W.B.'s Notes," July 16–17, Folders 54 and 602.) The final approval cited Stimson, not Truman. (Marshall to Handy, July 25, 1945, H-B 64.)

[145] See Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb . . . Historiographical Controversy," pp. 9–16.

[146] Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1967* (New York, 1968), pp. 386–389, 402–408, 414, and Adam Ulam, "Rereading the Cold War," *Interplay*, II (March–April 1969), 51–53. See also Rose, *After Yalta*, pp. 113–146.

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On August 9, the day that Nagasaki was bombed, the president delivered a national address on the Potsdam meeting. The United States, he declared, "would maintain military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace." The secret of the bomb, he promised, would be retained until the world ceased being "lawless." "We must constitute ourselves trustees of this new force—to prevent its misuse, and to turn it into the channels of service to mankind." He also emphasized that the Balkan nations "are not to be the spheres of influence of any one power"—a direct warning to the Soviet Union. Here was the first, albeit muted, statement of atomic diplomacy: the implicit threat that the bomb could roll back Soviet influence from Eastern Europe.[147]

"In many quarters," Stimson lamented in late August and early September, the bomb is "interpreted as a substantial offset to the growth of Russian influence on the continent."[148] He complained that Byrnes was wearing the bomb ostentatiously on his hip and hoping to use the weapon to secure his program at the September Conference of Foreign Ministers in London. "His mind is full of his problems," Stimson wrote in his diary. Byrnes "looks to having the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing. . . ."[149] Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy concluded, after a long discussion with Byrnes, that he "wished to have the implied threat of the bomb in his pocket during the conference . . . [in London]."[150] This evidence is unambiguous as to Byrnes's intent, and it cannot be ignored or interpreted as misleading. Byrnes had no reason to seek to deceive Stimson and McCloy about his hopes and tactics. Byrnes had no incentive to posture with them or to appear militant, since they opposed his vigorous tactics and instead counseled moderation and international control of atomic energy.

How could the United States employ the bomb in dealing with the Soviet Union? Apparently Byrnes had not decided precisely how to exploit the weapon to strengthen his position. He did not explicitly threaten the Soviets but apparently assumed that the weapon itself would be a sufficient, though implicit, threat.[151] Even before Hiroshima, Byrnes

[147] Truman, radio report on Potsdam Conference, August 9, 1945, *Truman Papers*, 1945, pp. 203, 212–213, 210. Also see Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 200–203; and *New York Times*, August 26, 1945.

[148] Stimson, "Memorandum for the President: Proposed Action for Control of Atomic Bombs," September 11, 1945, Stimson Papers, and reprinted in Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service*, pp. 642–646. For similar views, see his earlier draft, August 29, 1945, H-B 20.

[149] Stimson Diary, September 4, 1945.

[150] Stimson Diary, August 12–September 3, 1945, paraphrases McCloy.

[151] Stimson Diary, September 4 and August 12–September 3, 1945; Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, October 16, 1945, EW/10–1645,

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and others, including Stimson, had assumed that the bomb would impress the Soviet Union with the need for concessions. The bomb, itself, even without any explicit statements, as Conant told Bush, constituted a "threat" to the Soviet Union.[152] Because Byrnes wanted the bomb's power in negotiations and distrusted the Soviets, he opposed Stimson's plea in September for approaching the Soviets promptly and directly on international control of atomic energy.[153] At the same time, he was urging America's scientists to continue their work to build even more powerful nuclear bombs.[154]

At the London Conference, an uneasy Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, twitted Byrnes about America's nuclear monopoly and tried uneasily to minimize its importance. Molotov's humor betrayed Soviet fears. On September 13, three days into the conference, "Molotov asks JFB if he has an atomic bomb in his side pocket. 'You don't know Southerners,' Byrnes replied. 'We carry our artillery in our hip pocket. If you don't cut out all this stalling and let us get down to work I am going to pull an atomic bomb out of my hip pocket and let you have it.' " In response to this veiled threat, according to the informal notes, "Molotov laughed as did the interpreter."[155] Byrnes's barb emphasized American power. A few nights later, after a stormy session during the day, Molotov commented once more, with strained jocularity, that Byrnes had two advantages that the Soviet minister could not match—eloquence and the atomic bomb.[156]

In this period, the Soviets never officially admitted great concern or anxiety about America's nuclear monopoly. They never claimed that it actually constituted a threat to their welfare, and they publicly minimized its strategic value.[157] Presumably they adopted these tactics because they did not want to reveal their fears and encourage the United States to continue atomic diplomacy. They even devised stratagems to suggest that they had also developed the bomb. At the London Conference, for example, Molotov contrived a scene where he "accidentally" let

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Department of State Records; and Edward Stettinius, "Calendar Notes," September 28, 1945, Stettinius Papers. Also see Davies Journal, June 28, 1945, and Davies Diary, June 28 and 29, 1945, box 19.

[152] Conant to Bush, September 27, 1945, Bush Papers, Library of Congress.

[153] Stimson Diary, September 4, 1945; *FRUS*, 1945, II, pp. 55–57, 59–62.

[154] Oppenheimer to E. O. Lawrence, August 30, 1945, Lawrence Papers, Bolton Library, University of California (Berkeley); Hewlett and Anderson, *New World*, pp. 417–424.

[155] "W.B.'s Notes," September 13, 1945, folder 602.

[156] Ibid., September 17, 1945.

[157] Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, p. 414; see also Leland Fetzer (trans.), *The Soviet Air Force in World War II* (New York, 1973), pp. 366–377.

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slip the statement, "You know we have the atomic bomb," and then was quickly hustled out of the room by an associate.[158] In November, this time in a national address, he implied that the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons.[159] During this period, as later sources made clear, Soviet scientists were rushing to build the bomb.[160]

Though Soviet officials at this time never publicly charged the United States with conducting atomic diplomacy, the Soviet media carried oblique charges. A Soviet columnist contended, for example, "The atomic bomb served as a signal to the incorrigible reactionaries all over the world to launch a lynching campaign against the Soviet Union."[161] After Truman's militant Navy Day address[162] in late October, Moscow radio charged that the United States was keeping the bomb as part of the American program "to pursue power."[163]

On October 19, J. Robert Oppenheimer complained to Henry Wallace about America's nuclear policy and about Byrnes's attitudes. According to Wallace's diary notes, Oppenheimer "says that Secretary Byrnes' attitude on the bomb has been very bad. It seems that Byrnes has felt that we could use the bomb as a pistol to get what we wanted in international diplomacy. Oppenheimer believes that this method will not work." Oppenheimer, who did not attend the London meeting, did not indicate his source. He had served with Byrnes at some Interim Committee meetings and had later communicated with the secretary on at least a few occasions, so perhaps his conclusion was based upon a conference with Byrnes and knowledge of Byrnes's earlier attitudes. Significantly, Wallace, long a foe of Byrnes on foreign policy, did not challenge Oppenheimer's conclusion. Oppenheimer rightly forecast that the Soviets would rush to build the atomic bomb and that the result would be an arms race. The Soviets, Oppenheimer implied, were worried about their security,

[158] H. K. Calvert to Groves, November 13, 1945, with enclosure, TSMDF 20. For a different interpretation of Soviet attitudes, see Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, p. 414.

[159] Embassy of the Soviet Socialist Republics, *Information Bulletin*, V, November 27, 1945, reprints Moltov's speech of November 6.

[160] Zhukov, *Memoirs*, p. 675.

[161] A. Sokolov, "International Cooperation and Its Foes," *New Times*, no. 12 (November 15, 1945), 15; *New York Times*, September 4, October 10, November 3, 1945.

[162] Truman, speech of October 27, 1945, *Truman Papers, 1945*, pp. 431–438.

[163] M. Tolchenov, "The Atomic Bomb Discussion in the Foreign Press," *New Times*, no. 11 (November 1, 1945), 17; and Joseph Nogee, *Soviet Policy Towards International Control of Atomic Energy* (South Bend, Ind., 1961), pp. 14–16. Also see Byrnes's speech of November 16, 1945, disclaiming that the United States was using the bomb as a diplomatic or military weapon against the Soviets. Department of State, *International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy* (Washington, 1947), pp. 121–124.

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and his analysis suggested that they were not unreasonable in being uneasy.[164]

Some British and American observers stressed that the bomb frightened the Soviets and injured Soviet-American relations. The bomb "overshadowed" the unsuccessful London Conference, Prime Minister Clement Attlee told Truman in October.[165] Clark Kerr, the British ambassador to the Soviet Union, explained the growing bitterness of the Soviet Union toward the United States in terms of the bomb. "When the bomb seemed to them to become an instrument of . . . [American policy, the reaction was] spleen."[166] Writing from Moscow, the American ambassador, W. Averell Harriman, outlined a similar diagnosis:

> Suddenly the atomic bomb appeared and they recognized that it was an offset to the power of the Red Army. This must have revived their old feeling of insecurity. . . . It is revealing that in early September in the Bulgarian elections campaign the Communist Party used posters to the effect that "we are not afraid of the atomic bomb." This attitude partially explains Molotov's aggressiveness in London. I have confirmation of this from a former member of the Communist party. It is not without significance that Molotov, in his November 7th [6th] speech bragged about bigger and better weapons [implying the bomb]. The Russian people have been aroused to feel that they must face an antagonistic world. American imperialism is included as a threat to the Soviet Union.[167]

In Russia, America's use of the bomb and her nuclear monopoly undoubtedly provoked anxiety and insecurity. Assessing the impact of the atomic bomb on the Soviet Union after Hiroshima, Alexander Werth, the British correspondent, later concluded, "It was clearly realised that this was a New Fact in the world's power politics, that the bomb represented a threat to Russia. . . . "[168]

The combat use of the bomb against Japan added weight to American demands for freer elections in Eastern Europe and may have helped bring about some Soviet concessions—especially delay of the scheduled election in Bulgaria in August and a broadening of the multiparty ticket there to enlarge the representation of noncommunist groups.[169] When

[164] Henry A. Wallace diary notes, October 19, 1945, Wallace Papers, University of Iowa; also in Blum, *The Price of Vision*, p. 497.

[165] Atlee to Truman, October 16, 1945, Atomic Energy Files, State Department Records, State Department; and reprinted in *FRUS*, 1945, II, pp. 58–59.

[166] Clark Kerr to Ernest Bevin, December 3, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, II, p. 83.

[167] Harriman to Byrnes, November 27, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, V, p. 923.

[168] Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941–1945* (New York, 1964), p. 1044. Also see Reston and Sulzberger in *New York Times*, August 26, 1945.

[169] On Bulgaria, Byrnes's statement of August 18, 1945, in Department of State *Bulletin*, XIII (August 19, 1945), p. 274; cf., Byrnes in *FRUS*, 1945, IV, pp. 308–309.

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the American public and Congress compelled partial demobilization after the war, the bomb constituted a valued counterweight to the large armies that policy makers mistakenly thought the Soviet Union possessed. The military use of the bomb, policy makers presumably assumed, provided some credibility that the United States might use it again, in still undefined situations against the Soviet Union.[170]

Though the bomb strengthened American policy and partly compensated for reductions in conventional forces, Truman had private doubts about whether he could use atomic weapons against the Soviet Union. On October 5, in talking with Harold Smith, his budget director, the president worried about the international situation and that the United States might be demobilizing too fast. "There are some people in the world who do not seem to understand anything except the number of divisions you have," he complained. Smith replied, "You have an atomic bomb up your sleeve." "Yes," Truman acknowledged, "but I am not sure it can ever be used."[171] He did not explain his thinking, but presumably he meant that, short of a Soviet attack on Western Europe or on the United States, the American people, given the prevailing sentiments of late 1945, would not tolerate dropping atomic bombs on the Soviet Union. Certainly, they would not then countenance the military use of the bomb to roll back the Soviets from Eastern Europe. Few Americans then cared enough about Eastern Europe or were willing to endorse war against the Soviet Union.[172] The bomb, rather than conferring omnipotence on the United States, had a more restricted role: it was a limited threat. Perhaps partly because of popular attitudes, policy makers felt restrained from employing explicit threats. Implicit threats, however, may have seemed equally useful and have allowed more flexibility: Policy makers were not committed publicly to using the bomb as a weapon in future situations.

Conclusion: The Bomb and the Cold War

Did the bomb make a critical difference in shaping the early Cold War? Roosevelt's repeated decisions to bar the Soviets from the nuclear project and Truman's decision to use the bomb in combat without explicitly in-

Also see *New York Herald-Tribune*, August 29, 1945, which cited Truman's firmness, the bomb, and the U.S. Navy to explain Russia's "about-face" in Bulgaria. See also Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 201–204; cf., Rose, *After Yalta*, p. 117.

[170] Stettinius, "Calendar Notes," September 28, 1945; Smith Diary, September 19, 1945, Bureau of the Budget Library and copy in HSTL; Bush, in USAEC, *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, p. 561.

[171] Smith Diary, October 5, 1945.

[172] See polls in Hadley Cantril, assisted by Mildred Strunk (eds.), *Public Opinion, 1935–1946* (Princeton, N.J., 1951), pp. 370–371.

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forming the Soviet Union and inviting her to join in postwar control of atomic energy undoubtedly contributed to the Cold War and helped shape the form that it took. Yet, in view of the great strains in the fragile wartime Soviet-American alliance, historians should not regard America's *wartime* policy on the bomb as *the* cause, but only as one of the causes, of the Cold War. The wartime policy on atomic energy represented one of a number of missed opportunities at achieving limited agreements and at testing the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation on a vital matter.

The atomic bomb, first as prospect and then as reality, did influence American policy. The bomb reduced the incentives for compromise and even stiffened demands by the time of the Potsdam meeting in July 1945 because the weapon gave the United States enhanced power. Without the bomb, policy makers probably would have been more conciliatory after V-J Day in dealing with the Soviet Union, especially about Eastern Europe. The president certainly would have been unable to try to use atomic diplomacy (implied threats) to push the Soviets out of Eastern Europe. Rather, he might have speedily, though reluctantly, agreed to the dominance of Soviet power and to the closed door in that sector of the world. The bomb, as potential or actual weapon, did *not* alter the administration's conception of an ideal world, but possession of the weapon did strengthen the belief of policy makers in their capacity to move toward establishing their goal: an "open door" world with the Soviets acceding to American demands. This ideal world included free elections, an open economic door, and the reduction of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Without the bomb, the Truman administration would not have surrendered these ultimate aims, but policy makers would have had to rely primarily on economic power as a bargaining card to secure concessions from the Soviet Union. And economic power, taken alone, would probably have seemed insufficient—as the record of lend-lease and the Russian loan suggests.

The atomic bomb was the most important weapon in the American arsenal, but its promise proved to be disappointing, for it did not make America omnipotent. It did not allow her to shape the world she desired, perhaps because in 1945–1946 neither policy makers nor most citizens were willing to use the bomb as a weapon to "liberate" Eastern Europe, a section of the world that was not then deemed worth war or the risk of war.

Without the bomb, in summary, American policy after V-J Day would have been more cautious, less demanding, less optimistic. Such restraint would not have prevented the breakdown of the Soviet-American alli-

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ance, but probably the cold war would not have taken the form that it did, and an uneasy truce, with less fear and antagonism, might have been possible.[173] *

[173] For other views, see Herbert Feis, *The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II* (Princeton, N. J., 1966), pp. 194–197; Kolko, *Politics of War*, pp. 555–593, 617–623; Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb . . . Historiographical Controversy," pp. 1–16.

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Official Secrecy and Informal Communication in Congressional-Bureaucratic Relations

LEON V. SIGAL

Item: When Daniel Ellsberg decided to disclose the Pentagon papers, he first delivered a set to Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and perhaps the most prominent dove in Congress. Fulbright took the material and placed it in his office safe, where it remained unexamined. Subsequently, Ellsberg decided to leak the documents to *The New York Times.*

Item: While serving as national security adviser to the president, Henry Kissinger met periodically with senior members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over breakfast at Senator Fulbright's home. The existence of these meetings was not publicly acknowledged by any of the participants until Kissinger's nomination as secretary of state.

These incidents are somewhat puzzling. Why Senator Fulbright would choose not to make a political issue out of the information contained in the Pentagon papers until after Ellsberg had leaked them to the press, and why Henry Kissinger would meet with Foreign Relations Committee members while keeping secret the fact that he had done so, have a common strand of explanation. They are both instances of *informal communication* between the executive branch and Congress about matters which are officially secret. How such exchanges of information take place often affects how those who receive the information can exploit

LEON V. SIGAL teaches government at Wesleyan University. He is the author of *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking.*

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what they know, as well as what outcomes emerge from the policy process.

Three Channels of Informal Communication

Informal communication is a commonplace around Washington. In its most mundane form, it is gossip—"inside dope" on what really transpired, the likes and dislikes of the key players in the current political game in town, the fleshing out of the organizational charts. It rises above the mundane, though, when a significant area of governmental activity is veiled from public view by executive attempts to keep it secret. Then, informal communication may provide the only information that most congressmen have to act upon.

Individual congressmen have access to a number of regular channels of information. There are committee hearings and formal reports, their fellow congressmen, their own staffs and those of their committees, and various supporting staffs—the Government Accounting Office, the Congressional Research Service, and the new Office of Technological Assessment. They can also call upon the services of various experts, private organizations, and lobbyists in and out of Washington to provide them with information. Yet these channels are not always helpful in supplying the information that congressmen need in order to make a political issue out of some governmental activity. To the extent that they can garner attention or votes from an issue, these channels may dry up at the source—inside the federal bureaucracy. Especially when administrative secrecy is invoked, routine channels alone become insufficient for supplying congressmen with the politically exploitable information they need most.

Even under these circumstances, though, secrecy seldom prevails; *official secrecy* does. Word about supposedly secret matters still tends to get around town informally. Elected officials in Congress, and even specialists in the press and the general public, can usually gain at least a general awareness of what the government is doing even when information is closely held. Sometimes as the result of a decision by senior officials in the government, but more often as a political maneuver by subordinates in the bureaucracy to circumvent the directives of their putative superiors, informal communication takes place between the executive branch and the Congress.

Informal communication flows through three principal channels:

1. Bootlegging. "Bootlegging" is Washington's name for covert dissemination of information, usually copies of internal documents given to a government official not authorized to receive them, either because he lacks a security clearance or because, though cleared, he does not have a

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"need to know" and therefore is excluded from the routing list. Congressmen and their aides fall into the latter category. Insofar as this channel supplies copies of actual documents, congressmen may regard it as the most authoritative of the three informal channels and tend to rely more on the information provided through it. While bootlegging sometimes is practiced by senior officials, it is a maneuver more common to lower-level bureaucrats who thereby may attain a measure of political support from the congressmen they supply, without themselves risking exposure and administrative sanction.

2. Informal briefings. Government officials occasionally brief selected groups of congressmen about activities not formally reported to the Congress as a whole. Because more than one, and often large numbers of congressmen or their aides are invited to these briefings, the channel is less secure than bootlegging, and lower-echelon officials concerned with preserving their anonymity tend not to use it. Usually administration officials communicate through this channel in order to mobilize political support *in advance of* a forthcoming act or announcement. Sometimes, however, informal briefings serve *as a substitute for* formal consultation or testimony before committees of Congress, whether in open or executive session. By restricting invitations to supporters of administration policy, officials can avoid leaving themselves open to the charge of failing to "inform" the Congress, while helping to ensure that those in attendance will use discretion in their handling of the information. Even administration antagonists, when invited to attend these briefings, may feel constrained by considerations of national security and their desire for continued access not to reveal the substance discussed, or the fact that the meeting took place. The congressmen who attend, for their part, receive information which the administration wants them to have, helping them to anticipate and encourage future developments, while permitting them to deny any "knowledge" of, and hence responsibility for, what is happening. The Kissinger briefing was one example; another was the ongoing relationship secretaries of state in the Truman administration fostered with Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg.[1] Informal briefings are rooted in the organization of Congress—and the allocation of bargaining advantages to members that results from this organization. Knowledge of what is going on in the executive branch is perhaps the most important resource the leadership and committee chairmen have for controlling backbenchers.

3. "Leaks" to the press. The press is the best informal channel for disseminating information to the entire Congress in a hurry. Of the three channels, congressmen may consider it the least reliable because

[1] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, I: *Year of Decisions* (New York, 1955), p. 272.

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they often find it difficult to identify the source, and hence to establish the authenticity of the information provided to reporters. At the same time, however, it is the most public of the informal channels and thus the hardest to ignore: others in and around Washington are reading the same information as the congressmen, and they may wonder why their representatives are not doing anything about the situation.

"Secrets" and "Official Secrets"

The existence of informal communication makes it necessary to distinguish between secrets and official secrets. Although a piece of information may not remain a secret forever, so long as it is an official secret, those who know it may feel politically constrained from using it or even discussing it. Herein lies the essence of the distinction Washingtonians draw between having information and "knowing." For example, the following colloquy took place between Senator Harold Hughes and Army Chief of Staff Creighton W. Abrams in the course of hearings on the Cambodia bombing:

> *Senator Hughes.* Did you at any time get information from Prince Sihanouk that he would tolerate bombing in Cambodia willingly?
>
> *General Abrams.* No, sir. I have read all those things. Where I was I did not know those things.[2]

Gleaning information from the newspaper is one thing; knowing things officially by virtue of his position—"where he was"—is quite another.

Official secrecy nevertheless may severely curtail congressmen's ability to exploit politically the information that comes into their possession. Moreover, administrative efforts to enforce official secrecy by preventing unwanted informal communication often have as their unintended consequence, loss of control over other actions of subordinates.

The way in which informal communication takes place and some of its political and administrative ramifications may be inferred from two examples: the building of the atomic bomb from 1939 to 1945 and the bombing of Cambodia from March 1969 through April 1970.

[2] U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings: Bombing in Cambodia*, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 349. A variation of the same theme came earlier in the hearings in an exchange between Senator Hughes and General Abrams' predecessor as army chief of staff, Earle G. Wheeler:

"*Senator Hughes.* General, if I ask you some questions that are still classified that you don't want to respond to, just tell me. I may ask without knowing about the classification.

General Wheeler. I will beg your indulgence, because I have been out of office so long that I am not too sure of what I do know and what I don't know" (p. 188).

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Appropriations for the Atomic Bomb

The building of the atomic bomb followed an ideal-type bureaucratic strategy—not in the sense that every step proceeded according to a preconceived plan, but rather in the sense that it was a typical path for decisions and actions to take within the government—partly as a result of some tactical planning by bureaucrats trying to attain their objectives and partly through happenstance. Among the characteristics of this strategic path are (1) compartmentalization of information, disclosing significant details to other bureaucrats as well as to congressmen only on a "need to know" basis—to those whose governmental responsibilities necessitated their having the information in order to do their jobs; (2) avoidance of outside evaluation; (3) circumvention of regular budgetary procedures; and (4) involvement of experts in and out of government in the program, committing them to its success and exploiting their presumed expertise and prestige to deflect criticism of it. Although building the bomb in the course of World War II cost $2.2 billion, the rationale of national security was used in circumventing the regular appropriations process. Instead, officials devised a makeshift process.

Still, the bomb did not remain a secret. Most senior officials in the national security process—including many who did not qualify as having a "need to know"—had at least a general awareness of the bomb's existence, usually gained through private conversations with their colleagues. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes, and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau all learned of the project this way.[3] At least a dozen congressmen found out, as did William L. Laurence, Turner Catledge, and Arthur Sulzberger of *The New York Times*, and even Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. Many in scientific circles were aware of it, both in the United States and abroad.[4]

While it might strike the Washingtonian of today as extraordinary how few officials learned of so substantial and long-lived a project as the building of the bomb, word of mouth nevertheless did get around. It is

[3] Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, II (New York, 1948), p. 1110; James F. Byrnes, *All in One Lifetime* (New York, 1958), p. 247; Henry L. Stimson, *Stimson Diary*, October 17, 1944, Stimson Papers, Yale University Library.

[4] Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, I: *The New World, 1939–1946* (University Park, Pa., 1962), p. 327; Turner Catledge, *My Life and The Times* (New York, 1971), pp. 174–176; William L. Laurence, *Dawn Over Zero* (New York, 1946), p. xi. Within the Manhattan Project itself, some scientists chafed at the restrictions and eventually rebelled against the rigid compartmentalization enforced by army security personnel. Testimony of Leo Szilard, December 10, 1945, U. S. Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Atomic Energy, *Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 179*, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., part III, pp. 293, 295.

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virtually impossible to keep a secret in a town whose denizens pride themselves on being "in the know." But being aware of the project and having detailed official knowledge of it are not equivalent. Because most officials who did know of its existence did not know officially, they could not put their knowledge to political use in any official forum. Not secrecy, but official secrecy, involving the lack of formal, regular provision of information to Congress, characterized the appropriations process with respect to the bomb.

How did congressmen learn of the bomb's existence prior to August 6, 1945? None seems to have learned through the press, although a staff man who had even a rudimentary understanding of atomic energy might have made correct inferences from stray news reports which appeared in the press from time to time.[5] William Laurence of the *Times* had attended several lectures prior to the outbreak of World War II at which scientists described the revolutionary developments in nuclear physics. On Sunday, May 5, 1940, a seven-column article by Laurence appeared on page 1 of the *Times* telling of the first chemical separation of U_{235} in a laboratory. While he made no specific mention of a bomb, he did point out that 1 pound of U_{235} would yield the energy equivalent to 5 million pounds of coal or 15,000 tons of TNT and told of German research efforts. "I had hoped that the facts would galvanize Washington into action," he later wrote.[6] One member of Congress was sufficiently galvanized to insert the article into the *Congressional Record*—a California senator who appended it to a long statement about the threat that atomic energy posed to his state's petroleum industry. Laurence followed up this effort with a long article for the *Saturday Evening Post*, which appeared in the September 7 issue. The Federal Bureau of Investigation subsequently requested that the *Post* take that issue out of circulation and asked libraries to remove it from their shelves and report the name of anyone who asked for that issue to agents of the FBI.[7] Despite security precautions, news stories did appear in the regional press alluding to massive plants producing an unspecified weapon. To anyone with the least awareness of atomic energy, furthermore, the very absence of speculation might have

[5] Lansing Lamont, *Day of Trinity* (New York, 1965), p. 163. Elsewhere in the public domain, the 1943 edition of *Minerals Yearbook* contained these two nuggets: "Uranium production in 1943 was greatly stimulated by a government program having materials priority over all other mineral procurements, but most of the facts were buried in War Department secrecy." And later: "Most of the 1943 uranium supply was used by physics laboratories for research on uranium isotopes as a source of energy." Testimony of Alexander Sachs, November 26, 1945, *Hearings Pursuant to S. 179*, part I, p. 16.

[6] Laurence, *Dawn Over Zero*, p. ix.

[7] Ibid., pp. ix–x.

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provided a clue, too. There is little evidence, however, that any congressman made the connection between press reports and the manufacture of the bomb.

Some congressmen seem to have learned by a variant of "bootlegging." One was the junior senator from Missouri and chairman of the Senate Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program, Harry S. Truman. Previous queries from inquisitive congressmen had been satisfied by replies from the commanding officer of the Manhattan Engineering District, General Leslie R. Groves.[8] But Truman was not so easily dissuaded. Having learned of the Oak Ridge facility, he sent a long-time associate to investigate the project. The aide managed to gain access to Oak Ridge, apparently surreptitiously, but security personnel quickly detected his presence. It took a telephone call from Secretary of War Henry Stimson on June 17, 1943, to convince Truman to call off the inquiry. As transcribed by Stimson, their exchange on the bomb went as follows:

> *Stimson.* Now that's a matter which I know all about personally, and I am one of the group of two or three men in the whole world who know about it.
>
> *Truman.* I see.
>
> *Stimson.* It's part of a very important secret development.
>
> *Truman.* Well, all right then—
>
> *Stimson.* And I—
>
> *Truman.* I herewith see the situation, Mr. Secretary and you won't have to say another word to me. Whenever you say that to me, that's all I want to hear.[9]

Later, when Truman contemplated sending two staff members to Hanford, Washington, to investigate construction costs connected with the project facility there, though not the bomb itself, Stimson again took responsibility and refused access. This example is too easily dismissed as typical of an era of trust between politicians in the legislative and executive branches of government, especially when one party controlled both. Tactical considerations played a part, too. Conducting an investigation of the defense effort in order to improve efficiency and cut down waste could be made to seem patriotic in wartime, but breaching security regulations to conduct a preliminary investigation without a formal

[8] Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told* (New York, 1962), p. 361.

[9] Transcript of telephone conversation between Secretary of War Stimson and Senator Truman, June 17, 1943, Stimson Papers, Yale University Library, quoted in Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition* (Boston, 1960), p. 616. See also, Truman, *Year of Decisions*, pp. 10–11; Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 365; Michael Amrine, *The Great Decision* (New York, 1959), pp. 29–30, for slightly different versions.

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congressional mandate to do so was politically far riskier—better to take the secretary's word for it now and pin the blame on him later if the project did not succeed.

Informal briefings eventually became necessary as congressional protests mounted along with project costs. Money for the bomb—$16 million in calendar year 1942, $344 million in 1943, and about $100 million a month in early 1944—had mostly been concealed in two lines of the War Department budget: "Engineer Service, Army" and "Expediting Production."[10] Senior officials concluded in early 1944 that the time had come to let a few selected congressmen in on part of the secret. General Groves writes:

> We realized from the start that this could not go on forever, for our expenditures were too vast and the project was too big to remain concealed indefinitely. And, as always happens in the case of any large construction job, rumors and distortions of the facts abounded, and could understandably become a source of concern to any congressman who heard them.[11]

On February 18, 1944, Stimson, Groves, and Vannevar Bush met with House Speaker Sam Rayburn, Majority Leader John W. McCormack, and Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, Jr. Stimson outlined the "general state of the project" and current and projected expenditures, Marshall related the bomb to war plans, and Bush sketched the scientific background and military potential of the weapon. With only that general briefing, the congressmen gave their approval to circumventing the appropriations process. Speaker Rayburn would be notified in advance of requests for appropriations for the project, whereupon he would inform his two colleagues and then tell a few Appropriations Committee members that the two items in the budget had been reviewed with Stimson and Marshall and should not be questioned. "The other members of Congress," says Groves, "would be given only the most general reasons for the need to accord special handling to our requests for funds."[12] On June 10, a similar briefing was given to four Senate leaders: Majority Leader Alben Barkley, Minority Leader Wallace H. White, and Senators Elmer Thomas and Styles Bridges, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Military Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, who would vouch for the item on the Senate side of the Capitol. Carefully omitted from these briefings and whatever questioning that followed was one

[10] Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 361; Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, p. 290, Appendix 2.

[11] Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 362.

[12] Ibid., p. 363. See also, Vannevar Bush, *Pieces of the Action* (New York, 1970), p. 133, for a slight variant.

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salient detail—that the bomb might not be ready for use before the end of the war.[13]

The Appropriations Committees never challenged Stimson and Bush on the bomb. After the war had ended, Bush recalls, he appeared before the House Appropriations Committee for the last time in his capacity as director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Chairman Clarence Cannon chided him for not telling the committee about the bomb:

> So I told them, "You remember, every time I appeared before you, I put a red-covered book on the table and told you that it contained an account of everything my agency was doing." "I remember all right," said Cannon, "and I remember stating that it was a very dangerous book, and telling the clerk to guard it carefully. But the atomic energy matter was not in it." "Oh, yes, it was, Mr. Chairman." "But," said Cannon, "we would not have understood it if we had read it." "No, you would not have understood it," said I, "but it was there."[14]

Bush draws a lesson from the charade: although no member of the committee ever opened the book, "it was a symbol, and an important one." He writes:

> By its use I had said, in effect, to the Committee, "You are entitled to know anything you wish to know about the program of the OSRD," and they had replied, "We wish to know nothing."

Not all members of Congress went along, however. When an attempt was made in February 1945 to transfer other War Department funds to the line, "Expediting Production," as a first step in turning them over to the Manhattan Engineering District, Representative Albert J. Engel, having earlier raised questions about the project, demanded a detailed justification. Stimson and Groves met with the congressman at the Pentagon, and without giving him any details about the project itself, assured him that the costs of purchasing land and constructing plants, roads, and housing were not incommensurate with similar costs in the private sector, thereby allaying his suspicions of waste.[15]

As congressional restrictiveness grew, Groves proposed extending informal consultation to include a visit to Oak Ridge by a carefully chosen contingent from the Hill. Five congressmen, among them, Cannon and Engel, were allowed to inspect the Clinton Works at Oak Ridge—but

[13] Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 289–290. It is also unclear whether or not the words "atomic bomb" were ever used. Alben Barkley, *That Reminds Me* (New York, 1954), p. 266.

[14] Bush, *Pieces of the Action*, p. 134.

[15] Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 363.

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only from the outside. None was permitted to enter any of the plants. According to Groves,

> They appeared to be entirely satisfied with what they saw, and like everyone else were impressed with the hugeness and complexity of the installation. They did not raise a single question about possible waste. . . . [16]

The issue on the Hill was whether or not the project was a boondoggle, even a fraud; there seems to have been little controversy over the question of whether nor not to build the bomb at all.

Bombing in Cambodia, 1969–1970

On February 11, 1969, less than a month after President Nixon had taken office, the joint chiefs of staff renewed a request, first made in 1968, for authority to bomb enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia, in particular, to attack a suspected enemy headquarters commonly identified as "COSVN." After a round of meetings with advisers, the president approved the request in early March despite some opposition from Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. At the same time, Secretary Laird recommended withdrawal of 50,000 to 70,000 troops from Vietnam over the course of the year. The coincidence of somewhat contradictory acts suggests a quid pro quo, granting authority to bomb in return for military acceptance of the start of withdrawals.[17]

Between March 18, 1969, the date of the first raid, and April 30, 1970, when new bombing authority took effect in conjunction with the United States invasion of Cambodia, the Air Force flew 3,875 sorties against targets inside that neutral country, dropping 108,823 tons of ordnance at a cost of roughly $150 million.[18] None of the bombing was reported to the Congress. Moreover, since Congress had given no authorization, expending money for the bombing may have constituted a violation of law.

Unlike the case of the atomic bomb, secrecy was designed to keep the fact of the bombing from the Congress as much as from any foreign power. In order to do so, the Joint Staff, at the express request of the president, devised an elaborate system of double reporting on the bombing there, as well as in Northern Laos.[19] Requests for authority to hit specific

[16] Ibid., pp. 364, 365–366.

[17] U. S. Congress, *Bombing in Cambodia*, pp. 132, 138, 140, 502. For circumstantial evidence of a deal, pp. 347, 349, 445–446.

[18] Sorties and tonnage are from "Department of Defense Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos," September 10, 1973, ibid., p. 487. The cost estimate is based on comparable figures for bombing in South Vietnam over the same period.

[19] Ibid., pp. 17–18, 132, 144–145, 155, 164.

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targets in Cambodia were passed up through the chain of command from the commander of MACV, to CINCPAC and the SAC commander on Guam, to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and finally to the secretary of defense under security procedures which limited distribution to "eyes only" of those with a "need to know." At the same time, a request to hit "cover" targets in South Vietnam was routinely processed through normal channels. Upon receipt of authority, the mission would fly over or near its "cover" target in South Vietnam, but release its bombs only when it had arrived over its actual target in Cambodia. After the planes had returned to base, operations reports on the mission were filed through the "back channel," while routine reports were filed in normal channels without revealing the actual coordinates of the strike. This procedure enabled the Air Force to keep track of logistical requirements—fuel and munitions, spare parts, crewmen—without revealing the nature of its operations to the thousands of people who had access to that data. Reports to the Congress on sorties flown and bomb tonnage dropped were based on data from the logistics reports and failed to show any bombing strikes in Cambodia. In order to operate the dual reporting procedure, ground controllers who guided the B-52's to their destination and signaled the time for releasing their bomb load had to be briefed on the actual nature of their missions. So did the pilots and navigators who, alone among the crewmen on board, had access to navigational equipment that revealed the plane's exact position. Others did not.[20]

Administration officials insisted that secrecy was necessary in order to avoid diplomatic embarrassment for Cambodia's chief of state, Prince Sihanouk, who was said to have "acquiesced" to the bombing so long as it was not officially acknowledged—although his acquiescence seems to have taken the form of an inability to stop the bombers from going about their business, rather than discreet silence and lack of protest.[21] Notwithstanding administration assertions, it is difficult to understand why it became necessary to devise so elaborate a reporting system if the purpose was simply not to acknowledge the raids officially. The regular classification system seems to have sufficed to keep comparable information out of foreign hands.

The system enabled the administration to avoid officially informing the Congress of the Cambodia strikes. In public statements, officials who were aware of the bombings, from the president down, either lied or avoided responding directly to questions about the bombing. For instance,

[20] The details of procedures are in "Department of Defense Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos," September 10, 1973, ibid., pp. 482–487.

[21] Ibid., pp. 169, 366, 389, 392–400, 460–461.

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President Nixon, in a speech of April 30, 1970, announcing the invasion of Cambodia, said, "For five years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries because we did not want to violate the territory of a neutral nation."[22] In testimony before Congress administration officials who knew provided evasive answers to questions bearing on the bombing. Secretary of Defense Laird told a House appropriations subcommittee soon after Nixon's speech: "We moved across the border from time to time when we were under attack and when such movement was necessary to protect our forces—with tactical air at times, and at times with artillery. But we did not have the opportunity, primarily because of political reasons, to move into the sanctuary areas and destroy these facilities."[23] That same day, committee chairman George Mahon and Army Chief of Staff Earle G. Wheeler discussed air operations over Cambodia:

> *Mr. Mahon.* To what extent, General Wheeler, during past months and years have we bombed the fringes of Cambodia? I don't mean that we made any public statements about it, but have we over a period of months and years bombed the fringes of Cambodia?
>
> *General Wheeler.* We have responded to attacks from Cambodia with artillery fire and air strikes.[24]

On at least three occasions those who did not know were allowed to provide—unwittingly—false reports on sorties flown and tonnage dropped, based on data from logistical reports which failed to show any bombings of Cambodia.[25]

Despite elaborate precautions, the Cambodia bombing, like the atomic bomb, was no secret; it was an official secret. Word of mouth spread through Air Force ranks in Vietnam concerning the bombings in Cambodia and the accompanying border crossings by Special Forces units engaged in ground reconnaissance. Unofficially, word slowly got around

[22] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings: U. S. Policy and Programs in Cambodia*, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1973, p. 152.

[23] Testimony of Defense Secretary Laird and General Earle G. Wheeler, U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, *Hearings: Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., part VI, pp. 796, 800; also, p. 826.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans, Jr., who was not in the chain of command on the Cambodia bombing, was one victim of this practice. U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings: Fiscal Year 1972 Authorization for Military Procurement*, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971, pp. 1245, 1284. Although the classified numbers were deleted, the figures for Cambodia were zero. U. S. Congress, *Bombing in Cambodia*, p. 85; also pp. 75–77, 90–91.

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Washington, too.[26] At least eight members of Congress learned of the bombing informally at its inception.

Seven of them, all supporters of administration policy in Southeast Asia, learned of the bombing through informal briefings by the president, his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Defense Secretary Laird, or their staffs.[27] They included the chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Richard Russell and John Stennis; minority leaders of the Senate and House, Everett Dirksen and Gerald Ford; the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, L. Mendel Rivers and Leslie Arends, and House Appropriations Committee chairman George Mahon. The choice of whom to tell seems to have been made by the president or his national security adviser.[28] That they all were in favor of the bombing seems to have been one criterion: they could thus be trusted to keep the secret.[29] In singling out some congressmen for private briefings, the Nixon administration was following in the footsteps of previous administrations. To objections from those congressmen who were not among the chosen few, administration officials defended their action on grounds that the Congress had acquiesced to the practice in the past. One colloquy between Senator Stuart Symington and Deputy Defense Secretary William P. Clements, Jr., gave the essence of the legislative and executive stands on the issue:

[26] Air Force Secretary Seamans, for one, seems to have learned of the bombing through the informal grapevine. U. S. Congress, *Bombing in Cambodia*, p. 96.

[27] On June 17, 1973, Secretary Laird stated, "I did, of course, advise key members of the Congress from both political parties regarding those missions." Ibid., p. 73.

[28] "The Department understands that the decisions on whom to advise in the Congress were made by the notifying Executive Branch individuals who apparently took into account the extremely sensitive diplomatic situation and the strict orders for security." "Department of Defense Report on Selected Air and Ground Operations in Cambodia and Laos," ibid., p. 489; also, pp. 401, 420.

[29] Senator Stennis, for one, came close to revealing the secret in a 1970 appropriations subcommittee hearing on the defense budget while trying to encourage continuation of the bombing overtly:

"*Chairman Stennis.* And with no bombing he [the enemy] is free to make that supply line what he wants.

General Wheeler. He is reasonably free, yes, sir.

Secretary Laird. We are hitting that supply line pretty well though, Mr. Chairman. We are making it difficult for him to get supplies in there. I don't want to discount it. I am sure General Wheeler doesn't want to indicate that we are not causing him some difficulty.

Chairman Stennis. I should have said no bombing in certain areas.

General Wheeler. In North Vietnam."

U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, *Hearings: Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1971*, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., part I, p. 130.

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Senator Symington. If you did not give the information to the whole committee, which is the legislative committee responsible for authorization, then how could you expect the constitutional process of appropriating money to be exercised?

Mr. Clements. Mr. Chairman, I can only abide by the existing procedures within the committee, and what your procedures have been in the historical past. As you might change these procedures, I would certainly abide by them. Now, if these procedures have changed, and it is your considered judgment that we should act accordingly, then you need to so advise us and I am sure that we will be responsive.[30]

Bootlegging was the channel through which at least one influential senator, Barry Goldwater of Arizona, learned of the Cambodia bombing. Goldwater, who had long argued against imposing limits on United States bombing in Southeast Asia, found out not from a briefing in Washington, but from officers in the field while he was on a trip to Southeast Asia.[31] Goldwater's support of the bombing was doubtless a consideration in the minds of those in Vietnam who passed on the information: they could expect him to use his awareness and his influence to encourage overt bombing against Cambodia. If so, their expectations were not at all misplaced. On numerous occasions, Goldwater spoke out in favor of attacking enemy base areas across the borders from South Vietnam. He also encouraged military officers who testified before the Armed Services Committee to air their views on the need for such attacks. An exchange he had with the commander of United States forces in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, on March 19, 1969, is typical:

Senator Goldwater. Suppose you had been allowed to deny them the great bulk of their supplies that continue to come down from the north by railroad through China, by ships into certain ports, suppose that you would have no restraints to go into Cambodia and Laos to hit the sanctuaries, don't you feel this would very materially shorten the war?

General Westmoreland. I think it would put the enemy in quite a predicament. It would materially weaken his military posture and limit his freedom of action. I think it would have a major impact on the course of the war.[32]

Although informal consultation and bootlegging had informed a

[30] U. S. Congress, *Bombing in Cambodia*, p. 379; also, p. 156.

[31] As Goldwater put it, "I did know of this, but I did not learn it from the Pentagon, I learned it from the field, and I will not go further than that. I did not know any of the details, I only knew that it had taken place, and I believe this is the way a few others on this committee learned about it." Ibid., p. 106.

[32] U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings: Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development for Fiscal Year 1970*, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., part I, March 19, 1969, pp. 357–358.

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few congressmen of the Cambodia bombing at its inception, two months after it had begun a leak made the fact of the bombing public to the rest. *The New York Times* on May 9, 1969, ran a page-one story by its Pentagon correspondent, William Beecher, disclosing that Air Force planes had "raided several Vietcong and North Vietnamese supply dumps and base camps in Cambodia for the first time." Attributed only to "knowledgeable sources," who have yet to be identified, the story could have been partially the product of reportorial enterprise.[33] But those on Beecher's beat with the greatest incentive to talk were advocates of bombing in the Air Force, who, while chafing under the bombing restrictions, may nevertheless have preferred to avoid assuming responsibility for covert bombing. By making the fact of the bombing public, they were, in effect, making the bombing overt. They also might have succeeded in demonstrating congressional support for what the article implied was only occasional limited penetration of Cambodian airspace. A month later, a four-sentence item appeared in the "Periscope" column of *Newsweek* (June 2, 1969), adding details of the use of back-channel reporting procedures pursuant to a presidential directive ordering strict secrecy about the operations.

Doves in the Congress did not make a major issue out of the disclosure of the bombing. Tactical considerations can account for the reticence of the doves, as well as the talkativeness of the hawks who had made the disclosure. Soon thereafter, President Nixon announced the first of a series of troop withdrawals which even some dovish congressmen interpreted as leading to an end to American involvement in Vietnam. Under these circumstances, a nose count on the Hill would have indicated that a vote to halt the Cambodia bombing was an "iffy" proposition. For the doves, putting the issue to a vote and losing would have been tantamount to sanctioning overt bombing there.

A second tactical consideration in the doves' failure to raise an outcry was that in relying on information communicated informally, they ran the risk of political embarrassment; if either their information was less

[33] Persistent questioning to follow up a reported sighting of bomb craters in Cambodia may have induced someone familiar with the bombing to talk. U. S. Congress, *Bombing in Cambodia*, pp. 380, 383, 402. Previous *New York Times* articles had mentioned reported bombings in Cambodia as early as 1968, January 13, 1968, p. 10; November 11, 1968, p. 19; November 13, 1968, p. 14; and April 28, 1969, p. 6, which included the "protective reaction" rationale. Just after the covert bombing began, the *Times* ran a story stating that General Abrams had requested permission to conduct B-52 strikes in Svay Rieng province, but that the State Department opposed the request. Defense Secretary Laird's change of line in testimony to Congress the previous week also was cited: "Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries are of great importance in the enemy's ability to withstand our overwhelming superiority in mobility and firepower." *The New York Times*, March 26, 1969, p. 5.

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than the whole story or the circumstances of its disclosure involved an administrative transgression, they would have been vulnerable to the charge of "playing politics with the nation's security," even if none dared call it treason. Apart from the grave constitutional questions raised by the administration's deliberate effort to withhold information from congressmen, though, even when the walls of secrecy had been breached, channels through which members learned of the bombing affected their ability to exploit that information.

Three years passed before the Cambodia bombing became the subject of a major congressional inquiry. In the course of hearings by a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, disclosures by career subordinates in the Air Force would greatly enhance the doves' ability to make an issue of the bombing.

Informal Commmunication and Bureaucratic Tactics

Tactical considerations affecting the use to which informal communications can be put are not confined to the Cambodia bombing alone, but apply in general to instances of informal communication. On many occasions in which information is not officially transmitted to the Congress as an institution, individual congressmen do obtain information informally—through informal briefings, bootlegging, and leaks. Having to rely on information acquired through these channels, however, puts congressional opponents of administration policy at a bargaining disadvantage. Seeking to contest the merits of the government's actions, opponents may find the public debate recast in terms of the *information about* those actions rather than the actions themselves; that is, the issues become: Was that information lawfully obtained? How harmful to national security is its disclosure? What are its accuracy and validity? Anticipating this turn of events, an opponent may be reluctant to proceed on the basis of the information in hand, lest he be undercut or embarrassed by it. This seems to have been the case with Senator Fulbright and the Pentagon papers.

Moreover, the bureaucratic strategy of exploiting security procedures to maximize organizational autonomy from political control has its congressional complement in what might be called the "Calhoun strategy." Calhoun refers not to John C. Calhoun, but to the hard-running fullback starring on an otherwise hapless football team whose exploits Lyndon Johnson used to recount when he was Senate majority leader. In the course of a particularly lopsided contest, Calhoun's team was totally unable to move the ball. Unaccountably, however, Calhoun did not even carry the ball once, while runner after runner piled into the opposing line only to be stopped cold at the line of scrimmage. Exasperated, his coach

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began yelling from the sidelines, "Give the ball to Calhoun!" Instead, the quarterback pitched out to a halfback who lost two yards. Again the coach shouted his instructions and again they went unheeded—resulting in more lost yardage. Finally, the coach called time out and beckoned his quarterback to the bench. "Why don't you give the ball to Calhoun?" he demanded. " 'Cause Calhoun says he don't want the ball, Coach," was the reply.

Letting executive branch officials take full responsibility for a program and going along with their appropriations requests on the basis of only the most perfunctory and informal consultation, however, does not necessarily preclude subsequent investigations if the program proves unsuccessful. Underlying this strategy are three tactical considerations in obtaining information from the executive branch: (1) the information that congressmen care about most is information which may prove politically useful in making issues; (2) timing is often the most critical consideration in deciding to make something an issue; and (3) the means of acquiring information is itself an issue which can favor one side or another in a policy dispute. Disclosing secret activity in its early stages may leave a congressman vulnerable to the charge of endangering the nation's security, but once that project shows signs of failing and an investigation is launched, he can exploit the issue of excessive secrecy as well.

Informal communication not only fails to satisfy the Congress' need for information in order to perform its oversight function, but also lessens the opportunity for senior officials in the executive branch to exercise control and monitor compliance with their own objectives. The necessity of preparing periodic formal reports to Congress is an action-forcing process for those in executive authority, giving them a pretext, indeed a need, to examine what their subordinates are doing. The elimination of congressional checks on bureaucratic behavior goes hand in hand with the elimination of executive checks.

Official secrecy entailed considerable political risk for the handful of senior officials who had personally assumed full responsibility for the $2.2 billion program to develop an atomic bomb. As Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall would acknowledge after the war, "There was a great deal of difficulty persuading them on the Hill to put up all this money on a gamble, and one that they had to take our word for."[34] In the fall of 1944, Undersecretary of War Robert P. Patterson, who was personally authorizing the expenditure of funds appropriated to the Manhattan Project, became concerned as total spending on it neared the $2 billion mark. Over General Groves' objections, he insisted that his special as-

[34] General George C. Marshall, conversation with David Lilienthal, June 12, 1947, quoted in *The Journals of David Lilienthal*, II: *The Atomic Energy Years* (New York, 1964), p. 200.

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sistant, a New York consulting engineer Michael J. Madigan, conduct a personal investigation of the construction under way. After several weeks of touring, Madigan returned to Washington to report to Patterson. In a rush to get to the White House for a cabinet meeting, Patterson asked him to come back later. As Patterson related the incident to Groves,

> Madigan replied, "It won't take me five minutes—I can give you my report in thirty seconds." Intrigued by this, Mr. Patterson told him to go ahead, and Madigan reported, "If the project succeeds, there won't be any investigation. If it doesn't, they won't investigate anything else."[35]

Groves, too, appreciated the political predicament that he was in as a result of official secrecy. "If this weapon fizzles," he told his staff on Christmas Eve 1944, "each of you can look forward to a lifetime of testifying before congressional investigating committees."[36] The need to have something to show Congress was not without consequence for future decisions: it predisposed those in charge of the Manhattan Project to press for use of the weapon in combat.

Official secrecy enveloping the Manhattan Project had a second consequence unintended by many of those who had instigated it: it kept not only the Congress but also the secretary of war and the president in the dark about many details critical to the decision on the bomb, among them, the feasibility of dropping it on targets other than large cities. The compartmentalization imposed by security procedures narrowed the circles of advisers within the executive branch. It did not permit those working on various aspects of the Manhattan Project to raise alternatives, or even to compare notes on how the bomb might be used. Paradoxically, then, officially secrecy did not eliminate informal communication about the bomb, but it did limit formal discussion in official forums where knowledgeable participants might raise and evaluate options for its use.

The reporting procedures devised to keep the bombing in Cambodia a secret from the Congress produced unforeseen administrative problems of a related sort. First, the disclosure of the bombing in the *Times* prompted an immediate investigation, which failed to identify the source of Beecher's story. Within three days, it also served as pretext for wiretapping the first of at least thirteen officials engaged in national security affairs, including Defense Secretary Laird's principal military aide, as well as Beecher and three other newsmen. Finally, it contributed to a concern over leaks and the inability of government security agencies to

[35] Quoted in Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, p. 360. See also Laurence, *Dawn Over Zero*, pp. 92–93; William L. Laurence, *Men and Atoms* (New York, 1959), p. 108.

[36] Groves quoted in Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey, *No High Ground* (New York, 1960), p. 75.

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seal them which ultimately prompted the establishment of a highly irregular unit in the White House to conduct its own investigations of leaks—the so-called plumbers.[37] Thus, a preoccupation with keeping secret operations secret led to new operations of dubious legality, which then had to be kept secret too.

The reporting procedures established to maintain secrecy for the bombing of Cambodia and Northern Laos also would have enabled the president, had he wanted to postpone the Paris peace talks, to authorize renewed bombing of North Vietnam in secret under the guise of conducting "protective reaction" strikes. Indeed, he could have done so by going outside the chain of command and circumventing Defense Secretary Laird by hand-carrying orders directly to the Air Force commander in the field.[38] With only minor modifications, however, the same reporting procedures could also permit the Air Force commander in Vietnam to order preplanned "protective reaction" strikes against North Vietnam on his own authority—which is precisely the step General John D. Lavelle took. Lavelle's deputy was struck by the "supreme confidence" of his boss in conducting the raids outside the rules of engagement in force at the time.[39] Lavelle's confidence was not rooted in the certainty that his commander would back him up: when he sought such assurances from

[37] Henry Kissinger, in a sworn affidavit, has since said of the leak to Beecher, "While there were obvious adverse diplomatic repercussions from this disclosure, its greatest effect was to raise a serious question in the mind of the President as to the ability of the Government to maintain the necessary security required for this and other sensitive military and diplomatic operations, and whether in the future he could make critical foreign policy decisions on the basis of full and frank discussions." Affidavit of Secretary of State Kissinger in a civil suit, *Ellsberg, et al.* v. *Mitchell*, reprinted in *The New York Times*, July 19, 1974, p. 15. See also, statement of President Nixon, reprinted in *The New York Times*, May 23, 1973, p. 28.

[38] This contention was part of John Ehrlichman's defense of his coverup of the plumbers' activities on national security grounds. Both General Wheeler and General Moorer denied ever having transmitted an order to the field without first getting the approval of the secretary of defense. U. S. Congress, *Bombing in Cambodia*, pp. 133, 381; *The New York Times*, June 22, 1974, p. 13; *The Washington Post*, June 22, 1974, p. 1; U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing: Nomination of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, for Reappointment as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 6–7. See also, Hugh Sidey, "Nixon in a Crisis of Leadership," *Life*, LXVIII (May 15, 1970), 28.

[39] When he asked Lavelle about the raids, General Alton D. Slay testified, "His answer was supreme confidence that—my impression was that General Lavelle knew exactly what he was doing and also my impression was 'That is my worry; you run your end and I will run mine' and it never—as a matter of fact, Charlie Gabriel and I discussed this very point and we both agreed that well, he is a big boy and that is the way he wants to run it; that is his show. . . . "U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings: Nomination of John D. Lavelle, General Creighton W. Abrams, and Admiral John S. McCain*, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 301. Also pp. 289–291.

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General Abrams, he did not get them.[40] It stemmed, instead, from his assumption that no one above him would be willing to make an issue over his stretching the rules of engagement at the risk of revealing the extensive secret bombing that had been authorized.

Subsequent events suggest that his confidence was not misplaced. In December 1971, the plumbers' investigation of the India-Pakistan leaks to Jack Anderson uncovered a bootlegging operation in the White House. A liaison office between the joint chiefs of staff and the National Security Council staff was accused of passing the joint chiefs "eyes only" memoranda from Henry Kissinger to the president. The discovery infuriated Kissinger.[41] Yet shortly thereafter, his fury seems to have abated: Admiral Moorer was nominated for another term as chairman of the joint chiefs and the two military aides involved, Rear Admiral Robert O. Welander and a yeoman, were quietly transferred out of the White House. No formal charges were ever brought, on advice of Defense Department counsel, J. Fred Buzhardt, Jr., who argued that the evidence was circumstantial, the law was not very favorable, and because of the line of defense opposing counsel was likely to take, disclosure of additional secrets was probable—presumably, the existence of the plumbers and the Cambodia bombing.[42] There is some evidence that one of Admiral Welander's functions in the liaison office was to serve as a courier to carry secret bombing orders from the White House to a nearby airbase for a flight to the theater of war and to retrieve incoming operational reports from the field for the joint chiefs of staff.[43] By conducting the Cambodia bombing in secret, the administration had made itself vulnerable to political blackmail at the hands of those who knew of the raids.

[40] Although General Lavelle tried to make the most of his conversation with General Abrams, he never asserted that he had received a go-ahead, only that Abrams had not said no. All Lavelle had was the knowledge that Secretary Laird had warned against seeking any expanded bombing authority at such an "inopportune time" and the encouragement from CINCPAC to use whatever authority he had to the utmost. *Nomination of John D. Lavelle*, pp. 38–39, 45–51, 103–105, 443–445, 451, 456.

[41] U. S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings: Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., part I (February 6, 1974), pp. 51, 57, 59.

[42] Ibid., part III (March 7, 1974), pp. 5–7, 47. Also, *The Washington Post*, January 13, 1974, p. 1.

[43] Admiral Welander testified that "my staff communications to and from Dr. Kissinger and General Haig which dealt with military operational matters were allowed to be transmitted by hand delivery outside the usual staff correspondence processing channel through the Secretariat." *Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, p. 119. In the course of his second interrogation by investigators, Welander balked on grounds of national security: "This time the questioning had an entirely different tone and thrust and began to probe my exact duties and relationship with Dr. Kissinger and Admiral

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Conclusion

Secrecy thus has a constant companion: *informal communication*. Sometimes as a matter of high-level choice, other times as a political maneuver by bureaucratic subordinates, information is passed along to selected congressmen about governmental activity that was not disclosed formally to the Congress as a body. If informal communication is a constant in the policy process, its importance is magnified in times of deliberate official secrecy.

By adopting a strategy of official secrecy coupled with informal communication with the Congress, an administration can put its opponents on Capitol Hill at a temporary disadvantage. Unable to obtain an authoritative picture of what is going on, reluctant to rely on bits of information informally transmitted, they may choose to remain silent. But policies and programs require coalitions both in and outside of the executive branch for continued political support. At the first whiff of trouble, opposition within the government, often latent, is frequently quite ready to coalesce and locate legislative allies. Then, the flow of informal communication may be sufficient to nourish open opposition in the Congress, as well as arm them with the issue of executive coverup.

Official secrecy and informal communication may conspire to render opposition temporarily ineffective. Deliberately contrived to carry out an action in violation of congressional strictures, official secrecy and informal communication may provide a legislative-executive confrontation tantamount to a constitutional crisis. Even such grave consequences as these, however, may not be as serious as the consequences of official secrecy and informal communication for control of the bureaucracy. Congress may not be able to rely on informal communication to do its job

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Moorer and various operational matters. I suggested to the investigators that this didn't seem germane to the subject of their inquiry and, furthermore, got into security classification areas for which they were not demonstrably cleared." Ibid., p. 125; also pp. 144, 183, 198–199. The next interrogation session took place in John Ehrlichman's office, in the presence of David Young of the plumbers and another White House aide. Welander testified: "After a few preliminary questions about my background, Ehrlichman presented me a prepared statement on White House stationery for my signature. This statement would have had me admit to the wildest possible, totally false charges of 'political spying' on the White House." Welander reacted "rather strongly" and refused to sign but was puzzled about Ehrlichman's motive afterward. He told the committee, "But, I would say it would be a perfect way to set me up for something of this sort, to implicate me in something where I could not feel free to go ahead and take any action on anything else." Ibid., pp. 125, 151; also, p. 160. Yet, after the closing of the liaison office and his transfer, he received a telephone call from Kissinger, who "said words to the effect, 'Welander, it has been a hell of a mess. You have acted honorably in all of this.' I thanked him and I said, 'Well, Happy New Year.' " Ibid., p. 158.

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of oversight, but neither can an administration. The formal provision of information to Congress often enables senior officials to monitor and control the activity of their own bureaucratic subordinates. Even with informal communication, the suppression of information may lead to the loss of political control over the bureaucracy—whether legislative or administrative. Secrecy seems to beget more secrecy, expanding both the security apparatus and its domain. Less information may be circulated within the bureaucracy, lest it seep out to the Congress. The less information in circulation, the easier it is for those who possess it—often subordinates—to manipulate those who do not. As fewer officials are made privy to information, the circle of those who influence decisions narrows, often biasing outcomes in the policy process.

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The Politics of the Allende Overthrow in Chile

PETER A. GOLDBERG

The violent overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende halfway through his term in September 1973 was the outcome of a three-year experiment testing whether political institutions can survive sharp transformations in their policies. Allende's downfall was the result of the choices of public policy made by his government and the responses to those choices by key groups and elites both within and outside of Chile, including the United States.

Unlike many countries in the developing areas torn by the clash of raw social forces or held together only by strong family ties, by the sheer force of personal leadership, or by brute militarism, Chile had over the last four decades developed strong civic institutions. That is, it was governed in good measure through the allegiance of Chileans—particularly the elites—to formal governmental procedures. Moreover, the organizations and procedures were those of constitutional, pluralist democracy, not of a single authoritarian party.

The Adaptability and Decline of Chile's Institutions

An institutionalized system of government consists of the decision-making structures which have come to be accepted and valued by the people under their jurisdiction. In Chile these were the presidency; the

PETER A. GOLDBERG, a political scientist, spent two years in Chile under a Doherty Foundation grant and a National Defense Foreign Language fellowship in 1966–1967. He has taught at Rosemont, Saint Joseph's, and Haverford Colleges.

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administrative bureaucracy; the Congress; the courts; the command of the armed forces; and the national political party organizations, particularly their top policy-making bodies. Each structure had its own particular governmental role, and also interacted with the others.

By the standard indicators of institutionalized democracy—a regularized method of changing political leaders, accepted formal procedures for making policy, respect for constitutional tradition, low levels of political violence, and long-established party organizations—Chile ranked as one of the most politically stable countries in the Third World. The scholarly judgment on the high level of Chile's political institutions right up until Allende's downfall is neatly expressed by Paul Sigmund's comment in a review of a book on the Chilean Senate. Disputing those political scientists who too readily discount the influence of constitutional structures and procedures in Latin American political systems, Sigmund noted that in some countries executives, legislatures, and courts "are in fact institutionalized and play an important and permanent role in national politics" and that "Chile, as demonstrated by the astounding survival of its constitution and political structure in the midst of intense ideological polarization and social conflict, has the most institutionalized political system of all."[1]

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in December 1972, President Allende expressed his own consciousness and approval of Chile's high level of political institutionalization:

> I come from a country where public life is organized around civic institutions, one whose armed forces have demonstrated their professional vocation and profound democratic spirit . . . a land whose history, soil, and people have merged in a great sense of national identity.[2]

The problem for political analysis, then, is to explain how Allende and the institutional structure within which he acted could have been overthrown and the Chilean constitution forcibly abrogated by the military coup. The simple post-facto answer that "Chile had weak institutions" will not do in view of the evidence to the contrary. Nor, as we shall see,

[1] Paul Sigmund, review of Weston R. Agor's *The Chilean Senate*, in *American Political Science Review*, LXVII, no. 4 (December 1973), 1384. On the strength of Chilean political institutions, see also Robert Kaufman, *The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950–1970* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972) and Martin Needler, *Political Development in Latin America* (New York, 1968). In his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn., 1968), Samuel Huntington uses Chile as an example of a political system with a high ratio of institutionalization to participation (at a middle level of participation).

[2] Speech Delivered by Dr. Salvador Allende, president of the Republic of Chile, before the General Assembly of the United Nations, Dcember 4, 1972.

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does another simple answer, namely that "Allende violated those institutions and so was overthrown to defend them."[3]

Traditional Institutional Practices

During the forty years prior to Allende, the system generally worked in the following way:

1. The president, either directly or through his party agents, bargained and compromised over policy and personnel with some or all of the opposition parties. Public policy decisions were the outcome of this bargaining process between president and opposition party leaders. This did not preclude either the president or opposition leaders from bargaining directly with leaders of organized social groups to promote a desired decision or shape its implementation. Nor did it preclude competitive efforts to mobilize public opinion on behalf of alternative policy positions.

2. Congress provided an arena for debate and logrolling on policy. Congressmen tended to be disciplined supporters of their party's position in roll-call votes and statements to the press, although intraparty factional views could be legitimately expressed. In addition to their role as party supporters, congressmen acted as brokers between their constituents and the bureaucracy.

3. The bureaucratic agencies provided access to a variety of organized groups as well as to congressmen and party leaders. Some, such as the agrarian reform agencies, also served as organizing vehicles for new groups. Internal bargaining among bureaucratic agencies sometimes took place to coordinate policy, but often each bureaucratic unit would tend to go its own way, enjoying considerable autonomy from presidential control. One way in which presidents coped with this was to set up bureaucratic agencies of their own within the presidency.

4. The commanders of the armed forces were concerned primarily with the status, autonomy, and perquisites of their own military institutions. In this sense they were a powerful bureaucratic interest group, but remained subordinate to the president and not highly involved in bargaining over policy and positions outside the narrowly circumscribed military sphere. The president's occasional use of troops to quell civil disturbances was considered consonant with the military's institutional

[3] The official position of the military junta that ousted Allende includes the claim that he violated the Constitution and so lost his institutional legitimacy. But the junta states that it made the coup to defend the armed forces and the nation rather than the institutional framework which it gives signs of revamping altogether, rather than restoring.

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responsibility when the job was too large for the national police alone to handle.

5. The courts, even more so than the armed forces, did not play a central role in setting national policy. There was no tradition of judicial review.[4] Although they exhibited independence of the president, the policy consequences were small. Politically, then, the courts were important largely as symbols of Chile's high value on legality and as sources of status and professional perquisites for the country's lawyers.

6. All structures honored the results of presidential, congressional, and municipal elections. These elections were competitive and nonfraudulent, thus perpetuating the acceptance of the liberal-democratic civil liberties of speech, press, and assembly.

The development of Chilean political institutions preceded the broadening of their electoral base. While some broadening took place after 1920 and again after 1940, only in 1958—when liberalization of registration requirements encouraged expansion of the electorate—did the party-and-election system encompass more than 20 percent of the population. By 1970 the electorate had expanded to 40 percent.[5]

Voting turnout increased sharply in the 1960s through the encouragement of competing party elites—Christian Democrats and Marxists —who had put the mobilization of "marginal" people high on the country's political agenda. Expanding their campaigning and organizing activities for the 1964 presidential election, the parties reached beyond their traditional clienteles and cadres by recruiting votes among the broad lower-class strata. Until then, these people—peasants, rural workers, poor urban migrants—had either not voted or had supplied a traditionally deferential and manipulatable clientele for the conservative parties.

Chile's political institutions, then, had evolved from the mid-nineteenth century acceptance of party bargaining and competition for political office by rival factions of the landowning oligarchy. These institutions had demonstrated their adaptability by persisting in the face of socioeconomic change (integration of the Chilean economy into the world market by the turn of the century, import-substitution industrialization since the 1930s); transfers of presidential power to new party coalitions (the Liberal Alliance in 1920, the Popular Front in 1938, and the Christian Democrats in 1964); and increases in organized mass participation throughout the last decade. By the 1930s the structural pat-

[4] I am indebted to Paul Sigmund for this point, made in a lecture at Haverford College in spring 1974.

[5] Guillermo Chadwick Piwonka, "Participacion politica" in Jose Garrido Rojas (ed.), *Participacion para una nueva sociedad* (Santiago, 1973), p. 186.

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tern described above had been fully formed, and Allende took office in a system that had provided the country with nearly forty years of uninterrupted institutional continuity.

Allende Takes Office: Institutional Adaptability

The transfer of power to Allende in September-October 1970 demonstrated how shared commitment to democratic institutions could induce cooperation among competing political elites.

The popular vote of September 4, 1970, gave Allende a narrow plurality (36 percent to 35 for the conservative Alessandri to 28 for Tomic, the Christian Democrat). Under the Constitution it was the responsibility of Congress to decide the outcome of a presidential election in which no candidate received a majority—the case in all but two of the last eight elections. In view of Allende's avowed Marxist-Leninist ideology, some of the more radical planks in his election platform, and his organizational support in the Communist and Socialist parties, members of the political elite proposed swinging the election to Alessandri by forming a majority coalition of the National and Christian Democratic parties in Congress. While this would have been within the boundaries of formal constitutional provision (Congress could choose between the two top candidates), it would have broken the informal tradition set by past Congresses which had always picked the front-runner.

Institutional precedents and the democratic principle of choosing the top vote-getter prevailed, and the Christian Democratic party (PDC) entered negotiations with Allende's Popular Unity coalition (UP). The resulting pact—later formalized as the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees—provided new constitutional backing for the pluralism of Chile's institutional system, in return for which the PDC agreed to vote for Allende. Specifically, the agreement guaranteed the existence of opposition political parties, and of the armed forces as a nonpartisan and autonomous institution subject only to the president's control in his role as chief-of-state. Organized social groups such as labor unions were guaranteed their autonomy and multiparty character, as were the key institutions of the university, the private school system, and the communications media. The liberal-democratic freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion also were affirmed.

This party bargaining led to Allende's ratification as president at the joint session of Congress and to his subsequent inauguration. It demonstrates the value the party leaders placed in the institutionalized system and their desire to avoid a confrontation that could endanger its survival. The strength of the party bargainers' commitment to the existing

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institutional values was sufficient to overcome economic and political upheavals in the form of (1) financial panic in response to Allende's victory, indicated by a $90 million drop in bank deposits, a 60 percent decline in the volume of trade on the Santiago stock exchange, and a rush to buy dollars;[6] (2) incidents of terror designed to provoke a military coup, the most spectacular being the assassination of the commander-in-chief of the army; and (3) the threat of civil warfare launched by mobilized partisans of Allende if he were denied the election. In the face of these difficulties, key members of the competing party elites hammered out an agreement on specific aspects of Chile's institutionalized system that were valued and to be preserved. Even Alessandri, the conservative candidate whose National party had not participated in the negotiated pact, formally withdrew his candidacy prior to the joint meeting of Congress so as to "contribute to Dr. Salvador Allende's assuming the supreme command in a climate of greater tranquility."[7]

Allende in Power: Institutional Decay

The preservation of institutional machinery is not tantamount to its effective functioning, nor is the orderly succession of presidents and cabinet ministers tantamount to effective government. Over the past forty years, as described above, the Chilean national political elites had depended upon bargaining and compromise between government and opposition parties for the general governmental stability and for some policy agreement. However, during the three years after the agreement between the Christian Democrats and the Popular Unity coalition on the terms of Allende's succession to the presidency, such bargaining behavior was almost completely absent.

A comparison of the behavior of political elites in 1971–1973 with the model we have presented of Chile's system of government based on the forty-year experience prior to that time, reveals that important institutional change did take place during the Allende period. The political institutions were increasingly divided and rigid in their inability to reach any accords in the exercise of their shared power.

The following specific changes in the relationships between the individual structures and the overall system can be observed in the 1971–1973 period:

[6] North American Congress on Latin America, *New Chile* (Berkeley, 1972), p. 27. The covert soundings by ITT to the CIA offering to finance the bribing of Chilean congressmen to withhold their votes from Allende constituted another potential upheaval, although presumably unknown to most Chileans at the time.

[7] Statement by Jorge Alessandri, cited in Juan de Onis, "Rightist Withdraws in Chile, Endorsing Allende," *The New York Times*, October 20, 1970.

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1. Bargaining between the government and opposition parties was suspended, or when attempted, was ineffective in arriving at a compromise.[8] As a result, conflicts were not resolved by bargains struck between conflicting party elites, but were referred instead to neutral third parties, such as the courts, the administrative office of comptroller-general, and the army.

2. The army in particular gained a new and broader role as a conflict-resolving force between the government and the opposition.[9] Increasingly it came to hold the balance of power between partisan forces that by themselves were unable or unwilling to reach agreement. As a result the previously narrow realm of military concern—essentially limited to maintenance of the armed forces' professional status and budgetary claims—expanded to broader areas of substantive policy.

3. Instead of bargaining with the government over issues, the opposition parties in Congress—the Christian Democrats and the Nationals in a working coalition—used their majority to impeach seven cabinet members and two provincial *intendentes* (governors appointed by the president) during this period. The use of such legal sanctions of removal thus became the remedy for unresolved differences over governmental policy; indeed, the avowed objective of the opposition coalition was to win sufficient seats in the March 1973 congressional elections to impeach the president himself. Short of the majority needed for presidential impeachment, they did pass a formal resolution in the Chamber of Deputies on August 22, 1973—little more than two weeks before the coup—accusing the government of constitutional violations.[10] While

[8] There were only three formal bargaining sessions between the Popular Unity coalition and an opposition party, the Christian Democrats (who were in alliance with the National party): April 1972, June 1972, and July 1973. The first two dealt with the dispute over the status of a constitutional amendment pertaining to the social sector of the economy, and failed to resolve it. The submission of the issue to the Constitutional Court (itself created in a 1970 constitutional amendment) also failed to resolve it, since the court ruled in May 1973 that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. The third bargaining session between the UP and the PDC, in July 1973, took place at the urging of Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, as a means of restoring "social peace" during the crisis of the second truckers' strike. The contacts were broken off after a single day, and no agreement reached.

[9] The first major example of this expanded role was Allende's appointment of members of the armed forces to his cabinet in October 1972 in order to expedite a resolution of the government's conflict with striking truckers who were actively supported by the opposition parties. Subsequently, under a law passed to control the alleged spread of guns among the population, it was the army rather than the state bureaucracy that was assigned the job of enforcing the law. This new responsibility was justified on the basis of the armed forces' position as a supposedly neutral party outside the partisan struggle between government and opposition.

[10] In effect by withdrawing their constitutional legitimacy from the government, the opposition parties were indicating that they would have no quarrel with a coup

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the impasse with Congress did not block all the social reforms sought by Allende—since he was able to use executive power to effect many of them—it did increase their illegitimacy in the view of the opposition parties who had withheld their consent. The reforms also had critical effects, which we shall consider below, on broad segments of the population and their relationship to political authority.

The deadlock and polarization between government and opposition continued as economic crisis and escalating street violence increased in the second and third years of the Allende government. Despite these serious problems, the institutions did not adapt but remained rigidly deadlocked and disunited. We can infer, then, a decline in the value of these institutions and in their capacity to induce efforts by political elites to arrive at agreement.

Allende's Attempt to Shift Basic Policies

For at least three decades before Allende, Chile's institutions were geared to satisfying popular demands in excess of the economy's capacity to finance them. Since 1940 the government had not only protected and subsidized the economic elite, but also had extended material benefits to a widening range of social strata. The first to win the benefit of automatic annual cost-of-living increases in their pay were the middle-class government employees and private white-collar employees in 1940. In 1956 blue-collar workers won the same benefit. In 1965 the Frei administration extended similar benefits to rural workers. Yet the resulting expansion of demand in the economy was not met with corresponding increases in supply, and during this period Chile incurred an average rate of inflation of 30 percent. Once import-substituting industries had been set up with the support of the state development corporation (CORFO) in the 1940s, little new investment was forthcoming, so that Chile's rate of economic growth was stagnant throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Per capita GNP rose only 0.7 percent from 1955 to 1970,[11] precisely as broader strata came to make claims for material goods and the upwardly mobile upper-middle and middle classes demanded more luxury goods.

The reluctance of private businessmen to invest put an increasing burden of capital formation on the state, which by 1970 was already accounting for about 60 percent of total annual investment. This role, however, conflicted with simultaneous increases in government spending for salaries, pensions, and other immediate welfare-state benefits. When

and were preparing public opinion to accept as legitimate a coup against the government.

[11] *NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report*, VII, no. 1 (January 1973), 5–11.

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TABLE 1

Simultaneous Increases in Mass Participation and External Financing

Year	*Population Voting*	*Loans (in millions)*
1960	23%	$ 54
1961	25	171
1962	–	208
1963	33	227
1964	37	241
1965	36	238
1966	–	258
1967	37	228
1968	–	439
1969	38	639

inflation periodically approached runaway levels, the government would cut back expenditures—typically social programs benefiting the most deprived strata, which were organizationally the weakest.

The active mobilization of peasants and urban poor by the Christian Democratic, Socialist, and Communist parties during the 1960s might have constituted a severe strain on Chile's stagnant economy if not for an increase in United States loans and direct investment during this period. Economic aid from the United States and multinational lending agencies totaled $1.1 billion from 1965–1970.[12] (This left the nation's foreign debt at nearly $4 billion, which at $600 per capita was the heaviest in the world except for Israel.) As Table 1 suggests, continued political stability under conditions of economic stagnation and increasing political mobilization, required a simultaneous increase in outside economic assistance.[13]

Pre-Allende Scope of Conflict

Political parties that are held together on a clientelistic basis keep the scope of conflict over public policy narrow; parties that utilize broad group loyalties to mobilize support expand the scope of conflict by involving more people in the attainment of a common policy. Chile's political parties fell somewhere between these two categories—as is suggested by Arturo Valenzuela's description of their "two-tier" nature. While the top leadership of the parties communicated in ideological-program-

[12] Ibid.

[13] Figures on voting from source listed in footnote 5; figures on loans from source listed in footnote 11.

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matic terms using one or another class as their principal reference group, the local officials of each party were experts in delivering small favors to a somewhat heterogeneous range of small groups. Notwithstanding the fact that "certain sectors of society are more prone to identify with some parties than with others," according to Valenzuela, "electoral analysis shows that with the partial exception of the Communist party, all Chilean parties receive some support from a wide range of social groups."[14]

This two-tiered structure of the parties reflected the nature of organized groups as well. Many organized groups existed in Chile, but they were generally narrow in scope.[15] Ranging from professional and business associations to labor unions and neighborhood councils (the latter having formed during the Frei administration), each group was typically small and sought access to government individually rather than by linking up with other similar small groups in broader organizational units—although national confederations did exist. The success of each small organized group in attaining the material benefits it sought (e.g., particular pay or price increases, exemptions from general regulations, favorable implementation of a distributive policy) depended on its individual party activists having access to government patronage. Groups elected their officers largely on the basis of which political party they thought was in the immediately most advantageous position to secure such patronage. The annual wage and salary readjustment bill was testimony to the effectiveness of such small groups, since over and above the general income and price policy authorized in the bill, provisions were made for a multitude of small-group claims for special privileges.

The real stakes of Chilean politics, then, were not broad policy alternatives, but the maintenance and extension of pork-barrel patronage to small groups. When a political conflict took place, it involved most intensely only relatively narrow and/or local groups. While broader class and ideological claims were articulated by parties and organized federations, this was usually the relatively passive posturing of bystanders to the actual conflict. The key actors were heterogeneous coalitions of small-group clienteles identifying first with one party, then another.

Pre-Allende Content of Conflict

The essential function of politics is one of selecting from among the innumerable possible conflicts in a society the significant ones to be

[14] Arturo Valenzuela, "Political Constraints and the Prospects for Socialism in Chile," in Douglas A. Chalmers (ed.), *Changing Latin America* (New York, 1972).

[15] On labor union fragmentation, see Maurice Zeitlin, "The Social Determinants of Political Democracy in Chile," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin (eds.), *Latin*

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politicized. Since even among the politicized conflicts it is "reasonable to suppose that the more intense conflicts are likely to displace the less intense," there forms "a system of domination and subordination of conflicts." Conflicts thus compete with one another for attention, and the role of activitists is critical in reinforcing or shifting the content of the most salient conflict.[16]

It has already been suggested, in our discussion of scope, that the dominant concern of Chilean politicians and their constituents was to obtain and protect small-group shares of material reward in a generally stagnant economy. The annual attention given by parties and groups to the income readjustment bill was indicative of this concern. One close student of Chilean politics concludes that "the fundamental issue around which much of the politics of conciliation [i.e., Chilean politics before Allende] revolves is wage readjustment."[17] Demands by Marxist and left-wing Christian Democrats that the consumption of better-off strata be curtailed—whether for redistributive or productive purposes—were given short shrift in the Chilean conflict system.

Another indication of what constituted the central issue in Chilean politics, among politicians and voters alike, was the recurrent pattern in which the party (or coalition) controlling the presidency suffered a loss of electoral support in mid-term elections. This political tendency closely paralleled cyclical changes in the economy and in government economic policy. New presidents typically entered office with the economy operating at below capacity as a result of previously deflationary policies designed to dampen inflation. Increased government spending would stimulate the economy to reach full capacity, but beyond that point the rate of inflation would rise sharply since no new investment would be forthcoming to raise productive capacity. At this point the dominant direction of conflict would prompt the political elite to cut back on social programs so that inflation would not reach runaway levels. The impact of these austerity measures was the decline of the government parties' share of the vote in mid-term congressional or municipal elections (thus precipitating a realignment of parties).

While the presidential party lost support, popular discontent did not go so far as to jeopardize the institutionalized system itself. The government limited discontent by retaining the capacity to provide patronage on a selective, particularized basis—even while overall programs aimed

America: Reform or Revolution? (New York, 1968). On organizational deficiencies of business associations, see Dale Johnson, "The National and Progressive Bourgeoisie in Chile," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, IV (1969).

[16] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York, 1960). Schattschneider links changes in the content of conflict with changes in its scope.

[17] Valenzuela, "Political Constraints."

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at benefiting broad sectors of the population were cut back. Broad class-based opposition thus was fragmented as particular groups from a variety of social strata continued to jockey for the dwindling supply of patronage. In short, the dominant concern of Chilean politics reinforced established consumer patterns and their resulting inflation and inequalities.

Allende's Policy Changes

Allende's commitment to achieving what he called the "transition to socialism" in Chile consisted of three main objectives: extending the area of public ownership by expropriating private domestic and United States owned enterprises; redistributing income and government services to the lowest-paid 60 percent of the population (urban marginals, rural workers and peasants, and lower-paid workers); and providing mechanisms for rank-and-file worker participation in management and community affairs. In pursuit of these objectives his government made the following policy decisions:

1. Full nationalization of United States copper companies, in effect without compensation because of deduction for excess profits
2. Nationalization of 90 percent of the banking system through the state's purchase of bank stock
3. Expropriation of virtually all large and some medium-sized farms so that by 1973, 35 percent of all agricultural land was in the reformed sector
4. Expansion of the state sector of the economy and curtailment of the private sector through the administrative takeover of some 300 factories
5. Recognition in some of the socialized enterprises of some workers' control

These policies were new departures in a country where state economic activity had traditionally been supportive of, rather than competitive with, private capital. Moreover, the pace of the public sector's expansion was set by politically mobilized groups of workers and peasants who took over factories and rural estates counting on a favorable response from the government. By encouraging such direct action, the Popular Unity parties (particularly the Socialists) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (the MIR, formally outside the coalition but maintaining informal contacts) effectively quickened the pace of the economy's socialization.

While the Allende government eventually sought to restrain such direct takeovers, it refused to use police or military force to evict the poor "invaders" of large estates. In the case of labor-management disputes in factories, the government intervened by appointing state ad-

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ministrators to replace the private owners under an obscure forty-year-old statute authorizing state intervention to resume production in paralyzed enterprises.

Allende's government also encouraged the formation of local mass organizations to provide a more mobilized popular base of support (as well as defense) and to serve as vehicles for "mass" involvement in specific administrative programs—especially those directed toward the poor and working-class citizens to whom the government gave priority. These organizations—many of which were formed in response to the October 1972 producers' strike—included Committees of Direction for the Social Area of the Economy, Communal Campesino Councils, Juntas of Price and Supply, Industrial Cordons, and Communal Commands.

To counter the government's legal basis for appointing state administrators to run factories taken over by workers, the opposition parties passed a constitutional amendment limiting the executive's authority to nationalize any firm without specific legislative authorization. Allende vetoed the amendment; the opposition majority overrode his veto; but the question of whether the simple majority was sufficient or whether a two-thirds majority was required, remained unresolved. Pending efforts to resolve this constitutional impasse, the government after June 1972 slowed the pace of socialization. Deteriorating economic conditions, however, reactivated and intensified the issue of the desirable extent of the state sector, and in 1973 the government sought greater control of the wholesale distribution system.

Effects on the Scope and Content of Conflict

By linking the takeover of each factory or farm to the broad goal—favored by the government, opposed by the opposition—of a socialist economy, the scope of conflict was widened beyond the individual workers and owners involved. The issue at stake also changed, from that of which small group would bear the costs of a particular labor-management conflict, to which sector of the economy—private or public—would prove more productive and efficient.

In addition to raising the issue of the structure of the economy, the government shifted the priorities of Chilean politics by accepting runaway inflation as a lesser evil than curtailing its commitment to maintain the flow of benefits to the poor and to proceed with structural change.[18] The state expanded its social services and subsidized food

[18] See the statement of a government member of the Central Bank, Sergio de la Cruz, in *Chile Economic News*, vol. 21/43 (June 1, 1973): "A government that is making structural changes and faces internal and external aggression [i.e., the U.S.

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TABLE 2

Changes in Deficit Spending and Rates of Inflation

Year	Government Deficits (millions of escudos)	Increase in Consumer Price Index
1967	-220	22%
1968	-374	28
1969	+244	29
1970	-681	35
1971	-10,648	40
1972	-24,154	163

supplies to poor neighborhoods; by pushing ahead with agrarian reform it incurred new expenses for administration, payment to expropriated owners, and technical assistance to the new owners. In the face of opposition refusal to vote new taxes,[19] and insufficient revenue from the export sector to meet the new expenditures, this amounted to increased deficit spending and rates of inflation—as Table 2 indicates.[20]

By early 1973 the hyperinflation was widely expected to result in an increase in the opposition parties' share of the vote in the March congressional elections, compared with their combined total in the 1970 presidential election. (As we have seen, it was a normal pattern for the government parties' vote to drop once they had been in office for more than a year—because of voter disenchantment with either inflation or austerity measures to curb it.) Contrary to the anticipated decline of the government at the polls, however, the Popular Unity coalition actually increased its total from the 36 percent it had won in 1970 to 44 percent, largely because the number of low-income citizens voting their approval

credit blockade] has the following options: reduce the speed of societal change; detain the redistribution of income; lower the level of employment; reduce the growth rate; decrease the level of capital accumulation—or increase inflation. The [Allende] Government [by 1972], with much regret, had to opt for sacrificing monetary stability." He goes on to say that "it was the lack of financial backing for the laws approved by the majority opposition in Congress that compelled the Central Bank to issue currency emissions, which resulted in rampant inflation, compounded by international inflation."

[19] In his annual State of the Republic message to Congress on May 21, 1973, the president noted that in 1972 the opposition-controlled Congress "passed approximately twenty laws which represented expenditures of almost 60 billion escudos, while at the same time providing for only 12 billion in backing—barely one-fifth of the expenses called for by the respective laws." Nevertheless, Allende continued, "expenditures will not be reduced to the point that they endanger compliance with the aims of the Government's program."

[20] Deficit figures from IMF, *International Financial Statistics*, XXVII, no. 4 (April 1974); consumer price index figures from *New Chile* and *Chile Economic News*.

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for the benefits Allende's government had provided them, more than offset the loss of middle-income voters to the opposition attributable to inflation.[21]

By this time (early 1973) it had become apparent that, despite the Popular Unity's relatively strong showing at the polls, the authority of Allende's government was in increasing jeopardy. The new policies it had adopted changed basically the political conditions underlying Chile's institutions. Those institutions had rested on the government's capacity to maintain a minimum level of support in all strata by selective distribution of rewards on a particularistic, small-group basis. Now, however, this was no longer a viable political strategy because of three identifiable changes pertaining to the scope and content of conflict: (1) increasing and broadening group consciousness, reflected in coordinated protest activity and greater organizational capacity, particularly among middle- and lower-middle-class groups; (2) increasing saliency for these groups of basic value or ideological differences with the government, and increasing attention to broad general policy directions rather than to the flow of material rewards per se; and (3) increasing levels of activity and assertiveness, encouraged by Allende's determination not to rely on police or military force to contain protest, as all previous governments had done.

Allende's new policies thus transformed the latent class consciousness of Chile's fragmented middle-income groups into a full-blown identification with the economic elite. This identification was manifested by broad organizational solidarity, coordinated political action, and articulation of ideological critiques of Marxism and appeals to tradition and order.

The contributions of specific groups and elites—international as well as national—to the deinstitutionalization process remain to be discussed.

The Response to Policy Change

"New policies have inevitably produced new kinds of politics," as E. E. Schattschneider has pointed out.[22] In Chile the response to Allende's reforms was the transformation of stable civic institutions into nothing but stakes in a power struggle. Governmental authority was beseiged

[21] A public opinion poll published in the Chilean news magazine *Ercilla* in 1972 revealed that 75 percent of lower-income households said essential goods were easier to obtain than in the past, while 77 percent of middle-income and 99 percent of high-income households said they were harder to obtain.

[22] E. E. Schattschneider, cited in Samuel H. Beer, *Modern Political Development* (New York, 1974), p. 48.

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to the point where the government found itself increasingly unable to govern. Groups formerly "tolerant" and supportive of institutional continuity acted to obstruct Allende's programs, to force his ouster, and ultimately to bring down the institutions themselves. Since the liberal-democratic regime was no longer associated with policies these groups considered desirable, they acted in various ways to destroy it.

We have already discussed the uncompromising, nonbargaining behavior of the opposition parties—the Christian Democrats and Nationals—toward virtually all government-sponsored policies. After they had failed to win sufficient seats in the March 1973 congressional election to impeach Allende, many opposition politicians believed that elections could no longer be considered a reliable political resource for preventing threatening programs of social change. The president of the National party commented that "the struggle now is not in the ballot box, but in the streets."[23]

Besides the opposition parties, the actions of the United States, the army, business and professional elites, small businessmen (notably the independent truckers), and even some factory workers, peasants, and Popular Unity functionaries constituted sources of resistance whose collective effect was to plunge the society into near civil war.

The response of United States government agencies and corporations to Allende's policies was critical to his success—or lack of it.[24] The only Popular Unity initiative that obtained the support of all Chilean political parties was the full nationalization of the Anaconda and Kennecott copper mines in June 1971. The Chilean Congress approved the nationalization bill unanimously, leaving the executive the right to assess and deduct "excess profits" from the amount of compensation to the two United States companies. (The UP government deducted all profits above 12 percent that the companies had extracted from Chile since 1955—$774 million—from the book value—$500 million—of the expropriated assets.) Thus in effect the corporations were said to owe the Chilean government an indemnity for their net capital outflow.

In retaliation for this policy decision, the United States vetoed Chilean applications for loans from the U. S. Export-Import Bank and from the multinational institutions of the World Bank and the Inter-American

[23] *NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report*, VII, no. 8 (October 1973), 3.

[24] In addition to NACLA's reports already cited, for the following paragraphs I have drawn on Federico G. Gil, "Socialist Chile and the United States," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 27, no. 2 (Autumn 1973); Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs*, 52, no. 2 (January 1974); and Jonathan Kandell, "Private U.S. Loan in Chile Up Sharply," *The New York Times*, November 11, 1973. (While Sigmund tries to refute the notion of a credit blockade, much of his own data bear it out.)

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Development Bank. Even more important, American commercial banks cut off virtually all short-term credits to Chile. Such bank loans had risen from $50 million to over $300 million a year from 1955 to 1970, as consumption demand, and demand for the importation of intermediate goods, increased. Whereas under previous Chilean administrations the country had received an average of $220 million in credits, by the middle of 1973 they had dropped to about $30 million. In effect, then, the response of the United States government and financial community was a credit blockade, forcing Chile to dip into her foreign currency reserves. By 1972 the scarcity of dollars had forced a reduction in non-agricultural consumer goods imports by 58 percent. Whereas about 40 percent of Chile's imports had come from the United States, in 1972 no more than 20 percent did so. One account sums up the economic impact in Chile this way:

> People found it hard to get certain food stuffs (like chicken, beef, pork, and potatoes); some consumer items like yarn, textiles, and medicine; and more expensive items like radios, tires, cameras, film, and photo lab chemicals. . . . The credit blockade seriously affect[ed] the Chilean transportation sector where a large percentage of all buses and trucks are General Motors or Ford models. A source in Chile estimate[d] that around 30 percent of the privately owned "microbuses," 21 percent of the taxibuses and 33 percent of the state-owned buses are immobilized because of lack of parts or tires. The truck owners who precipitated the October "walkouts" cited as a reason for striking their inability to obtain needed replacements for their trucks.[25]

It should also be noted that the American credit blockade had a widespread psychological as well as economic impact. Although Allende tried to rally support to the government on the basis of the need for national unity in the face of economic imperialism, the credit blockade raised the specter among many middle-class Chileans that the country would become completely dependent on Soviet and other socialist-bloc credits in the future, which could easily be regarded as part of a government plan to justify a socialist dictatorship at home.

The United States credit blockade aroused intense consumer dissatisfaction which the opposition parties succeeded in mobilizing against the government, despite Allende's attempt to mobilize it against the United States and for a needed "battle of production." Producers whose imports were also curtailed joined newly deprived consumers in protest strikes and demonstrations against the government. The impact of these protests caused a serious erosion in the government's authority, particularly in its perceived capability of managing the economy. The

[25] *NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report*, VII, no. 1 (January 1973), 26–27.

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United States resistance to Allende's reforms, then, was a major factor in the transformation of Chile from a civic to a disintegrated polity.

Not all United States money was cut off or reduced, however. The armed forces continued to receive substantial aid. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency covertly funneled some $8 million into the hands of striking Chilean truckers and opponents of the government to sustain the organized resistance to Allende.[26]

The growth of a widespread and well-organized black market constituted another response to Allende's reforms. In the face of escalating inflation, the government took measures to assure supplies of foodstuffs and necessities at subsidized prices to the poor by organizing neighborhood supply committees in poor districts. At the same time, government regulations restricted the consumption pattern of the better-off by limiting the amount of purchases by distributors catering to middle- and upper-class clienteles. The rampant black market, however, undermined such attempts at rationing and triggered an intense struggle over distribution of goods. The middle classes refused to accept any restrictions on their standard of living and began to coordinate their activities to defend it in mass mobilization campaigns of protest against the "totalitarian" government's encroachments on "freedom." The opposition parties refused to support a bill on economic crimes that would have given the government authority to take stern action against speculators, hoarders, and newspapers that promoted panic buying situations. The government saw this as part of a pattern in which the opposition engaged in deliberate attempts to discourage the production and distribution of goods and thus promote the further deterioration of the economy.

A critical response to Allende's policies was the emergence of class-based organizations to supplement and replace the small-group ones. This, of course, was precisely Allende's goal with regard to workers and peasants, but it occurred most dramatically among merchants, small businessmen, professionals, and white-collar employees. These groups formed organizations in broadly coordinated actions of protest and "civil disobedience." The objectives of these protests became increasingly broad, moving from the demand that the government make specific concessions to their economic interests, to the demand that it halt the transition to socialism altogether, to the demand that it resign or be removed.

Mass protest under Allende had its first sources in the middle- and upper-class housewives of Santiago who in December 1971 protested that their customary food supplies were becoming difficult to obtain. In October 1972 the Confederation of Truck Owner-Operators—aided by the

[26] *The New York Times*, September 8, 1974; ibid., September 24, 1974.

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CIA—struck against the government's plan to create a state trucking enterprise, and masses of sympathetic merchants and professionals joined the strike. The Confederation of Small Merchants, the Confederation of Small Industry, the Chamber of Commerce, and the National Front of Professionals all backed the strike, and drafted a "Petition of Chile" addressed to the government and signed by each local organization. The strike, which lasted twenty-six days and severely aggravated supply shortages, was symptomatic of the belief of much of Chile's lower middle class and small businessmen that they would be put out of business by the government just as the economic elite with larger businesses had been. It was also a demonstration of a new class solidarity and organizational capacity among these people. In July 1973 the truckers' confederation began a second strike which by September 1973 had strangled Chile's flow of supplies to the breaking point, a major contribution to the crisis atmosphere in which the coup took place.

This crisis atmosphere was intensified during the last few months prior to the coup by a series of acts of sabotage against bridges, factories, radio transmitters, the homes of prominent government and loyalist army officers, etc. In August a nationwide broadcast by President Allende was blacked out by the bombing of electric pylons in Santiago. This violence increased the insecurity of many Chileans and must have contributed to the feeling that the government had lost the capacity to provide basic security. Military figures favorable to the president came under increasing pressure from their subordinates to end their association with the government. One, the president's naval aide, was assassinated in July 1973.

The response of the armed forces to Allende's policies had at first been in accordance with the Chilean military's forty-year tradition of constitutional support for the elected president. While the top officers continued to give their loyalty to the president, a group of colonels in the army began conspiratorial planning in November 1972 to overthrow the government.[27] The conspiring colonels shared the opposition of the United States and the middle-class protestors toward Allende's policies. Once the conspiracy was launched, it follows that the conspirators—as well as the civilians with whom they consulted—lost all interest in working toward any accommodation between the government and the opposition parties. In the words of one officer after the coup, "we [the colonels] would have acted even if Allende had called a plebiscite or reached a compromise with the political Opposition . . . [since] we felt

[27] Jonathan Kandell, "Chilean Officers Tell How They Began to Plan the Take-Over Last November," *The New York Times*, September 27, 1973. The quotation in this paragraph is from this article.

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that no politician could run the country and that eventually the Marxists might be even stronger."

Even among the government's main sources of support there was some behavior that contributed to economic difficulties and deinstitutionalization. The government hoped to increase production—particularly in the newly nationalized industries, including the copper mines and the agrarian reform cooperatives—so as to be able to meet *both* the customary expectations of the middle-income groups *and* the unmet needs of the poor. In this they relied heavily on the political solidarity of the workers and peasants in the reformed socialized sector of the economy. While these people did indeed tend to support the government with their votes (as did the urban poor employed in public works programs), they tended to be more interested in their pay than in participating in a revolutionary process.[28] Interviewing workers and peasants in the expanded state sector, James Petras found ample evidence of particularistic and "economist" attitudes, but scarcer evidence of "socialist consciousness" or strong commitment to support the government by producing more and asking for less. He suggests—as was advocated by more radical groups in Allende's coalition—that greater provision for workers' control in the management of the nationalized firms would have deepened their ideological commitment to the success of the government's program, increased their production, and encouraged their willingness to make material sacrifices.

The officials of the state enterprises, moreover, were apparently not always immune to diverting some of the goods produced within them to the black market; while this added to their personal upward mobility, it increased the scarcity of goods by reducing the government's capacity to ensure their wide distribution, and added to price inflation. The general claim by the opposition of Marxist mismanagement was no doubt distorted, but self-criticism by the Communist daily *El Siglo* suggests that the problem of black-market corruption was not altogether absent from the government's own cadres:

Any all-out offensive against the enemies of the people would be quite

[28] James Petras, "Political and Social Change in Chile," in Petras (ed.), *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution* (New York, 1973), pp. 29–34. While the Central Labor Confederation (CUT) supported the government by calling a one-day work stoppage (June 21, 1973) to counter the antigovernment strike of the truckers and other middle-class groups, Petras found that "paradoxically the growing number of radical voters among the working class and peasantry have become increasingly apathetic." He attributes this to their limited role in the revolutionary process; with few serious attempts at workers' control, he says, all that is left to the broad mass of the population is "the chore of voting and occasional rallies to support the government's legal standing."

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> pointless if it were not accompanied by a determination to put one's own house in order. Some Popular Unity militants are working hand in hand with the worst reactionary elements. They have no scruples about organizing a black market with the "momios" [the reactionaries], cornering all available products, and living it up. Whatever the political party they belong to, membership cannot be a passport to dishonesty or inefficiency.[29]

In sum, by 1973 it became increasingly legitimate to disobey the government's regulations, ignore its pleas, discount its threats, and sabotage its programs in wide areas of the middle class from well-to-do professionals and businessmen to modest merchants and small businessmen. As for the government's supporters and primary beneficiaries, they had demonstrated considerable loyalty at the polls in the March 1973 congressional elections and had worked impressively to keep the economy going during the October 1972 massive producer boycott, but in general they were less actively and broadly mobilized than the antigovernment forces. The decline in governmental authority among the latter was not sufficiently redressed by an increase in governmental authority among the former. This net decline in public authority, the deadlock between government and opposition, the mass demonstrations of protest, the increasing economic crisis, the active plotting within the military—all signaled by 1973 the downward spiral of civic politics into anarchy and authoritarianism.

The Quality of Allende's Leadership

While the government of Salvador Allende did achieve substantial reforms, their impact was not the movement toward a new political community that he desired, but rather the breakdown of institutions, community, and civic politics.[30]

Allende failed to achieve his goal of a peaceful transition to socialism not because he lacked the skills of political leadership. On the contrary, he and most of his cabinet were skilled players in the game of politics in Chile,[31] and his performance in office included many well-estab-

[29] Quoted in "Chile's Ailing Revolution," *Le Monde*, June 20–21, 1973.

[30] The number of people killed in the coup and its immediate aftermath is conservatively estimated at 2000, and the number of political prisoners is many times that. During the Allende period less than 100 people were killed in political confrontations of one kind or another, there were no political prisoners, and no newspapers were closed or censured.

[31] Allende was a founder of the Chilean Socialist party in the early 1930s, a minister of health in the Popular Front government of the early 1940s, a three-time presidential candidate before winning in 1970, a successful vote-getter and long-time senator, and president of the Senate during the Frei period. In 1970 his defeated op-

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lished institutionalized political patterns. While we have noted that the government generally avoided bargaining with the opposition parties, it did make several attempts to negotiate agreements with them, including Allende's last-minute call for a dialog with the Christian Democrats in an attempt to restore social peace shortly before the coup. While it is true that he was overly sanguine about the strength of the Chilean middle-class commitment to legal procedures and constitutional legitimacy as a means of reconciling them to his reforms, he did more to gain middle-class support than merely lecturing them on the responsibilities of constitutional opposition. Perhaps his most important effort in this direction was his decision to reorganize his cabinet in June 1972, which marked a halt in the nationalization process, restraint of his more radical supporters who urged workers' control and further takeovers, and an emphasis on labor discipline and production rather than labor militancy and revolution.[32] He also made important efforts to keep the loyalty of the army by attending to their various material, professional, and status claims, by the tactical shifting of commanders allowed by the prerogatives of the presidency, and by his repeated public praise for the loyalty and constructive role of the armed forces in Chilean development.

A cogent explanation of his ultimate failure in leadership lies in his very determination to shift basic policies, and the consequent change in the conditions of political groups, already described, which made ineffective many of the conventional tools of Chilean presidents to maintain, broaden, and solidify their base of support. He failed precisely because he had succeeded in changing the conditions on which the stability of Chile's institutionalized system rested—fragmented small groups obtaining short-run material rewards through competing patronage parties and open credit lines to the United States. Under the new conditions he could have obtained sufficient support only on terms incompatible with his socialist ideals, such as by outlawing and crushing the MIR, dropping his efforts to subsidize the poor, or returning all industrial property seized by the state. All of these, however, were policy shifts precluded by his commitment to basic change, and thus inconsistent with his sense of obligation as a political leader. That he also had assumed an obligation to preserve Chile's constitutional democracy might make his suicide (if indeed it was suicide and not murder) the tragedy of a man who realized, as the military planes bombed La Moneda, that

ponent Alessandri referred to his "long and proven democratic conviction, reflected in attitudes of constant respect for the Constitution and the laws (that) are well known."

[32] The government did, however, push for a bill to nationalize the wholesale distribution and marketing system in 1973.

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TABLE 3

Percentage of People in Greater Santiago Agreeing with Four Alternative Views of Social Classes

Views	*Percentage*
The existence of social classes is a natural fact that cannot be changed	15.0
The problem of social classes is not resolved by stripping the upper class of its wealth, but by elevating the economic and social level of the lower class	50.3
The problem of social classes is resolved by stripping the upper class of its wealth to elevate the standard of living of the lower class	25.0
Inequality between classes is resolved definitively only through class struggle	9.7

his competing obligations had proved to be irreconcilable, and that neither would prevail.

While Allende tried to persuade the middle classes to bear a more equal share of the burden of national development in a time of imperialist pressures from abroad and right-wing extremist reaction at home, the opposition succeeded in persuading them that the issue was one of defending their hard-won material life-styles against the government's pressures to install a revolutionary dictatorship. The conflict between the government and the opposition, then, was between alternative ways of defining the dominant stake of Chilean politics.

Why was the large Chilean middle-class relatively impervious to Allende's way of defining the issue? The economic elite in Chile enjoyed considerable legitimacy historically, and in the late 1960s began to organize to defend this legitimacy when it came under attack by the left-wing faction of the governing Christian Democrats. The organizational ties with small and medium business established at that time were the basis for the increasingly militant class consciousness of the middle classes in the face of the Allende government's policies designed to isolate the elites; they were also the basis for organizing the black market. The legitimacy of the rich and the predisposition of middle-class strata to identify with them is suggested by the survey data in Table 3 on the public's attitudes toward social classes in 1966.[33]

Finally, the ultimate failure of the Allende government was to convince the middle classes that a long-term economic and social crisis ex-

[33] Centro de Estudios de Opinion Publica (CEDOP) as reported in *El Mercurio*, January 8, 1967. The same survey revealed that 42 percent of all Chileans considered themselves middle class, 22 percent "popular" (or working) class, 28 percent "humble people," and 5 percent *gente acomodada* (upper-middle or bourgeoisie).

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isted in Chile, and that the government's policies were a response to that crisis. Instead, most regarded the only crisis as the shortage in consumer goods and the runaway inflation, both of which they blamed largely on the incumbent government.

Basically, the middle classes were simply not dissatisfied enough when Allende took office to convince them that his policies were justified if any sacrifices were involved. Competing with the claims and actions of the opposition, the government was at a disadvantage because of the conservative, consumptionist, and status-conscious predispositions of many middle-class Chileans. Only if the United States had helped to ease the economic strain—rather than intensify it—or if Allende could have established a revolutionary dictatorship—a means he regarded as essentially contradictory to the ends he sought—was it likely that he could have succeeded.*

* The author would like to thank Douglas A. Chalmers, Harvey Glickman, Sidney Waldman, Sara Shumer, and Robert Mortimer for their comments on an earlier draft.

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JFK Through Russian Eyes

NELSON W. POLSBY

Over the last few years a number of American scholars have made the casual observation, based on brief interactions with their Russian counterparts, that it is very difficult to get Soviet specialists in United States studies interested in discussing American politics. To Americans who specialize in American politics, this is invariably puzzling and disconcerting, for many of us see in the American political system a complexity that poses, no less to us than to others, a formidable array of intellectual challenges. Consequently we are on the whole eager to learn what the fresh perspectives of outsiders can offer to our common understanding of the ins and outs of American politics. With a fair frequency, we are richly rewarded by foreign observers: Tocqueville, Bryce, and Ostrogorskii are of course still read and pondered by American specialists on America. In our own day we have been enlightened by the late Denis Brogan, by Henry Fairlie, Max Freedman, M. J. C. Vile, and many others, mostly journalists, who have successfully turned their hands to explaining America to Americans, as well as to readers in their own homelands. Not all their observations have by any means been flattering, but a warts-and-all portrait is the highest compliment an inquiring visitor can pay a society that purports to be open.

American politics specialists at the U.S.A. Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, such as Anatolii A. Gromyko, have not yet entered into

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NELSON W. POLSBY is professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley. His latest book is *Political Promises: Essays and Commentary on American Politics.*

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this lively international commerce of ideas and observations about contemporary America. In general, the subject matter that has evidently preoccupied them most has been recent and contemporary United States-Soviet relations from the Soviet rather than the American perspective, and their energies have focused upon giving an account of these relations that squares with official Soviet justifications and explanations.

Since such accounts are copiously available directly from official sources, it is hard to grasp the utility, even from the standpoint of the Soviet government, of researchers at their main center of academic study of the United States occupying themselves in this way. Presumably at some level of Soviet society it ought to be useful and desirable for the study of the United States to proceed at a level of comprehension and with a breadth of interest that approximates the subtlety and insight that other highly competent foreign observers bring to the subject. Perhaps in the future, a movement in that direction will become evident.

For the present, however, we have Anatolii Gromyko's book, the first political treatise to be made available here in English from the U.S.A. Institute.[1] It is a product of a somewhat different spirit. At many points Gromyko (who is, incidentally, the son of the Russian foreign minister) provides his readers with reminders of the conflicts which have in past years agitated United States-Soviet relations. At some points he offers interpretations of United States institutions and events that possess the novelty of being at variance with the current American understanding of these matters, but at no point are his interpretations argued with a coherence or supported by evidence sufficient to display their merits, if any, to maximum advantage.

For example, Gromyko's assessment of the official explanation of President Kennedy's assassination is as follows: "It presented facts and judgments—at times resembling half-truths—which can be either accepted or rejected."[2] No real justification for the implied criticism of the Warren Commission is offered; instead Gromyko moves promptly forward to speculate that "It is common knowledge . . . that the various groups of American monopoly capital engage in a furiously competitive struggle, which often produces tragic consequences for the individual—even if he is rich and powerful. Kennedy, as a member of the Boston financial grouping, with his close ties to Wall Street, doubtlessly displeased rival monopolists."[3]

[1] Anatolii A. Gromyko, *Through Russian Eyes: President Kennedy's 1036 Days*, authorized trans. edited by Philip A. Garon, with an epilogue by Hans J. Morgenthau (Washington, D. C., 1973). (Originally published in Moscow, 1971.)

[2] Ibid., p. 6.

[3] Ibid.

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There is much, much more of this sort of stereotyped rhetoric in the service of mushy analysis in this book, and the mush extends far beyond the discussion of discrete events. For example, it is worth quoting Gromyko's understanding of the normal workings of the U.S. Senate at length:

> [T]he members of such an influential American political institution as the upper house of Congress, the Senate, must often stick together on the most critical questions of American domestic and foreign policy, even when their personal convictions dictate otherwise. Is this not a confession of the existence of the class discipline in people who serve monopoly capital! And, simultaneously, it is a reminder that, contrary to the bourgeois propagandist assertion that congressmen are "responsible only to their constituents," the situation is entirely the opposite.
>
> To behave in the Senate "like everybody else" and "to get along with one's colleagues" means being under the control of the Republican or Democratic party machine. Of course, it would be misleading to think that this or that senator is just a pawn in the hands of the Republican or Democratic party leader and his assistants in the Senate. A senator is "independent" to a certain extent, but only within rigid limits. If one or another among the "people's representatives" begins to ignore the opinion of the party leadership in the Senate, the leadership begins to threaten him, to put it mildly, with great trouble.
>
> Senators may, of course, take "independent positions" on this or that domestic or international problem. This is due to the conflicting interests of American monopolies and nothing else. But a senator is in trouble when he begins to diverge from the official line and thinks that the course of action adopted by the government will ultimately jeopardize American prestige in the international arena. Political rivals then call him "a naive and short-sighted political dilettante."[4]

As a fairly devoted reader of the newspapers, I have to confess that I have never run across this particular American epithet. Conceivably something has been lost in translation from English to Russian and then back into English again. No such difficulty is apparent at other points, however. For example, Gromyko rather long-windedly describes a 1959 meeting at which Senator John Kennedy planned his presidential campaign in a passage reprinted in the appendix to this article. For convenience, Gromyko's account is juxtaposed with Theodore White's description of the same meeting, as it appears in his 1960 book.[5]

The two accounts continue, in some places dovetailing remarkably. Because Gromyko does not mention White's decade-old account, one leaps

[4] Ibid., p. 26.

[5] These passages are quoted from Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1960*, copyright Atheneum House, Inc. © 1961 (New York, 1961), pp. 49–53. The corresponding passages from Gromyko are from pp. 31–36.

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to the hopeful inference that the differences between bourgeois and socialist perspectives on the same event can easily be exaggerated.

It would be wrong to suggest, however, that Gromyko shares White's fascination for the telling anecdote, or for the colorful details of American domestic political maneuver. On these matters Gromyko is mostly silent, and understandably so, given his view of what the real mainsprings are of American domestic politics during the Kennedy era.

Enough of Gromyko's own words have been quoted to make clear his vision of what American domestic politics really consist of—namely, a ruling class of "monopolists" whose primary preoccupation is self-aggrandizement vis-à-vis one another and the Soviet Union. At any given time, it appears various monopolists may differ about strategy and tactics, and Gromyko himself records spectacular instances of bickering within the ruling circle, including his ingenious interpretation of the Kennedy assassination quoted above. He also has words of praise for the maverick Cleveland industrialist Cyrus Eaton, an old friend of the Soviet Union. Then there is the anomaly of Richard Nixon's defeat of Nelson Rockefeller in 1960 for the Republican presidential nomination. "The fierce competitive struggle among American monopolies," Gromyko explains, "seriously hampered Nelson Rockefeller's plans. The monopolistic groupings which support the Republican party gravely feared that one of their monopolistic competitors would stand at the helm of governmental power and begin using the influence of the governmental machinery (in a broader manner than they could allow) to enrich still further his own monopolies."[6]

The prolonged repetition of any set of syllables tends to rob them of meaning and Gromyko's use of the term "monopoly" runs that risk. The very idea of monopoly, which entails the absence of competition, loses some of its coherence in a coinage like "monopolistic competitor." After a while, it makes more sense simply to stipulate that Gromyko probably means "unpleasant businessman" when he uses the term "monopolist," and to recognize that he has only the dimmest conception of the manifold ways in which the American business community is organized, or relates to politics. This is clear, for example, when Gromyko refers to the National Association of Manufacturers as "currently the brain center of American monopoly capital."[7] Indeed, the passages in which he discusses the main components of the "monopolistic groupings" (the Morgans, the Rockefellers, and so on) are reminiscent of a bygone era. More up-to-date is the astounding disclosure that "John Kennedy's personal wealth was by American standards comparatively small—$11 million."[8]

[6] Gromyko, pp. 41–42.
[7] Ibid., p. 79.
[8] Ibid., p. 74.

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The largest part of the book is devoted to an assessment by Gromyko of the pros and cons of various Kennedy administration activities. In some respects, Kennedy is given unexpected credit. What seem in retrospect to be saber-rattling campaign speeches, Gromyko contrasts favorably with Nixon's 1960 foreign-policy stance, and he makes the utterly unfounded claim that American voters preferred Kennedy on foreign-policy grounds. This is the opposite of what public opinion surveys found at the time, but for all of Gromyko's professions of interest in what the mood of "the people" was, it is apparent he is entirely oblivious to the most reliable and widely available information on the subject.

The balance of the book is taken up with meaningless details that might have been cribbed from old copies of *Time* magazine: "Arriving at his residence, Kennedy went immediately to his bedroom, ornamented with blue-gray silk, where Louis XVI once slept. First, he needed a bath. . . ."[9] Interspersed with this sort of trivia are illuminating editorial remarks: "English and French circles refused to understand the forward-looking and peaceable nature of the Soviet Union's proposals."[10]

Although students of American politics will find *Through Russian Eyes* pretty dreary hackwork, it is conceivable that there are some morsels in the book for students of Soviet politics. How delightfully dexterous, for example, is Gromyko's treatment of the 1961 Vienna summit meeting, the erection of the Berlin Wall (described as "defensive installations" and "border protection measures"), and the subsequent Cuban missile crisis. Throughout, the name Khrushchev does not occur. Indeed, the name of Kennedy's Russian opposite number appears nowhere at all in a book preoccupied with Soviet-American relations in the early 1960s.

This, no doubt, is a phenomenon specialists on Soviet politics can explain. While they are at it, they can also tell us what purposes might be served by the American publication of such an unfriendly piece of propaganda in these days of so-called detente. For it is a sad fact that *Through Russian Eyes* is little more than unfriendly propaganda. It contains few facts and no slogans unavailable elsewhere, and so in a sense can be regarded as a notably dispensable book. Viewed as a document rather than as an intellectual contribution, however, the book yields the somber message that the days of Lysenkoism may be over for the biological sciences in the Soviet Union, but in the realm of social inquiry there is as yet no tradition of independent empirical investigation whose products are free from the obligation to provide occasion for the ritualistic observance of the official interpretations of events. Until the Soviet Union is able to create such a tradition, her "scholars" will not be contributing to the ongoing flow of findings and discoveries that inform

[9] Ibid., p. 133.
[10] Ibid., p. 134.

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contemporary scholarship about American affairs. Moreover it is doubtful that they will even be able to put this stream of accumulating knowledge to much use in their own country, other than as grist for the propaganda mill. This, somehow, seems a notably banal sort of employment for the assembled experts of an Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and it suggests that the leaders of the U.S.A. Institute have their work cut out for them in the years ahead if they intend to create a role for themselves more in keeping with modern standards of serious political inquiry that prevail elsewhere.

Appendix

Gromyko

A small group gathered on October 28, 1959, at Robert Kennedy's home in the little town of Hyannis Port, Massachusetts. They made themselves comfortable in the living room, where green and yellow chairs were colorfully arrayed. It was a golden autumn outside, with the falling leaves covering the still emerald-green lawn.

White

Of all the groups that were then meeting in this germinal season of politics none, however, was more important than the group that met at Hyannisport, Massachusetts, on Wednesday morning, October 28th, 1959. . . .

They met in the living room of the home of Robert Kennedy, the same living room that one year and eleven days later was to be their command post on election night. It was, as the participants remember, a frosty New England day, quite clear; . . . and through the windows beyond the fireplace they could see the turning fall color of the New England leaves, flaunting their red and gold against the dead winter green of the scrub pines of the Cape. . . .

The room in which the men met was a simple one too—furnished in yellow and green lounge chairs, several worn easy chairs and a hassock or two; open to the sun, dominated by a big fireplace, it was a comfortably large room for either party or conclave.

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Gromyko

Sixteen men were present at the meeting called by John Kennedy. Not all of them would leave a clear imprint on Kennedy's election campaign, but without the help of most of those assembled, Kennedy would hardly have become President.

Who were these people?

Besides John Kennedy and his brother Robert, there were two Irishmen present, both long-time Kennedy assistants. One was Kenneth O'Donnell, lean and dark-haired, 35 years old and a former football team captain at Harvard University. The other was Lawrence O'Brien, 42 years old, a broad-faced, stocky man. Both had already worked for Kennedy for eight years.

O'Donnell and O'Brien each had their own special skills. O'Donnell was an excellent election campaign tactician, while O'Brien had the reputation of a first-class organizer. The pair worked well together and became a unique tandem, with whose aid Kennedy won elections, leaving his opponents trailing far behind. O'Donnell and O'Brien utilized the Kennedy family fortune to attract to their boss' side a large number of ambitious young men, who also mapped victories for Kennedy in the Massachusetts political arena.

White

Sixteen people attended this conclave, and it is well to pause and study them, for their craftsmanship and vitality were in the next year to create a President. . . .

Of the sixteen, nine at least should be starred for the record, for it was these nine who together created and directed the machinery that was to give them, a year later, in this room, their victory.

There were, to begin with, the candidate himself, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and his brother Robert, host of the gathering; forty-two and thirty-three years old, respectively.

There were, next, two young men from Massachusetts. Kenneth O'Donnell, thirty-five, a former Harvard football captain, team mate of Robert Kennedy at college, is a dark, lean, slight-figured man, tactiturn, whose expression throughout the following year was to alternate publicly only between a quiet curiosity, expressed by raised dark eyebrows, and quiet amusement, expressed by the faintest turning of his mouth in a smile. O'Donnell's partner was Lawrence F. O'Brien of Springfield, Massachusetts, forty-two, a placid, stocky man with a round benign face, an endless capacity for work, never ruffled, almost unfailingly gentle. O'Donnell and O'Brien were a team, like quarterback and blocking center—O'Donnell the tactician, O'Brien the organizer. They thought in almost identical terms, and when they expressed an idea it was impossible to say whether it had come first from one or the other. They had been working in harness now for Kennedy for eight years; together they had overturned Massachusetts politics.

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Gromyko

Seated in a chair near the Irishmen was a still quite young man named Theodore Sorensen, who was 31. Sorensen never spoke loudly and seemed to prefer listening, rather than trying to persuade others with his comments. Sorensen had already worked seven years for Kennedy. He was a knowledgeable, highly educated individual, who knew how to set forth his ideas accurately, concisely and clearly, in good literary style. Kennedy called him "my intellectual blood bank." But, most important, Kennedy and Sorensen as a rule thought "on the same wavelength." In truth, Kennedy assigned Sorensen the task of preparing drafts of his speeches more often than any of his other advisers. Sorensen became Kennedy's "alter ego"—his "second I." He played a prominent part in formulating Kennedy's political platform, acting as the source of many ideas.

White

. . . As a team, O'Donnell generally handled the candidate's person and reflections, transmitting the directives to O'Brien, who commanded the base of organization. Beyond these, but not at Hyannisport that morning, was a phalanx of other young men, *their* people, whom they had brought up in Massachusetts politics, who would staff and operate the campaign for the next year. These men were Kennedy's operating political arm.

There was, next, sitting beside the candidate, Theodore C. Sorensen, then thirty-one. If O'Donnell and O'Brien were stewards of Kennedy's political personality, then Sorensen was steward of the candidate's intellectual personality. "My intellectual blood bank," Kennedy styled him late in the campaign. Tall, handsome, even more youthful in appearance than his age, quiet-spoken, shy, Sorensen, perhaps as much as any man, had helped educate the candidate to his present views. A gut-liberal (his father, in Nebraska, had been George Norris' campaign manager), Sorensen had now been with Kennedy for seven years; his introspection, his reading, his elegant writing, had stimulated many of Kennedy's finest thoughts and expressions. Hired originally as little more than an intellectual valet by the young Senator from Massachusetts in January, 1953, just after Kennedy had been elected to the seat, Sorensen had, by his learning, his dedication, his total devotion to his chief, become almost a lobe of Kennedy's mind. Through Sorensen were to filter, in the coming year, all major policy decisions on matters of national or international importance.

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Gromyko

Another participant at the conference was Stephen Smith, the husband of Kennedy's sister Jean, a man of great administrative and organizational ability. He subsequently became the individual responsible for the financial aspects of the election campaign. Smith was also given the task of mobilizing thousands of "volunteers," who were to carry out the instructions of Kennedy's election headquarters.

Among the others, Louis Harris, a prominent specialist in the analysis of American public opinion, must be mentioned. While still a very young man Harris had formed a company to engage in United States market surveys. This work was so successful that Kennedy noticed Harris and offered him a job.

Pierre Salinger, age 34, was slated to play a role of no small importance. This dark-haired man with a round face had something of a Frenchman about himself. He knew how to get along with journalists, and he sub-

White

Sitting quietly, unobserved as usual, was Stephen Smith, thirty-one, a brother-in-law of the candidate, husband of his sister Jean. In January of 1959, ten months before, Steve Smith had come to Washington to open, unannounced, the first Presidential headquarters of the Kennedy campaign. Slim, soft-spoken, absolutely discreet, business-minded (his family was one of the foremost of New York waterfront families), Smith was to be first office manager, then logistics manager, then unflustered administrative chief of all the impossibly complicated financial and personnel details of a campaign that eventually was to mobilize scores of thousands of volunteers and employees.

Present also was Louis Harris, a public-opinion analyst, thirty-eight, young, shrewd, vibrant, a man who found subtleties in statistics. . . . Proprietor of his own highly successful market-research firm, Harris had first been employed by the Kennedys as a public-opinion analyst prior to the Kennedy Senatorial race in Massachusetts in 1958. Accepting that job as little more than a routine professional contract, Harris had by now become so entranced by the Kennedy personality that his enthusiasm and excitement at practicing his craft at the summit of American politics made him a Kennedy zealot and a member of the inner circle.

Also there, for the first time admitted to the in-group, was Pierre Salinger,* then thirty-four. Salinger, an

* Now Press Secretary of the President of the United States.

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Gromyko

sequently became Kennedy's press spokesman.

And finally, it is impossible not to mention John Bailey, the Democratic party chairman of Connecticut. He was a tall, bald man, who spoke with an air of confidence. Bailey managed one of the most effective political machines in the United States. He headed Kennedy's election campaign in the northeastern states—Kennedy's principal political base in his fight for the Presidency.

Those meeting in Hyannis Port were, as is easily noted, comparatively young. None of them, except John Bailey, was a state or big-city political boss. Yet, everyone knows that the bosses usually play an influential role in the election campaigns. Thus, in the fall of 1959 Kennedy had at his disposal no representatives from the Democratic party's national apparatus. And this was natural since, measured by national standards, Kennedy was still a novice in American political life. "Stars" of much greater magnitude were shining in the American sky in October, 1959, and the overwhelming majority of state and city political bosses looked in their direction because these "stars" spelled victory in the elections.

White

American of French descent, a man of dark, round face and broad cheeks, might, with ten or fifteen more years of age, be mayor of any Burgundian village—large in manner, full of gusto, a wine drinker and brandy bibber; his mind, in the French manner, is at once hugely jovial and quick, shrewd, practical.

There was, lastly of the in-group, John Bailey, Democratic State Chairman of Connecticut. Bailey, a tall, cigar-smoking, baldheaded man, is one who affects an exterior hardness of manner, talks in a high, rusty, confidential tone of voice, and effectively conceals the fact that he is a Harvard Law School graduate. Bailey had in his fourteen years in office in Connecticut built the tightest New England political machine, which he operated with merciless efficiency. . . .

His role was to be that of shepherd of the Northeastern bosses in the Kennedy pre-Convention planning. None of the young men in the room, so youthful and so fresh, could win the confidence of the aging back-room power brokers who wield such influence in the Democratic Party; Bailey, then a ripe fifty-four years old but still youthful, was the man for such a job.

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The Potboiler Reconsidered: A Comment on "JFK Through Russian Eyes"

PIERS PLOUGHMAN

Professor Nelson W. Polsby's informative review of Anatolii Gromyko's book about President Kennedy clearly establishes that as far as the American reader is concerned, Gromyko has written a potboiler; that sections of it are nothing but a rewrite job based on American secondary sources; that, in short, the specialists on American politics at the U.S.A. Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences "have not yet entered into (the) lively international commerce of ideas and observations about contemporary America." So far, so good.

My only disagreement with this review is in its assumption that a Soviet publication of this kind should be expected to produce, for the benefit of Soviet readers, an analysis after the fashion of Tocqueville, Lord Bryce, or Henry Fairlie. Nothing could be further from the truth. To be published in the Soviet Union at all, a book must fit into the permissible ideological mold and must seek to propagate the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and serve the interests of the Soviet state. Consequently, the thing to look for is not an analysis of the American political process that would be enlightening to the sophisticated American student of United States politics. It is rather the nature of the image of the United States offered in 1968 (when the Russian version was published) to the Soviet reader. The latter, though thoroughly unversed in American politics, is likely to be highly sophisticated politically in deducing the changing perspectives of the Soviet elite about the American system, and in detecting any signs of a broadening or narrowing of the permissible limits of political discourse on that subject.

PIERS PLOUGHMAN is a pseudonym.

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Anyone who has spent time ploughing through some of the unbelievable Soviet official publications dealing with contemporary affairs in America will realize that Gromyko's potboiler stands head and shoulders above its peers, and that, without defying the one approach and style authorized in the USSR, or criticizing Soviet policy, it nevertheless provides the Soviet reader with more realistic glimpses of the workings of the American system than almost any other book available in that country. Russian readers are a sophisticated breed, part victims of, part immune to, propaganda; they are quite capable of ignoring the claptrap about "monopolistic capitalist cliques" and focusing on the fact that a self-appointed group of young men who obviously represented no capitalist-monopolistic group could meet at Hyannisport in 1959 and prepare to launch a campaign for the presidency without being immediately arrested by the monopoly-controlled "organs of state power." Of course the story is paraphrased from Theodore White; but White's 1960 book is *not* generally available to Soviet readers, and the standards to be used in evaluating Gromyko are not those of American scholarship.

The picture of American life that emerges from Gromyko's book—albeit simplistic by American standards—stands in stark contrast with the Stalinist image of American politics[1] as an undifferentiated evil system, doomed to war and revolution, ruthlessly dictatorial despite the sham trappings of democracy, run for its own exclusive benefit by a ruling class, representing monopolistic capital, which directly controls the machinery of the State as its instrument for the oppression of the working class. The Stalinist image, which is totally ideological, and which totally disregards reality, had of course been undergoing modification in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev, Kennedy's Soviet counterpart, who as we know had become an "unperson" by the time Gromyko's book was published.

What we can see in Gromyko is a critical and distorted but somehow recognizable picture of the United States with its openly competitive political life, its enormous variety of power elements involved in a complex interplay of interest, and its extensive and free public debates on matters of government policy, including foreign policy (the account of the Kennedy-Nixon television debates must have come as a revelation to Soviet readers). Gromyko's discussion of the financial and publicity aspects of American electoral campaigns, though simplistic, is not altogether imaginary; at the same time the book brings out the unmistak-

[1] See, for example: Frederick Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of the United States* (New York, 1953), and Richard Nordahl, "Stalinist Ideology: The Case of the Stalinist Interpretation of Monopoly Capitalist Politics," *Soviet Studies* (1974), 239–259.

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ably democratic features of United States elections, even to the point of explaining how certain elections, notably presidential primaries, cannot be rigged by the political bosses. To keep within the permissible framework, Gromyko dutifully follows every account of American political activity—the West Virginia primaries, the Los Angeles convention, the 1960 elections—by pages of traditional Soviet analysis about the nefarious "monopolistic groupings": the Rockefellers, the Morgans, the DuPonts; the Wall Street and Boston groups; the competing Chicago-Cleveland groups, etc. It almost seems as if Gromyko were offering the reader a choice between the varicolored reality of America and the tired abstractions of Marxist-Leninist dogma. Indeed, he makes almost no attempt to reconcile the two. On page 261 of the Russian edition, Gromyko describes Kennedy in 1962 as being "at the head of the monopoly-controlled State apparatus of the U.S.A., consistently subject to the pressures of the military-industrial complex, acting according to an apparent pre-conceived scenario." According to Gromyko, Kennedy was "formally the author" of that scenario, but in reality he merely executed the role assigned to him with minor deviations from the text. On the very next page, Kennedy in 1963, following the Cuban missile crisis, is described as having grown "more reasonable in his actions." Moreover, Gromyko points out, "it was also evident that the President himself was not directly linked to the military-industrial complex by financial ties." The contradiction could not possibly escape the Soviet reader.

The only parallel in the Western tradition may be found in the theological writing of the early medieval Church, when pious monk scholars would delight in revealing to their readers the subtleties of Aristotle or Averrhoes even while purporting to denounce those heathens.

For the American reader, the last half of the book, following the 1960 elections, is disappointing because it deals mainly with American foreign policy and Soviet-American relations and has little or nothing to say about United States domestic politics during Kennedy's presidency. The younger Gromyko cannot be expected to criticize the wise and peace-loving policies for whose formulation and execution his father, Andrei Gromyko, was primarily responsible. Professor Polsby rightly points out that Gromyko manages the neat trick of describing the Vienna summit meeting of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 without so much as a mention of the name of the Soviet protagonist. What is equally interesting is that Khrushchev's foreign minister is not mentioned either—perhaps to avoid associating him with an unperson. The story is told from the familiar Soviet point of view, which, as pointed out by Zimmerman in his important study that was published at the same time as Gromyko's, presents an international system that "con-

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formed generally with reality or acceptable Western notions thereof."[2] There is little in these chapters that is new or interesting to the American student of Soviet foreign policy or of Soviet perspectives of American policy. There is nothing on China.

To sum up: Gromyko's book is indeed useless for the American reader who seeks information on the American system. It is, however, most interesting for the light it casts on changing Soviet perspectives on the American system; it should be compared with its Soviet predecessors, not with Bryce or Tocqueville. More important, it represents a major Soviet attempt to come to terms not so much with the America of John F. Kennedy as with the realities of America in the late 1960s. In an era of political realignments, the Soviet elite found it necessary to demythologize and reevaluate America in line with the changing needs of the USSR, and Gromyko's book must be evaluated in that light.

[2] William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956–1967* (Princeton, N. J., 1969), p. 157.

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Rejoinder to Piers

NELSON W. POLSBY

Piers Ploughman is evidently thoroughly conversant with trends in political writing—and reading—in the Soviet Union, as I am not. My essay is written from the perspective of a specialist in the politics of the United States and applies to a purportedly scholarly publication, published in America for an American audience, the same standard one would normally use in assessing any other work of scholarship.

It is discouraging to learn, first from the evidence of Mr. Gromyko's performance, and then from my commentator, how inappropriate that standard still is. Is it really true that the rules of behavior for Soviet intellectuals are unchanged since the time of George Orwell, or of Merle Fainsod's first edition? I thought it gratuitously patronizing to assume so, and especially to assume that a treatise offered to American readers as an exemplar of U.S.A. Institute work would make so little concession to the norms of ordinary scholarly discourse. The result fortifies my commentator's contention that this book, regardless of its American publication, was indeed written for Russian internal consumption. Conceivably, then, the best evidence of its success with its intended audience will be rejection by Western scholars. In this small way we Americans can join hands with our Russian colleagues and certify to Soviet authorities that a Russian author has not somehow wandered off the reservation and in his impropriety disobeyed W. H. Auden's commandment to commit no social science.

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Book Reviews

The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World, 1945–1973 *by Raymond Aron. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, and Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers, 1974.—xxxviii, 339 pp. Cloth, $10.00; paper, $4.95.*

At a time of national confusion about the proper ends and means of American foreign policy, when the trauma of Vietnam and a faltering economy have produced renewed uncertainties about a choice between the burdens of globalism and the comforts of neoisolationism, Raymond Aron has contributed a voice of reason to the national debate. With his customary lucidity and the objectivity of a wise and brilliant Frenchman, he has written a critical analysis of American foreign policy during the past thirty years that—to this reviewer at least—has more balance and significance than any American book on the subject in recent times. His book well deserved the *Prix des Critiques* which was awarded to the original French edition in 1973. Its appearance now in English translation (by Frank Jellinek) and with an updated postscript is an event of uncommon importance.

There are no villains or heroes in Aron's book. There are only men in Washington struggling to understand and to cope with the problems of a fast-changing postwar world and hampered in doing so by the confused tradition of the American past in the face of the imperatives of the present. In some cases, e.g., the cold war policy, he regards the response of the United States to Stalinism as appropriate, even inevitable. In others, e.g. Vietnam, he sees a major policy blunder brought about by *hubris* and a fear that a defeat anywhere might jeoparize America's role everywhere in the world. On balance, his judgment about America's postwar record in foreign affairs shows great discernment and a willingness to allot praise or criticism only on the basis of close

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analysis. Incidentally, his demolition of various "revisionist" historians, and their para-Marxist interpretation of American policy, is devastating.

This is particularly so in his long section entitled "The United States and the World Market" in which he examines the outward expansion of American capitalism, its motivation and its effects. He rejects the notion that economic considerations have determined American foreign policy; he finds that the reverse has usually been true. Further, he considers in detail, and then discards, the theory that our policy has been decisively influenced by American corporate leaders or even by any alleged military-industrial complex. Finally, he refuses to single out the United States for condemnation because of its exploitation of Third World resources in order to maintain its high standard of living. Western European countries, he points out, are in fact "far greater pillagers than the United States" because, being so deficient in native raw materials, they import so much more from the LDC sector. His conclusion is blunt: "the operation of the system, or the capitalist world market, is bound to favor the already industrialized countries so greatly that most of the others are doomed to a future of under-development unless there is a socialist revolution (whether it is in the name of Marxism or anti-Marxism is irrelevant)" (p. 282).

Aron is worried on several counts about the future course of American foreign policy. As a good European he is troubled by the apparent tendency of American policy makers to place greater emphasis on establishing a dialog with our enemies than on the reenforcement of solidarity with our allies. This does not mean that he is opposed to the current drive toward detente with the Soviet Union and the opening of relations with the People's Republic of China; such moves are inevitable, desirable, and overdue, but they should not be allowed to exclude the cultivation of allies in Europe and Japan.

An even greater danger for the future is the American "incapacity to master the tendency to veer between crusading and withdrawal" (p. 72). As yet, he feels that we have not succeeded in finding a viable middle ground between globalism and isolationism. Our involvement in Vietnam was merely the result of a mistaken sense of globalism, and on the rebound from that bitter experience he fears that we may be tempted unduly to throw off our imperial burden and reject a role which in the nature of things we cannot abandon without world disaster. What the United States needs, in his opinion, is not to reject world responsibility but to become more selective about the areas and problems where it is prepared to use its massive power. Given the special nature of the American political system, the influence of the press and pressure groups, and the complexities of decision making in Washington, Aron does not underestimate the difficulties inherent in such a program of policy priorities, but he feels strongly that no other valid course is open to the United States. This is wise counsel, and one can only hope that it will be heeded.

Finally, since this review appears in a scholarly journal, it should be pointed out that there are a few translator's errors that ought to be corrected in a future

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edition. A few dates are wrong, e.g., the Monroe Doctrine was not issued in 1829 (p. xxix) but in 1823, and our Pearl Harbor installation was acquired in 1887, not in 1884 (p. xxi). Also, Walt Rostow and Hans Morgenthau should not be listed as Walter Rostow and Henry Morgenthau, but these are editorial trifles and they in no way mar the impact of a book that deserves the widest possible readership

GRAYSON KIRK
Columbia University

Kissinger *by Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb. Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1974.—xiii, 577 pp. $12.50.*

Kissinger's story is here in detail, told professionally and superbly by two news analysts who saw much of it unfold. The account is always interesting, often revealing, and sometimes fascinating. The Kalbs describe and comment on Kissinger's past, his emigration, his American military service, his education, his Harvard career, his counsultantships, his writings, and his service at the center of power, first as Nixon's assistant for National Security Affairs and then as secretary of state. They describe lucidly the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), the negotiations on the Vietnam withdrawal, the "China breakthrough," the detente with Russia, and Kissinger's role in ending the Middle-East war of 1973. They add dimension and interesting observations on Kissinger's and Nixon's corresponding views on foreign policy; on the impact of Watergate and its cover up; on the impact of campus protest (including a description of an exchange about Cambodia between Kissinger and his Harvard colleagues); on the Department of Defense's disagreement with Kissinger's (and Nixon's) decision to supply military hardware to Israel in 1973.

Kissinger, who obviously supplied many "background briefings" for the book, could hardly have written a more sympathetic account. Even the failure of his year-of-Europe program is attributed to the recalcitrance of the Europeans and the influence of Watergate. The Kalbs note, for example, that the speech Kissinger used to launch the program was broadcast live to Europe by the United States Information Service; that it was presented in New York to "the nation's most influential publishers, editors, and television executives" (p. 427); that it got a standing ovation, and the "listeners began to compare" it with George C. Marshall's Harvard speech that had launched the European recovery program twenty-six years earlier (p. 428). With such preparation—and with spiritual company such as that of Marshall—the Kalbs imply that the project hardly deserved the poor reception it got. But there is more. The Kalbs refer to Kissinger's false and misleading public statements as shading "the truth to satisfy the needs of policy" (p. 259), as fibs (p. 243), and as "unrevealing and studded with half-truths" (p. 281). Would they have done as much for

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Nixon? For Johnson? For Dulles? They note that Kissinger "knew that, as a Jew, he could not conduct a policy that could lead to Israel's defeat" in 1973 (p. 525). Would they concede as much to a Roman Catholic president, or to a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who held critical views on the Isreali lobby in the United States—the lobby that Kissinger himself jokingly referred to as the Israeli ambassador's "shock troops" (p. 464), whom the ambassador could mobilize at any time he decided to "go public" (pp. 472, 475)?

Books based on privileged information and as superbly done as this one is, often have a deleterious influence in the long run. James F. Byrnes's *Speaking Frankly* (1947) illustrates the point, even though it does not match the Kalbs's book in style, readability, and in other respects. Unlike Kissinger, Byrnes always professed to want to conduct foreign policy openly and in full view of the public. *Speaking Frankly* nevertheless contributed directly to a whole series of myths about American policy in Germany, about the Russians, the French, and the cold war. The myths became standard historical wisdom as historians cited Byrnes again and again. Not until some twenty-five years later—when historians got access to the records to check the story for themselves—did researchers began to demythologize Byrnes's version of the events. Of course, the Kalbs's book could be an exception, but history might also be repeating itself.

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State University

Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards *by Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974.—xvi, 252 pp. Cloth, $13.50; paper, $4.95.*

This may turn out to have been a landmark book. Willrich and Taylor calmly and in detail spell out what could have been a much more shrill message: there is a serious risk that atomic bomb materials can be stolen in the years ahead, and that such bombs will be assembled and used for the perilous purpose of criminal syndicates or fanatical political splinter groups. The book shows how this risk is inherent in our growing reliance on nuclear reactors for electric power, and in detail demonstrates how present safeguards may not prevent such bombs from being stolen. The book has indeed been accompanied by another "book about the book," John McPhee's *The Curve of Binding Energy*, which describes the personality and energies of Theodore Taylor in spreading this warning.

There was a time when this Willrich-Taylor book would have been attacked as sensationalist and irresponsible escape. As we get tired of worrying about governments deterring each other with H-bombs, why not liven up the topic with the possibility of nongovernmental nuclear blackmail? At least there

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might be a newness about this, when there was nothing new to be said about Berlin, or guerrilla war, or the defense of Israel. Willrich and Taylor would thus have been accused of livening up the facts in a Hollywood-scenario manner, of exaggerating threats just because these were refreshingly interesting threats. It is doubtful that anyone will respond to their book this way today, however, after the experience of Arab skyjackings, after the bombing of electric power supplies in Oregon with a demand for ransom, after the detonation of dynamite bombs in New York and Los Angeles and London and Rome.

In the nature of things, other critics may attack the book not because it is factually exaggerated, but perhaps because it should not have been written. Why indeed should such a book have appeared at last now, rather than in 1964? Why couldn't it wait until 1984? Have the authors perhaps spelled out a murderous avenue to wealth and power, for readers who would have taken years yet to hit upon the same idea? If a similar study of aerial piracy had been undertaken in 1955, it might have seemed terribly prescient, but might have been charged with the responsibility for the numerous "skyjackings" of the 1960s and 1970s. If plutonium gets stolen from American reactors to destroy an American city in 1982, will we blame our authors here for having opened Pandora's Box, for having put the idea in some villain's head?

One might counter any such criticism by noting that this nuclear blackmail scheme has already surfaced a fair number of times in the entirely different literature of the popular novel, the most salient example being Ian Fleming's *Thunderball* of the James Bond series. In most of these novels, to be sure, the reader is moved to the exciting part more quickly by having bombs stolen from military arsenals, rather than laboriously assembled from stolen plutonium.

A slightly different criticism of the Willrich and Taylor book might thus contend that atomic bombs can more easily be stolen as fully fabricated weapons from U. S. Army bases than extracted from nuclear power plants. If the hazards of plutonium and the tedium of bomb assembly thus steer the Mafia and the IRA and Black September in a different direction, some of the many thoughtful recommendations in the book may be criticized as needlessly expensive. They would not be so faulted, of course, if security over the military nuclear depots were bolstered, for then the bomb seekers would soon enough come back to try to get at the reactors.

In any case, of course, this leaves all too relevant the authors' speculation about how a government should react when first confronted by nongovernmental nuclear blackmail. Is there any reason to hope that governments will be able to prepare good procedures for responding to such threats, procedures that will save lives, procedures that will discourage such blackmail, and apprehend and recover stolen bombs? Any "Pandora's Box" criticism of this book might easily be dismissed if we got counterblackmail speculation going at a faster

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clip than problackmail speculation. The Willrich-Taylor book points out some items for the agenda here, but we have hardly begun the kind of rigorous analysis that will be needed on the "What to do after a theft?" question.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

Why Nations Go to War *by John G. Stoessinger. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974.—xvi, 230 pp. $8.95.*

This sensitive, personal statement about the causes of war comes at a particularly compelling moment: in the aftermath of one Mideast war and the ominous possibility of another. Offering a series of thoughtful, provocative observations, the slim volume distills a lifetime's reflection on the fundamental issue of international relations: why do nations go to war? What emerges from this analysis is original and insightful, if only mildly encouraging to those worried about the future.

For Stoessinger the causes of war stem not from man's innate aggressiveness nor from abstractions such as alliances, economics, or militarism. Rather the essential factors should be sought in the behavior of those decision makers who, in the final moment, actually make the choice for war. To buttress this contention the author presents six essays that examine various decisions for war: the Austro-German actions in July 1914; Hitler's decision to attack Russia in 1941; the American decisions over Korea in 1950; American policy toward Indochina after 1945; the Indo-Pakistani clashes since 1947; and the Arab-Israeli wars starting in 1948 and going through Yom Kippur in 1973. The essays are connected by Stoessinger's stress on the individual and, in particular, by his belief that misperceptions of reality are the basic cause of war.

These misperceptions he divides into four categories. First, there is the impact of a leader's mistaken image of himself or of his role. Count Berchtold's conception of the dangers confronting Austria-Hungary influenced Vienna's decisions in 1914, yet his fears were certainly exaggerated and indeed excessive. Hitler, who prided himself about his sure grasp of reality, was in fact increasingly cut off from reality when Russian affairs were in question. A second type of misperception involves a leader's assessment of his adversary's character. For example, MacArthur's hubris toward and disdain for the Chinese Communists brought catastrophe at the Yalu; the masculine dislike of Yahya Khan for "that woman"—Indira Gandhi—contributed to Pakistan's defeat and division. A third kind of misperception derives from a wrong interpretation of an adversary's intentions. The classic case, of course, is Stalin's failure to heed the warnings of an imminent German attack; Stoessinger's analysis of why the Soviet leader failed to act is persuasive. Finally, the author believes that "A

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leader's misperception of his adversary's power is perhaps the quintessential cause of war" (p. 227). Into this category fall the Pakistani attacks on India in 1971 and the repeated Arab assaults upon Israel. In summation, he concludes that "the beginning of each war is a misperception or an accident. The war itself then slowly, and in agony, teaches men about reality" (p. 229).

Specialists will find in the essays points of disagreement and even error. The portrayal of Kaiser Wilhelm II is overdrawn, the explanation for the German nation's attachment to Hitler somewhat labored, and the bureaucratic dimensions of Vietnam ignored. Also it is surprising, in a study with such stress on misperception, not to see the work of Robert Jervis cited. Other readers, who may accept Stoessinger's assertion about the importance of individual decision makers will nonetheless view the Indo-Pakistani and Arab-Israeli cases as powerful evidence that structural limitations can also be determinant. These religious wars severely constrain the range of options open to the local policy maker; a Golda Meir has far less flexibility than a Richard Nixon or a Henry Kissinger. Thus in some situations the personality and perceptions of individual leaders count for less and the tragic fatalism of circumstance for more. But these caveats aside, the book's readable style and comparative focus make it a perfect candidate for reading lists in international relations for years to come.

Two final words of commendation. To date no account of the Vietnam morass can match the few paragraphs offered by Stoessinger. They contain the essence of that tragedy and a profound observation: in the end history simply passed Vietnam by. Nor will many be unmoved by the author's twin hopes that the atomic era may yet prompt a greater sanity in international politics and a willingness to be wise about the use of the earth's resources. "The bomb must not become the earth, nor must the earth become the bomb" (p. 230). Hardheaded contributions about the problem of war, such as this study, might help those hopes become a reality.

SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON, JR.
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The United Nations in a Changing World *by Leland M. Goodrich. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1974.—ix, 280 pp. $12.95.*

Leland Goodrich, who might with some justice be called the "Dean" of international organization scholars, has given us a book on the United Nations that will serve admirably both as a basic text for students and as a means by which mature readers can gain an overview of the development of the world organization to date, enhanced by the interpretations and evaluations of a sober and

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balanced observer. He provides the essential minimum of legal analysis without retreating into legalism, surveys the history of the United Nations without resorting to a case-by-case narrative, and reflects upon the political origins and implications of trends without ascending into the stratosphere of abstraction where so many contemporary theorists find refuge from mundane concerns. Readers who do not regard down-to-earthness as incompatible with theory will find Goodrich a valuable and stimulating theorist. There is much to learn and to think about in this succinct and well-written book. The chapter on "Peace-Keeping" deserves to be singled out as the very model of a brilliantly compressed essay on a complex issue, at once informative, analytical, and perceptive.

The treatment of the formation of the United Nations is sounder than most such discussions, particularly because it avoids the common error of giving undue weight to the San Francisco rhetoric about collective security and stresses instead the founders' realistic retreat from the Wilsonian dream of a virtually automatic system of collective enforcement action against any and all disturbers of the peace. Attention is also given to the often neglected point that the Great Depression ranked along with the World War II as a major factor in shaping the organizational design set forth in the Charter.

Goodrich flirts with the idea that the United Nations has the status of an international actor, asserting that it "must be viewed as being something more than just the sum of its parts" or "a bit of machinery . . . available to members" (p. 27), and identifying the Charter provisions concerning common ends and principles as the bases of the organization's capacity to become "the expression of a nascent world community" (p. 30) rather than merely a set of diplomatic tools. He is saved from pressing this point too far, however, by the political sense that impels him to emphasize the role of governments as creators and directors of the organization and the fact that it serves, above all, as a setting within which members undertake to put pressure upon each other. His ultimate judgment is that the United Nations is not much more than a standing conference, "because it is still the member governments which in the last analysis determine what the Organization can do" (p. 95).

For all his political realism, the author has some difficulty in coming to terms with the proposition that the United Nations is not a vehicle somehow steered and propelled by the noble aims stated in its Charter. In discussing the impact of members—especially the numerous new states—upon the organization, he stresses their role in determining how effectively it will work toward its declared purposes and in deciding which of those purposes should have priority. He is curiously reluctant to assert that members can and do repudiate the purposes enshrined in the Charter and substitute purposes more to their current liking—though he concedes this point when he observes that the sanctions originally intended to be directed against breaches of the peace are now being used to enforce resolutions relating to self-determination and racial equality.

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Indeed, Goodrich's treatment of the anticolonial drive and its notable successes is the most ambiguous section of the book. He repeatedly declares that the Charter's purposes with reference to trust and other non-self-governing territories have been substantially achieved, that the task has been virtually completed; yet, he demonstrates full awareness that what in fact has happened is that those aims have been discarded and the task of preparing colonial peoples for independence has been abandoned in response to demands for rapid decolonization. He is on firmer ground when he acknowledges that this "has amounted to a redefinition of the purposes and assumptions of the United Nations Charter" (p. 198) than when he speaks, in a more general context, of the tendency of members to alter the organization's priorities and of their variable contributions to its effectiveness in achieving its declared purposes. It would seem best to recognize frankly that the problem of the United Nations is not so much how to achieve its declared purposes as how to achieve agreement among its members as to the purposes for which it should be used. That issue was not settled at San Francisco, nor will it be settled; to say that the struggle to determine the goals toward which the organization will be turned must continue indefinitely is simply to declare that the United Nations is, after all, a political institution.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.
University of Virginia

Multinational Companies and the Third World *by Louis Turner. New York, Hill and Wang, 1973.—ix, 294 pp. $8.95.*

Louis Turner has again written an eminently readable work on multinational corporations, concentrating on their "confrontation" with developing countries. Mr. Turner's purpose is "to reflect most of the major issues raised by multinational investment in the Third World . . . " (p. vii). Thus the first six chapters revolve around the controversy of whether companies can and do contribute to the "development" of Third World economies. Mr. Turner maintains that they can on a selective basis; he then considers the effects, particularly on developed countries, of the so-called runaway industries, the issue of the corporations and the environment, South Africa, and the cultural impact of tourism.

One of the greatest strengths of the book lies in the vivid accounts, case after case, of company activities; the amount of research is impressive. Yet the argument on the contribution of the companies is unsatisfying. For example, Mr. Turner maintains that local experienced entrepreneurs can play an advisory role to governments in negotiations with multinational companies. He cites two cases, Vehbi Koc of Turkey and Torcuato di Tella of Argentina. Yet a commonly recognized problem in the capitalistic development of Third World economies is the lack of independent entrepreneurs. In a recent interview with

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an AID official I was told of the lack of response to a loan for the promotion of agro-industry in a Latin American country. The more typical role of the local entrepreneur has been that of intermediary for private foreign investment and Mr. Turner quotes Frantz Fanon to that effect: "The national bourgeoisie steps into the shoes of the former European settlement. . . . It will insist that all the big foreign companies should pass through its hands. . . . The national middle-class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary" (p. 107). However, he leaves the argument there—one is left wondering whether Messrs. Koc and di Tella are typical or atypical. In another chapter, he states that "Companies today are not meddling in any significant way with the domestic politics of particular countries" (p. 41). Yet he notes that large firms have divisions which resemble State Departments analyzing the economic and political conditions in host countries. "Du Pont at one stage was experimenting with a model that analyzed the fifteen or twenty key interest groups in each country and then assessed the relative power and influence each would have over the others in policy areas that affected private investment. Moreover, companies do act on the basis of such analyses. . ." (p. 129). Mr. Turner also mentions the Council of the Americas which acts on behalf of most United States firms in Latin America but he does not cite their extensive lobbying activities, including maintaining "ambassadors," sponsoring radio and television announcements, as well as magazine and newspaper articles, etc. Their representative in Peru reported: "We have broadened the contacts of the U.S. business community considerably beyond the contacts with the new government. At the breakfast meetings in my house or in formal sessions at the American Chamber of Commerce, our managers have gotten to know leaders from the political parties, the Church, the labor movement, the universities, professional associations and the slums" (Council for Latin America, *Report*, January 1970). The companies may not be "meddling" but they are in the business of influencing host governments.

I have chosen these two examples to show that Mr. Turner leaves important questions unresolved. Thus his main point—that the balance of power has shifted firmly away from the companies to the Third World—though thought-provoking, remains unconvincing. With the exception of the case of oil, it is not entirely clear that a major confrontation exists between most companies and most governments.

ROSEMARY GALLI
Johnston College, University of Redlands

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Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy *by Morton Halperin with the assistance of Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter. Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1974.—xvii, 340 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $3.50.*

This book is the latest addition to a now lengthy list of studies which focus on internal governmental politics to explain how the United States behaves in the international political arena. The bulk of the analysis centers on identifying the major political participants within the executive branch, describing the organizational determinants of various actors' perceptions of America's primary security interests and their resulting behavior, and examining the wide variety of ways that intraexecutive politics can affect both the formulation and implementation of policy decisions. Along the way, Halperin succeeds in delivering yet another kick to the now prostrate—but by no means dead—"rational" model of foreign policy analysis.

Several aspects of this book make it well worth reading. First, it is unique in the clarity of its description of the decision-making process as seen by the entire spectrum of executive actors. The reader comes away with a more firmly grounded comprehension of what makes foreign policy bureaucrats "tick"—the motivations behind the policy goals they formulate and fight for, and the structural and political constraints under which they operate.

Second, Halperin has compiled a fascinating and exhaustive catalog of the maneuvers used by policy makers to get the decisional outputs they seek. Supporting each point with specific examples, the author goes far beyond previous efforts in explaining precisely how civilian and military bureaucrats can use their control over information, their power to set the policy agenda, and their political logrolling capabilities to affect both the timing and substance of policy decisions.

Third, Halperin makes an important contribution to our understanding of foreign policy behavior by extending his purview beyond the point when a formal decision is made to the crucial yet largely ignored process by which a decision is translated into concrete action. Halperin shows that rather than ending bureaucratic in-fighting, announcements of policy decisions often tend to generate new rounds of political activity. As bureaucrats scurry to reap domestic political gains from "favorable" foreign policy decisions or to subvert or ignore "unfavorable" decisions in order to defend organizational interests, they can distort the intent of even a presidential decision beyond recognition. The result is often considerable slippage between high-level executive branch statements and low-level executive branch actions. These inconsistencies, in turn, produce unintended consequences in the international system and befuddlement on the part of analysts wed to a "rational" model of foreign policy behavior. Halperin's analysis does much to explain away the long-standing con-

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fusion as to why supposedly "rational" actors—governments—so often behave "irrationally."

For all its merits, the book is marred by a serious flaw that perhaps could have been avoided through more careful scholarly craftmanship. The problem is that while the author gorges the reader with an enormous amount of material on the role of bureaucrats in the foreign policy process, he does little to help the reader digest it. Twenty pages from the end of the book, the author boldly announces, "At last we are done, and the framework for explaining national security decisions and actions is in place" (p. 293). This is the first that the reader has heard of the "framework," and, in fact, no such framework exists. This book is a compendium of virtually all the ways that executive branch personnel can have a policy impact. (For example, in one chapter alone, the author presents eleven different tactics used by bureaucrats to constrict the free flow of information to superiors, and nine techniques available to the president to counteract such efforts and expand his information base.) There is, however, no underlying set of related analytical propositions that can be used to separate out the most important features of bureaucratic behavior from the most trivial or irrelevant in determining the policy-making role of various executive actors.

Without any kind of explicit model to guide the endeavor, the analysis can only reflect the intricacies of the process. It can do little to reduce the complexities to their essence, thereby allowing the reader to place the role of bureaucrats firmly in the context of all the other complex factors involved in the making of foreign policy. The alternative employed by the author—an inductive approach relying on extensive use of verbatim quotations from memoirs and secondary sources—results in a disjointed array of interesting examples that frequently bury rather than highlight his central arguments. From the standpoint of scholars interested in the policy process as a whole, it is unfortunate that while synthesizing so many of the substantive findings from the bureaucratic politics literature, Halperin attempted neither to integrate nor go beyond the theoretical insights found in these earlier works.

ROBERT H. TRICE
The Ohio State University

The Economics of Peacetime Defense *by Murray L. Weidenbaum. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.—xii, 193 pp. $15.00.*

The Economics of Peacetime Defense attempts to make a "realistic appraisal" of the role of the military in American society and the nature and size of the contribution it makes to, or burden it places on, the United States economy. Essentially, the book is an introductory survey of the various ways in which

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the Defense Department interacts with the civilian sector in the United States. Drawing upon considerable experience with defense contractors and in the government, Professor Weidenbaum describes how defense spending affects the performance of the economy, the distribution of resources among competing national and regional priorities, and the international economic situation of the United States.

The range of substantive topics covered in the book is impressive. Weidenbaum begins by examining trends in the overall size of the defense budget in absolute terms, and as a share of both national resources and total federal spending. He then examines the defense budget more closely, highlighting trends in the distribution of defense dollars. Next, he explores the interrelationships between the Defense Department and industry, addressing issues such as the size of defense-related profits, the relative benefits of private versus public control of militarily related industrial production, and the effect of military spending on the magnitude and distribution of resources devoted to research and development in the United States. The final portion touches briefly on contemporary public attitudes toward the military in this country.

The book is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It covers a wide variety of topics, most of which are quite controversial, in an even-handed manner. Weidenbaum manages to maintain his own balance and objectivity even while fully, and fairly, presenting extreme views on either side of these issues. His treatment of the interrelationships between the Defense Department and industry is particularly good and should serve to dispel many myths which have arisen concerning the mechanics which underlie these apparent alliances.

On balance though, this reviewer found the book wanting. Essentially, in my view, the author attempted to cover too much and, as a result, he covers everything only superficially. When reading the book, one has the sense of a never-ending introduction. In each chapter the reader finds himself waiting for the substantive analysis of the particular topic under discussion; but never is there more than an introductory description of the factors bearing on the problem presented. This was particularly apparent in the discussion of Soviet military capabilities and their impact on the size of the United States defense budget. Besides giving this important topic only a cursory look, the author depends on dubious secondary sources—such as *U.S. News and World Report* —far too often.

One issue for which the author does present his own evaluation of alternative solutions is the question of private versus public ownership of major defense contractors. But even here, Weidenbaum presents the results of his earlier works without including much substantiation in the present volume. A final deficiency of the book stems from the time-sensitive nature of the topic. The author did not, for example, foresee the extent of the problem facing the military as a result of the enormous price increases now being encountered. But

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this comment may be unfair, as very few economists correctly projected the scope and persistence of the present inflation.

Despite these criticisms *The Economics of Peacetime Defense* is a useful volume. It can serve adequately as an introductory text to a very complicated topic. And in such a role, the book should find an audience in universities and among the general public interested in the very real problems now facing the U. S. Department of Defense.

BARRY M. BLECHMAN
The Brookings Institution

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1971 *by the Office of Public Information, United Nations. New York, United Nations, 1974.—xi, 861 pp. $35.00.*

The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence *by Richard Hiscocks. New York, The Free Press, 1974.—371 pp. $8.95.*

The 1971 *Yearbook of the United Nations* is the first to show in its size, print, and price the combined effects of inflation and financial stringency. In size it is more than 300 pages smaller than the 1970 volume, which is not to be regretted if this is not done at serious cost in adequacy of coverage. A sampling of content would suggest that this is not the case. Furthermore the reductions seem to be distributed fairly equally among the principal sections of the book. To some extent this reduction in size is no doubt due to the use of a different and inferior type. The print is far inferior to that of previous volumes and in places—documentary references, for example—is difficult to read. The price is up $5, roughly in line with the rate of inflation. It remains, however, a reference book of great value and a credit to the care, devotion, and industry of the people in the Secretariat who did the work. They certainly are not primarily responsible for the fact that the presentation of the results of their labor takes a definitely inferior form and appearance.

Another book dealing with the United Nations, Richard Hiscock's *The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence*, fills a serious gap in the literature by providing a well-informed and balanced analysis of the background, structure, procedure, and practice of the Security Council, combined with a discerning and wise discussion of the more serious problems of the council and its future prospects. Since the manuscript was finished in 1972, it does not cover the important developments of 1973 and 1974, but it is doubtful that the author would have found in the events of the last two years reason for substantially altering his general conclusions.

The book falls into three parts. The first gives a brief survey of the background of the United Nations, an exposition of the theory and practice of the

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Security Council, and a discussion of council procedure. The exposition is clear and well-written, and reflects not only acquaintance with documents and secondary sources but also understanding acquired through interviews with participants. The author does not make it as clear as he might that Article 25 of the Charter does not make all decisions of the Security Council binding, only those which according to the specific provisions of the Charter are so regarded. Thus decisions under Chapter VI, for example, to recommend terms of settlement are not binding, and even decisions under Article 40 of Chapter VII may not be. The author makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of the council's decision-making process in his discussion of "the method of consensus" (pp. 104–109).

The second part of the book consists of a long chapter giving in summary form the council's record in dealing with disputes and threatening situations. These capsule accounts, on the whole well done, are of considerable value for an overall view of the council's work, but for one interested in greater understanding of the complexities of the problems the council faces, the interests involved, and the nature and effectiveness of the council's action, much more is needed. The bibliography is helpful on this score, and further assistance could have been given by greater use of footnote references to more detailed studies.

In the third part of the book, the author deals with special aspects of the council's work, drawing on the factual data of the council's record, and discussing at some length the future of the U.N. and the Council. His treatment of the relation of the General Assembly to the Security Council is not wholly satisfactory. Much more could be said on the shifts in this relationship that have occurred, and the changing atttudes of members. In particular, the subsequent fate of the United for Peace resolution might have been more fully explored and explained.

In discussing the future prospects of the United Nations and the Security Council, the author combines realism with optimism. While recognizing that the organization is an association of states, each jealous of its independence and concerned with its own interests, he is hopeful that enlightened statesmen will come to realize that national interests in the long-run can best be served by advancing the common interest, more particularly the common interest as expressed in the Charter and represented by the United Nations. He fully recognizes the obstacles in the way of achieving this result—ideological differences between communist and noncommunist countries, differences in stages of development, cultural differences, and differences inherent in nationalism itself. When we consider the size and diversity of United Nations membership and the complexity of the problems of the world today, we must not be too impatient with its limited successes to date.

LELAND M. GOODRICH
Columbia University

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The International Law of Pollution *by James Barros and Douglas M. Johnston. New York, The Free Press, 1974.—xvii, 476 pp. $14.95.*

This volume is a useful initial source book for anyone concerned with the control of pollution, broadly defined, in its international aspects; it is a tantalizing near-miss as a course book for a university program in pollution and its management. The editors have assembled material from many sources, much of it by now standard, but some usefully novel (e.g., the Canadian-United States materials at pp. 83–154). They include materials on all areas—oceans, atmosphere, international rivers and lakes—and on various pollutants including not only nuclear test pollution but perhaps surprisingly, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well. Documents on international cooperation in pollution control also are included.

While the editors have given us a useful note at the beginning of the volume and a brief comment at the end, and brief notes in some of the sections, the bulk of the materials and extracts are presented with no commentary at all and many are drastically abbreviated. This volume is *not* in fact a presentation of "the international law of pollution," but it is a collection of some of the materials which go to make up or form the basis for some part of that law. The book thus presupposes a vast knowledge of the areas covered, at least by an instructor, so that the materials can be fitted into some sort of real world context. To cite an obvious example, we find a reprint of extracts from the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (p. 388) but we find nothing as to how it came into being; why several important nations (China, France, Japan, India, Israel, etc.) have refused to accept it; what effect it has had on pollution levels; and the meaning of continued testing, e.g. by France and China, not to mention the problem of potential testing by additional states which had not yet demonstrated a device when the editors' work was in progress (as India has in fact done—for "peaceful puposes" only, of course).

The editors are highly competent scholars; they have made a useful start. The history of the American legal casebook which has, in its development, tended to move from "cases on—", to "cases and materials on—", to "cases, materials and comments (or notes) on—" might serve them as a useful precedent for their next version.

HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD
Southern Methodist University

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Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism *by Allen Yarnell. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.—ix, 155 pp. $8.95.*

Out of the wreckage of the Progressive party's 1948 campaign, Henry Wallace and some of his closest supporters took public solace in the contention that their party had forced Truman to move to the left. Indeed, they claimed credit for encouraging the president to belatedly rediscover the New Deal, and to back off from some of his more aggressive foreign policy pronouncements. While the later history of the Truman administration strongly suggests that these alleged shifts were little more than cynical and empty gestures, many students of American politics continue to accept the view that Truman's militantly pro-New Deal campaign in 1948 had been substantially shaped by fears of liberal and labor defections to the Progressive party.

In this slender but closely researched study of the relevant public and private source materials of the Truman and Wallace campaigns, Allen Yarnell examines and thoroughly rejects this thesis. Instead, Yarnell concludes that "The Wallace candidacy . . . not only failed to achieve what it set out to achieve in 1948, it encouraged the Democratic party and its standard-bearer to maintain its old position unimpaired, while giving the country a real taste of what was to come in later years over the issue of anti-Communism" (p. 114). On the whole, this must be considered an accurate analysis, supported not only by Yarnell's own research, but also by the great bulk of the critical scholarship that has emerged concerning the Truman administration in recent years.

Yarnell's work is a useful edition to the scholarship on the Truman period essentially because it goes into great detail in its analysis of important primary documents (the Clifford memorandum, for example, for the 1948 campaign, perhaps the most famous unpublished document in the Truman research field, is the great example of this strength). Yarnell also permits the protagonists in the campaign to speak for themselves in extended quotations instead of forcing his points upon them. Beginning with the background to the Truman-Wallace split over foreign policy and Wallace's opposition to the cold war policies as editor of the *New Republic,* Yarnell interprets the evolution of Truman's "liberal" campaign strategy for 1948 as a response primarily to Republican rather than Progressive party pressure. Furthermore, the author shows the use by the Democrats of a secondary strategy of identifying the Progressives with communism, and details the successful application of both strategies to the election contest. Yarnell concludes by presenting interesting although by no means new material concerning the involvement of Americans for Democratic Action in the campaign against the Progressive party.

The book's major weakness for general readers is the narrowness of the questions it asks, i.e., its failure to analyze the meaning of the New Deal heritage over which Wallace and Truman fought so fiercely in 1948 and the importance

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of that struggle for the development of contemporary American politics. But the answers to those questions would require another book—perhaps a great many books. In the meantime, Yarnell has written a short book on an admittedly limited topic that gives one some insights into the inner workings of party politics in the Truman era.

NORMAN D. MARKOWITZ
Livingston College, Rutgers University

Choosing the President *edited by James David Barber. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.—vii, 208 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper, $2.95.*

In the aftermath of Watergate, books on the presidency have threatened to inundate the reader who tries to keep up with the new literature. This volume, slender only in length, is one of the best for it avoids being obsessed with immediate events and takes a longer, deeper perspective than yesterday's headlines. It also avoids the shrill, polemic tone of so much of the recent outpouring. While the book does contain some prescriptions for change, it avoids a primary concern with temporary patchwork and current reformist fashions. It is also primarily descriptive and analytical.

The volume consists of a series of papers by respected, able scholars prepared for the Forty-fourth American Assembly meeting on the selection process for president. It is similar in format and quality to the earlier, well-received *Congress and America's Future* edited by David Truman. It covers a wide range of topics, from the rules governing the selection of national convention delegates to the psychological relationships of the presidency to the public. Although the essays are all of a high quality, this reviewer was particularly taken with Austin Ranney's "Changing the Rules of the Nominating Game," Murray Edelman's "Politics of Persuasion," and Richard Boyd's "Electoral Trends in Partisan Politics."

Although the book is not primarily prescriptive, it does suggest that modern social science research and analysis can make a contribution—can throw some light on the problems faced by what Barber describes as a "political order in disarray" (p. 6). Whether such knowledge or insight will be heeded by the general public or key decision makers is doubtful, even in post-Watergate America.

DALE VINYARD
Wayne State University

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Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth *by Raoul Berger. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974.—xvi, 430 pp. $14.95.*

The Executive Privilege: Presidential Control over Information *by Adam Carlyle Breckenridge. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1974.—vii, 188 pp. $7.95.*

The extent of presidential power to withhold information requested by Congress or the courts is a long-standing problem which recent events have highlighted, not created. From President Washington onward, chief executives have expressed doubts about the propriety both of surrendering and of refusing to surrender information to another branch of the government. Presidents have often succeeded in withholding information that they have preferred not to release, yet usually they have given in when congressional pressure was strong and insistent. The process has been a preeminently political one, determined primarily by pragmatic considerations of power and policies, not by legal or constitutional niceties. Nonetheless, the terms used to justify the actions of the various branches have invariably been legal-constitutional ones. The very term "executive privilege," as Raoul Berger points out, originated some twenty years ago as an attempt to lend constitutional weight to presidential withholding of information from McCarthy era investigations.

It is to these legal aspects of executive privilege that Berger primarily devotes his attention in the present volume, and the learning and intelligence he brings to the task are truly awe inspiring. Ranging from early English precedents to the debates in various state ratification conventions to the revelations of the Pentagon papers, Berger explores various aspects of presidential power in order to demonstrate that neither the "executive power" clause nor the president's powers as commander-in-chief and as the "sole organ" of foreign relations can properly justify an alleged right to withhold information through the invocation of executive privilege. Very useful also is Berger's examination of the historical incidents fallaciously cited in 1957 by then Attorney-General William Rogers to justify presidential refusals to supply information. As in his previous volume, *Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems*, Berger so thoroughly explores every conceivable constitutional implication of his analysis that his argument ultimately seems to preempt any alternative interpretation. As an exercise in legal history and constitutional analysis, the present volume is a genuine tour de force.

However, as already suggested, executive privilege is as much a political problem as a legal one; and in terms of purely political analysis, Berger's book is not fully satisfying. How governmental information should be used and shared among the three branches is very much a practical as well as a constitutional problem. For example, insisting on a totally open executive branch may well result in enhancing the already excessive clientele control of executive agencies while at the same time jeopardizing presidential ability to counter-

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balance the all too often parochial concerns of Congress. On the other hand, allowing too broad an executive privilege invites the secrecy-related abuses that have been so prevalent in recent years. Faced with such problematic issues, Berger displays a recurrent tendency to resolve them by discovering "the intent of the Framers" or by suggesting that the conflicts must be handled by the courts. While the book examines at some length "the cost of secrecy" (chap. 9) and "practical arguments" (chap. 10), the thrust of these sections is to underline the abuses that have occurred and to reemphasize the need to submit these disputes to adjudication. In keeping with this orientation, Berger devotes most of the final part of his book to a lengthy argument that disputes over executive privilege are indeed justiciable and that "[a]rbitrament by the courts is the rational substitute for eyeball to eyeball confrontation, such as was narrowly averted with respect to the continued bombing of Cambodia" (p. 340). The rather superficial reasoning of the Supreme Court in *United States* v. *Richard M. Nixon* (decided after publication of the book) casts doubt upon the wisdom of relying on judicial review. While Berger is correct in asserting that executive privilege is not in legal terms a "political question," its limits may still better be determined by the flexible forces of the political process than by the unwieldy mechanism of the law.

Adam Carlyle Breckenridge places more emphasis on the political factors at play in the development of executive privilege, but this is virtually the only merit to this slim volume that might better have been left unpublished. In every respect—quality of research, quality of argument, and quality of writing—the book is inadequate. The gist of Breckenridge's argument seems to be that there is indeed a constitutional and historical basis for *the* executive privilege (as he insists on calling it) and that the breadth of the privilege has been determined by an ongoing process of bargaining and pressuring between Congress and the president. This may be a sensible position, yet Breckenridge's book is so poorly written that neither an argument nor a presentation of factual material can emerge with any coherence from the confusion of his verbiage. The author's style, reminiscent of Nixon administration rhetoric, uses imprecise words and awkward constructions to disguise complexities rather than to explore them. A few examples will hint at the problem: "Presenting and maintaining one voice or position on a complex of external matters and having differences of consequence stop at the water's edge are as rare as they are frequent" (p. 83); "Furthermore, efforts to compel disclosure suggest that a president should be a witness against himself, and disclosures from subordinates could have that result" (p. 158).

Breckenridge's scholarship is often as sloppy as his style. Much of his book is devoted to a presentation of historical material for which he appears to rely primarily on the fallacious interpretations set forth in Attorney General Rogers' memorandum. This is all the more surprising in that Breckenridge cites, but does not deal with, an article by Raoul Berger which demolishes the Rogers

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interpretations. It should also be noted that the footnoting in Breckenridge's volume is cavalier: many quotations that should be footnoted are not; other footnotes are irrelevant or trivial; and some are simply inaccurate, such as one (p. 117, n. 38) that refers to "the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the Watergate affair." Fortunately, one need not dwell on Breckenridge's flaws, for Raoul Berger's superb volume is sure to satisfy those who wish to learn more about the mysteries of executive privilege.

ROBERT H. HAMMEL
Moravian College

Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society *by the Georgetown Law Journal. Amherst, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1973. —xiv, 229 pp. $12.00.*

As Osmond K. Fraenkel says in his "Foreword," the publication in book form of this tripartite article which originally appeared in the March 1972, issue of the *Georgetown Law Journal* should be welcomed by all students of the First Amendment. Others should be interested as well. As its title suggests, *Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society* considers a number of constitutional problems attending the nature and function of the communications media in the contemporary United States. But it does more than that. Constitutional problems result from the necessity of resolving conflict among competing values and interest, and are, therefore, fundamentally public policy dilemmas. And the authors offer their readers a provocative discussion of what, in their view, are the relevant factors to be considered in resolving those policy issues. Lawyer, political scientist, journalist, concerned citizen—anyone seriously interested in the relation between the communication of ideas and information and the use and abuse of power should find this book well worth his time.

The book begins with a short but useful discussion of the drafters' understanding of the First Amendment protections and the subsequently evolving concept of free expression "away from a negative conception of the First Amendment toward a more positive application." The authors' view of this evolution is summed up in the following:

> The goal seems to be a fuller right to express ideas, not merely the right to be free from government interference with that expression. This transition is being effected by means of a balancing of interests, with actual balancing often masked by a dedication to established theory and rhetoric. The balancing is there, nonetheless. Explicit recognition of the various interests involved and the ways in which they are to be reconciled can serve only to make the evolution of first amendment law more rational (p. 21).

According to the authors, there are at least five basic interests that must be considered and balanced in any given situation. They are:

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> 1) the consumer's interest in receiving ideas, or in not receiving them, as he chooses; 2) the transmitter's interest in using his medium as a means of self-expression and in protecting a limited property interest; 3) groups' interest in access to the media for publicizing their opinions; 4) government's interest in keeping certain types of information out of the press, in getting its viewpoint to the people, and in maintaining the rights of all citizens; and 5) society's interest in having the media perform their educational and watchdog functions (p. 18).

Part I is principally concerned with the development of and problems attending the various types of printed communication. Included is a survey of the newspaper industry today and a brief but incisive discussion of the reasons for and the difficulties inherent in the trend toward consolidation a well as the inadequacy to date of governmental approaches to the problem of maintaining diversity. Among other problems receiving balanced discussion are the application of the fairness doctrine to the newspaper industry, the difficulties attending the promotion of books through reviews and commercial advertising and the postal rates/magazine distribution controversy.

Part II concentrates on electronic communication, principally television. In addition to discussing the impact of television journalism, television entertainment, broadcast advertising, and the regulatory dilemmas posed by each, the authors carefully consider the great communications potential of cable television and the special problems it poses. The section concludes with a critique of the use by the FCC of its licensing power and of judicial supervision over it.

Part III is entitled "Points of Conflict–Legal Issues Confronting Today." Discussing the problem of concentration and the need for a new approach to diversification, the authors call for more active consideration of the antitrust law by the FCC in administering its "public interest" standard and permanent funding for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to ensure it freedom from governmental pressure. They present a brief but pointed and persuasive argument against any government-owned broadcast media. Other current issues discussed include government support for the arts and the potential for censorship inherent in the giving and withholding of grants and subsidies, the free press versus fair trial dilemma, and the newsman's privilege problem. In each instance, the authors' discussion, in both its critical and prescriptive aspects, reflects the "balancing" perspective set forth in the early part of the book.

The discussion of the confidentiality of news sources issue points up one of the inevitable limitations of any book of this type and yet, at the same time, one of the principal strengths of this particular work. Written before the Supreme Court's ruling in *Branzburg* v. *Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), it is, as a discussion of the state of the law, already out of date. In this particular instance (as well as some others) the problem is remedied in Fraenkel's "Foreword," but both the authors and Fraenkel wrote prior to the decision of other cases, perhaps most notably last term *Miami Herald* v. *Tornillo*, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974). But this book is considerably more than a discussion of the state of the law; it is a careful consideration of a number of related public policy problems and the

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conflicting values that bear on their resolution. In this respect the discussion of the newsman's privilege issue, the right to reply problem, and the other "legal issues confronting today" will not be outdated for quite some time, if at all.

JOHN A. MORGAN, JR.
George Washington University

Elites in the Policy Process *by Robert Presthus. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1974.—xiii, 525 pp. $19.50.*

Elites in the Policy Process is a comparative study of elite accommodation—that is, the process of setting government policy by interaction between both public and private members of the political elite—in Canada and the United States. Presthus used structured interviews with interest group directors, legislators, and high civil servants in Washington, D. C., Michigan, Louisiana, and the state of Washington for the United States, and Ottawa, Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia for Canada. Additionally there were case studies which asked directors to describe issues involving their interaction with government to provide supplemental data. The purpose of the research is to provide a base for generalizations about group behavior in a comparative context and to show differences in interest group behavior between presidential and parliamentary systems. This is a companion volume to *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics.*

One of the first difficulties involved in approaching this study is that Presthus makes no differentiation between interest groups and elites. There is no specific discussion of elites except as a "minority which enjoys most of such scarce and higly valued resources as security, prestige, income and power" (p. 332). Do we presume that this minority forms an interest group or that all interest groups come from this minority, or that each interest group is headed by one from this minority? We are given no reason to think that the "men at the top" use interest groups as their representatives in dealing with government policy makers instead of using their personal influence for direct access. The source of this confusion is perhaps unfamiliarity with the literature on elites which he demonstrates in a misstatement of C. Wright Mills's view of elite theory. He asserts that Mills takes the same position as Mosca, Michels, and Pareto in maintaining that "elite rule is a functional necessity in all societies" (p. 332). [In *The Power Elite* Mills rejects Mosca's idea of the inevitability of elite rule (p. 20). Also, in his discussion of democracy he sees the potential for the rejection of the elite in a society composed of publics rather than the mass (p. 359).]

Presthus displays methodological sophistication in manipulating his data, some of which is questionable. He uses interest groups of every shade of

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seriousness and degree of power indiscriminately. Nor does he differentiate between issues, so that those of great systemwide impact are included with those of importance to only a small group of committed believers. This makes anything resembling real power analysis impossible and lowers the validity of the findings by blurring the results. Also the use of two sets of data, interviews and case studies, are not presented in a way that reconciles their sometimes different results.

The study uses structural-functional analysis as one of its major tools. This method assumes that interest groups serve the "functional requisite of democratic participation" by allowing citizen participation in interest groups which inform elites of "popular expectations" (p. 55). This position makes it "beside the point" to view interest groups as "undemocratic or [un]responsible." In a study which proposed to look at the effects of interest groups on two systems, it is at best questionable to use a method of analysis which presupposes a beneficial result as part of the method. This is all the more curious because Presthus concludes *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* by saying that the present system supports the status quo, keeps meaningful participation minimal, doesn't allow for long-range social and economic planning, treats all demands on the system as equally valid, makes the suppliers of campaign funds political king makers, and, in short, makes the government the defender of the strong against the weak. The introduction to *Elites in the Policy Process* reconfirms this conclusion and extends it to the United States. Even from the point of view of structural-functional analysis this creates a problem because the lack of participation in the system and the inequities of the status quo put real strains on the political system. These strains increase the level of conflict and lower the overall stability of the system, which raises the question of whether the interest group status quo is not in fact dysfunctional.

Presthus contradicts himself most when he contends that interest groups present the public position to government policy makers. He maintains that even though participation within groups (leaving out the overall question of participation in society) is low it is symbolically important because of "the propensity of men to accept such imperatives of organizational life as the so-called 'iron law of oligarchy' " (p. 55). If, in fact, symbolic representation by interest groups was sufficient to fulfill the need for participation in either of these systems would there be the great strains, particularly in the area of welfare issues, observable in both systems?

In sum, this book is as full of contradictions as it is with data. Presthus has investigated an area of great interest and little comparative empirical research but the careful reader emerges with more questions than answers. His normative judgments, his methodology, and the weight of the data all point in different directions leaving the reader in the uncomfortable position of trying to reconcile these difficulties all alone.

SHARON A. SMITH
Temple University

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When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying *by Donald H. Haider. New York, The Free Press, 1974.—xvi, 336 pp. $10.95.*

Not so long ago knowledge of the attempts of public officials at the state and local level to influence federal action was based more on hearsay and surmise than on study and research. Then Suzanne Farkas published her *Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena* (New York, New York University Press, 1971), which focuses on the United States Conference of Mayors and uses housing and urban redevelopment as the substantive area in which to examine its success at lobbying. It is a fine work in and of itself, and now it appears that what one reviewer at the time hoped would happen has indeed taken place: he thought the Farkas book would "stimulate further inquiries as to methods and purposes of elected officials of one level of government seeking to influence those of others" (D. L. Norrgard, *Library Journal*, May 1, 1971, p. 1617). Donald Haider's book responds directly to that challenge.

Haider deals with both city groups—the USCM and the National League of Cities—as well as with the National Governors' Conference, the Council of State Governments, and the National Association of Counties. Like Farkas, his interest is in the groups' operations at the national level. The book is first of all an historical account of the activities of the groups in what Haider identifies as three stages in the development of group lobbying from the 1930s through the early 1970s. The bulk of his attention, however, is devoted to the years after 1966, when the groups had matured enough and become sufficiently organized "to mobilize sustained pressure activities and demands upon the national government" (p. x). Second, the book analyzes the intragroup dynamics involved and shows how, though continually competitive, they have learned to cooperate on major issues, such as federal revenue sharing, overhauling the categorical grant system, and strengthening the role of state-local executives. Third, the book presents a series of case studies which demonstrate not only the extent to which state and local officials affect national policy but also how these groups implement their influence strategies. There is a particularly revealing chapter on the Nixon administration and the New Federalism, in the development of which the government groups played a key role.

Haider's conclusions are, not surprisingly, the most interesting part of the study. Briefly, he concludes that "it would be erroneous" to equate the governmental groups with the "more cohesive and narrowly oriented pressure groups. . . . Their impact is restrained . . . where substantial consensus and bargaining is required among a wide variety of actors, officials, and institutions" (pp. 287–288). "Nonetheless, it can be asserted that such interests are often more encompassing and broader than those represented by special interest groups, functionalists, or even individual congressmen whose purview is often limited by committee assignments and less identifiable constituencies. In a true Madisonian sense, the government interest groups . . . provide another form of political representation at the national level, one founded not on functional

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lines or shifting congressional boundaries but on representation of interests based essentially on geopolitical units—states, counties, and municipalities" (pp. 305–306). Moreover, Haider goes on, "the government interest groups and their members contribute to the range of values, tensions, movement, and strength found in the American federal system. The friction of government acting upon government, officials upon officials, and institutions upon institutions for the forwarding of state and local interests only adds to the vitality of all governments" (p. 307). Perhaps most important, Haider concludes that the activities of government interest groups work against excessive centralization: "In practice, the federal government's powers to impose definite and enforceable choices on states, their subdivisions, and other executors of public policy are severely limited, as are the states' on their subdivisions. Even where higher government levels have direct powers over the program or agency of lower-level ones, officials on both sides tend to agree that such powers are generally exercised through a process of competition and conflict, negotiation and compromise, maneuver and strategy" (p. 308). Thus the government groups serve in the end to "add further to the viability of the overall system through the legitimacy they confer on the often negotiated outcomes among government levels" (p. 308).

The book is well written, it has a useful bibliography, and a well-done index. If the tradition thus begun by Farkas and now Haider is built upon further, a new dimension to the literature on federalism promises to be well on the way to development.

RICHARD H. LEACH
Duke University

Urban Outcomes *by Frank S. Levy, Arnold J. Meltsner, and Aaron Wildavsky. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.—vi, 277 pp. $12.50.*

Relevance is a word that has been cheapened by misuse. It has come to connote fashion and fad in addition to social applicability. This is a pity, for it has lead to a confusion within the academy which stigmatizes applied research as somehow unworthy of a true scholar's effort. Yet it is possible to do dispassionate and committed research and to bridge the gap between theory and practice so that both the theoretical enterprise and the practical problem solving are enhanced. *Urban Outcomes* is an example of this. It is relevant research in the best sense of that word.

This is the third volume in a series summing up the work of the Oakland Project. The series is of particular value to the student of urban politics and public policy because it is a most significant attempt by political scientists to link the analytical rigor and theory of the university with practical needs of

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urban decision makers in a manner that can be implemented. The project director, Aaron Wildavsky, deserves special mention both for undertaking this massive project and for using it pedagogically to train some of the ablest minds in the public policy field today. Nothing cleanses theory or tightens thought like the cold shower of political reality and practical feasibility.

This particular volume consists of a set of project reports, each complete in themselves but tied together by a common theoretical framework developed and elaborated in the opening and closing chapters. The authors are not interested in encompassing the whole of the policy process. Rather, they chose to focus on and illuminate one select aspect of that process: urban outcomes. Outcomes, for the authors, differ from the policy outputs commonly referred to in the Easton model and its numerous varients and applications in the field of public policy research. In the authors' framework, outputs have impacts which result in outcomes. Rather than looking at the "Who benefits?" question by peering back into the black box of the decisional process and asking "Who benefits from this output?" the authors are examining outputs after they have passed through the implementation stage and gone through the filter of agency or line-department action. Thus, in a sense, they are analyzing the consequences of the decision-making process. "Consequences" is a key word, for outcomes are the result (consequence) of urban outputs and as such have an evaluative connotation as well as a descriptive or nominal one. In this way the authors examine outcomes against the demographic landscape of Oakland's neighborhoods and illuminate the empirical reality of "Who benefits?"

I find that the conceptual emphasis of work on outcomes rather than outputs, and methodological design of casting the various issue outcomes against a demographic mapping of the research site (Oakland, California) particularly useful and informative. It is a method that is useful to the practitioner for it highlights the differential effects of a given policy and stimulates an awareness of differing policy needs of neighborhoods and groups within the city. The method is equally advantageous to the scholar for it directs him, as is shown beautifully by the book, to raising theoretical questions about equity, distributive justice, civil obligation, and the like, which can only hone our theoretical model of urban polity. Indeed, this reviewer would argue that the book makes as important a contribution to political theory as it does to the advancement of our knowledge of the policy process. For the authors link the individual studies of school, street, and library outcomes with a theoretical design that turns on the equity component of the "Who benefits?" model. Equality of opportunity, market equality, and equality of result are the three equity alternatives that give theoretical substance to this book.

This work also provides insights into the world of departmental or agency politics as part of the decision process and certainly belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in bureaucracy, public administration, or organizational politics. Indeed, one could teach a good public policy course by using this volume.

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Its straightforward methods and measures permit students to replicate the analysis of these and other outcomes. Though based on a single case, this book, particularly those sections on impacts of bureaucracy on outputs, is applicable to every American city with which I'm familiar.

While this book is not without flaws—the quality of the individual issue reports is uneven, and loose and unnecessary digressions occur—it is overall a solid contribution to the study of the urban policy process and a model of how high-quality relevant research can add to the knowledge of both practitioner and academician.

PETER A. LUPSHA
The University of New Mexico

Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty *by J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1973.—x, 325 pp. $12.50.*

This is a very interesting book which, despite an often ponderous writing style, should prove very stimulating to professional students of urban and racial politics. A potential reader should recognize that this is not a study of the economic impact of the war on poverty in terms of people helped, quality of training programs and the like, but a study of the politics of participation. Intensive field studies conducted between June 1965 and August 1968 in five cities (Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia) provide the basic evidence.

Greenstone and Peterson cannot be complimented too highly for their magnificent discussions of the literature. Their command of the scholarly writings in areas too numerous to mention here should make the book unusually useful in graduate classes. Issues in the literature are summarized very well and related to the subject matter very creatively.

The central theoretical perspective should also produce stimulating debates in the classroom. The key concept is that of "latent interest." A latent interest is one which is unrecognized by the incumbent of a social role, but can be identified by an analyst as one which would improve the "role's social position" (p. 60). In brief, "an analysis that focuses on latent-manifest role interests accepts the argument that interests can be attributed to social roles, even when members of those roles do not recognize them" (p. 59). Further, "to identify a latent interest is always to imply the hypothesis that under certain conditions which affect the incumbents of the relevant role, these incumbents will not only recognize their role interest, but act upon it to improve their social position" (p. 60). The struggle over the form of citizen participation in the Community Action Program, the subject of this book, is seen as an issue which "triggered the blacks' recognition of their role interests in a new sphere of public policy,

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accounting for the rapid divisions that this policy evoked" and the key interest that became manifest was one of "eliminating the imputation of Negro inferiority that has patterned race relations in the United States" (p. 12).

The notion of latent interest is quite attractive, especially since it does not confine the analyst to the pluralist's attention to manifest interests, but it presents certain problems. Two in particular should be of special interest to readers of this book. Both are discussed by Greenstone and Peterson, but neither, in my opinion, is resolved satisfactorily.

First, let us consider the difficult problem of specifying the "predisposing and triggering conditions" required for a latent interest to become manifest. Greenstone and Peterson identify four in the case of black protest: (1) adequate resources; (2) skilled leadership; (3) the example of a struggle for political rights by others; and (4) "a precipitating event that identifies the illegitimacy of preexisting patterns" (p. 88). Given the specification of these conditions, one wonders just how essential is the notion of latent interest. Greenstone and Peterson argue that while the conditions specified facilitated the surge in blacks' demands for political rights, "only an assumption that identifies a latent interest in these rights even in quiescent times accounts for this change in attitude about the long-established pattern of American race relations" (p. 89). But any role's "social position" can be improved and all of us, therefore, have latent interests in improving our life situations. What becomes manifest as a discontent is a function of what we see around us and what it seems possible to achieve (i.e., what is often called relative deprivation). If this is true, then the "conditions" are the crucial variables and the notion of latent interest is of secondary importance.

Second, if the latent interest factor that concerns one is difficult to quantify, there is a temptation to let one's own values completely dominate the analysis. The assumption made in this book is that the best way to achieve the latent political interest of blacks (defined as eliminating the imputation of inferiority) is through programs which foster black control of the black community. Representation of this latent interest is best achieved by those who recognize that these programs are necessary. Greenstone and Peterson assert that "if he is concerned with universalistic interest representation, the representative of the socially disadvantaged may well differ from most of his constituents at most points in time" and, therefore, "arrangements for selecting representatives that provide substantial influence for organized groups committed to universal interests" may be necessary (p. 198).

The political and ethical implications of this assertion are rather staggering. Let me just concentrate on the narrowly political factors here. Most people would agree that eliminating the imputation of inferiority is in the interest of blacks, but the best mechanisms for achieving this goal are the subject of intense debate. In the cases discussed in this book it is asserted that in the two cities where the poverty area representatives were chosen by community group

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leaders rather than by the poor themselves "universalistic" representation was more consistently provided. What this means is that Detroit and New York representatives made many strident public demands for policies approved by Greenstone and Peterson, while those in other cities were more moderate and openly interested in securing jobs for themselves, their friends, and relatives. (Even in Detroit and New York, it should be noted, the leaders of community organizations "benefited much more as individuals than did the residents of the poverty areas collectively" (p. 308).) The impact on "racial shame" of different programs and systems for representing the black community's interests cannot be established by a series of definitions. What is required, at minimum, is a systematic study of the effects of each system on the attitudes and behavior of individuals through time. That is beyond the scope of this work which is focused on the politics of participation in a limited period, but it is an essential task.

In summary, this is a very stimulating book which deserves a wide professional audience. It has weaknesses in my view, but they are the weaknesses of a highly creative and provocative work and will inspire spirited debate of great benefit to the profession.

JOEL D. ABERBACH
The University of Michigan

Urban Economic Development: Suburbanization, Minority Opportunity, and the Condition of the Central City *by Bennett Harrison. Washington, D. C., The Urban Institute, 1974.—xiv, 200 pp. $4.50.*

As was intended, this book summarizes the recent economic research dealing with metropolitan decentralization and its impact on minority populations. It is short and readable, and it contains a wealth of useful data and references. In general the many unsettled issues that are examined are handled in a fair and balanced manner.

The first and strongest section of the book which analyzes the suburbanization of jobs and population may come as something of an eye-opener to those who have become conditioned to viewing the central city as a hopeless basket case and the decentralization process as the pathological flight of industry and middle-class whites from high taxes and minority populations. While Harrison is careful to point out that it is too early for a definitive judgment on most issues, the bulk of the evidence simply does not support many of the "common truths" of the urban crisis. For example, suburbanization does not appear to be either a postwar or an accelerating phenomenon; it has been occurring for at least as long as the relevant data have been collected and has shown some recent signs of tapering off. Nor are central cities incapable of

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generating new jobs—they have accounted for a substantial fraction of the recent growth in metropolitan employment. Moreover in the past decade the ratio of central city employment opportunities to city populations has expanded at a fairly healthy clip implying that there is no critical shortage of potential jobs for city residents. Much of the expansion has been in semi- and low-skilled positions of the sort capable of employing the cities' new residents—in short, the job-mismatch hypothesis does not seem to hold up. However, a point that is of some relevance considering the current state of the economy is that city employment opportunities are very sensitive to business cycles, contracting the most during periods of recession as firms close or curtail operations in their oldest and least efficient plants. Overall, however, Harrison concludes from the evidence that the cities are viable and far more dynamic than most persons are willing to admit.

The second section weighs the evidence cited by those who oppose ghetto economic development and by those who advocate a dispersal or suburbanization of the ghetto, and finds these arguments wanting. Harrison's review of econometric models that estimate the employment and income benefits which would result from suburbanization of central city ghetto residents should provide noneconomists with an excellent lesson in the credibility of such exercises, for it indicates how sensitive policy conclusions are to the specification of a model. With respect to ghetto development, however, Harrison's criticisms are not always convincing. For example, the fear of some that new rural migration would swamp any ghetto redevelopment effort is discarded because a review of the recent migration literature leads to the conclusion that factors other than differential employment opportunities appear to exert a strong influence on black migration. While this is true, the importance of these factors does not negate the possibility of ghetto development attracting an influx of migrants. However unless black migration were extremely sensitive to changes in employment opportunities, it is difficult to see how the lot of the black population—rural as well as urban—could be worsened through ghetto development.

The final section, which deals with the feasibility of developing the central city and the various approaches to rebuilding the ghetto, is the weakest. Much of the problem arises because very complex issues such as suburban exploitation of the city, city-suburban fiscal disparities, and new urban technologies are dealt with in a page or two. Another source of inadequacy arises because Harrison lays most of his stress on technical rather than political feasibility. Sufficient space may be available in the city for redevelopment, new technologies may be available for this effort, alternative government structures and land-use patterns can be outlined, but one can have little faith that the current political system will adopt institutional changes that will allow these technically feasible plans a chance of success. For those who share this position this section can only have a pie-in-the-sky ring to it. On the various efforts to

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rebuild the ghetto even Harrison is a bit pessimistic. None of the approaches reviewed have met with a great deal of success. However the author does hold out hope for community development corporations.

Overall this book is a good and much-needed review that if widely read should inject some realism into future debates on the urban crisis, suburbanization, and alternative policies for minority economic development.

ROBERT D. REISCHAUER
The Brookings Institution

The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians *by Kenneth Prewitt. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1970.—xv, 234 pp. $8.50.*

The Threads of Public Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership *by Robert Eyestone. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971.—xii, 197 pp. $8.50.*

City Mangers in Legislative Politics *by Robert O. Loveridge. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971.—xv, 224 pp. $8.50.*

Local Interest Politics: A One-Way Street *by Betty H. Zisk. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973.—xv, 184 pp. Cloth, $10.00; paper, $4.95.*

Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics *by Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1973.—xxxi, 713 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $9.00.*

What was begun by Heinz Eulau at the University of California, Berkeley, as a graduate seminar in legislative research during the 1961–1962 academic year eventually became the well-funded and amply staffed City Council Research Project, which was underwritten by the Ford Foundation for a number of years through the California Legislative Internship Program. Although the original intent of this enterprise was simply to replicate and to explore further, in a different legislative setting, the conclusions which had been drawn on American legislative behavior by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson in their seminal work, *The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior* (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962), each member of the academic staff and the growing number of doctoral students contributed their hypotheses and ideas for an expanded research design which was pretested and revised in 1962, 1963, and 1965.

From this earnest attempt at small-group analysis in an urban legislative

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environment has sprung the Bobbs-Merrill *Urban Governors* series of monographs under the editorship of Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt. Five of the ten projected studies have been published since 1970.

Each volume reflects the writer's own theoretical inclinations and substantive interests, and it attempts to deal realistically with a specific aspect of legislative behavior as the author found it among the council-manager form of municipal governments in northern California. In selecting a single metropolitan region within a single state to provide a basic environmental, political, and legal background against which city-by-city differences could be appraised, the researchers, in effect, truncated their initial objective of a comparative analysis, and they have severely constrained the possibilities of replication in other metropolitan regions and sections of the country. Commenting upon these aspects of the project, Eulau and Prewitt state:

> The price paid for this research design should be obvious. The San Francisco Bay metropolitan region is quite unlike any other metropolitan region, including even the Los Angeles metropolitan area, and it differs significantly from the Chicago, Boston, or New York metropolitan complexes. Undoubtedly, metropolitan regions, despite internal differences, can be compared as ecological units their own rights. But as our units or analysis are individual or collective decision-makers in the cities of a particular, and in many respects internally unique, region, the parameters imposed on our data by the choice of the San Francisco Bay metropolitan area recommend the greatest caution in extending, whether by analogy or inference, our findings to councils or councilmen in other metropolitan regions of other states, (*Labyrinths of Democracy*, p. 619).

Although this series of legislative studies deals ostensibly with the San Francisco Bay region, the governing body of the city and county of San Francisco is conspicuous by its absence from among the list of cities which were contacted for their assistance in this program. The 435 incumbent councilmen who were interviewed between January and April 1966 by the members of the research team, or by professional interviewers, had run at large in nonpartisan elections against the entire field of candidates, and they constituted 89 percent of the target population, or 91 percent of the 478 councilmen from the eighty-seven cities which cooperated. Conspicuous by their absence are declared and defeated candidates and retired and defeated incumbents over time. By limiting the membership of this statistical universe only to incumbents, the research team lost an invaluable opportunity to compare, check, and contrast its initial findings against a larger potential universe which might have pointed out some of the rhetoric in the responses which were given to the leading questions used in the survey.

In a one-newspaper town, such as Oakland, which was the largest city participating in the project, municipal elections come, not when issues arise, but by the calendar, and independent incumbent councilmen may not be able to establish in time a "track record" that will appeal to the mass electorate. Without the support of a "mass electorate" on sensitive issues, they must appeal to

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their friends at church, their acquaintances in the local businessmen's clubs, and their attachments with the publisher of the *Oakland Tribune*. In this light, incumbent officeholders are really not free to be themselves, or to develop the full resources of their personalities. They really cannot trust their peers, nor can they trust their "ticket-makers-with-power" not to "dump" them at the next election. Eulau and Prewitt have a stock answer for this methodological question:

> While it is naive to assume that those who govern are always the powerful because of the officiality of their positions, it does not follow that the powerful, if identifiable, do the governing. One need not assume one or the other in focusing on governing behavior, and we treat the issue of power as essentially moot. The council may or may not be powerful in this perspective; it may be the effective holder of power or it may be merely the agent of others who are powerful in the community. Our interest, therefore, is not in the origins, location, or exercise of power but in the process of governing (*Labyrinths of Democracy*, pp. 12–13).

An efficient research design should attempt to maximize experimental variance, to minimize error variance, and to control extraneous, systematic variables thought to be present in the statistical universe by the imposition of a thoroughly pretested instrument which would contain an array of validated psychological scales as well as questions of fact, opinion and attitude, information, and self-perception. The research instrument which was used in this study is made up of some 165 major, open-ended questions, a set of 35 checklist items, two pages of biographical items, and a set of 58 agree-disagree attitude items. Scales which would have furnished additional insights into the public policy formulation processes of the respondents and would have permitted the research team to extend the validity of their conclusions include the following: political efficacy, political alienation, intolerance of conflict, local-cosmopolitan, self-esteem, citizen duty, status concern, authoritarianism, and so forth. Eulau and Prewitt have responded to this objection by stating:

> Each collaborator contributed to the design of the research and was free to utilize the commonly collected data as he saw fit. . . . Our analysis has been alternatively marginal, correlational, multivariate, causal, contextual, or configurative, depending on what the data seemed to permit and what our theoretical notions called for. We behaved as analysts very much like citizens trying to find their way through the labyrinth. "Muddling through" may not be the best or most rational way of governing, but it seems to be the way in which democratic governance solves its problems; the metaphor or model of the labyrinth appears to be the most appropriate way to describe what happens in democracies (*Labyrinths of Democracy*, pp. xi, 612).

If the research team were bent on eliciting a particular role set from its respondents, the reviewer believes that it was successful because each of the "lead-in" questions used in the instrument tends to "trigger off" a specific response which would be consistent with an internalized role-set of the local governing body. There are no indications that the research team did take addi-

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tional precautions to ensure that a "halo" effect would not occur throughout the study. Each respondent tended to take an "ego trip" along with the amateur or professional pollster who administered the instrument and chose those alternatives which would bolster his own self-image, or would reduce the amount of dissonance which might be present in his actual role-set.

Although the research team may not have built sufficient safeguards into its research instrument to prevent it from gathering a biased sample upon which it ultimately drew its research hypotheses and its tentative conclusions, the reviewer does acknowledge that it has put a great deal of time and effort into the *Urban Governors* series to date, and it is hoped that the remaining volumes may be able to incorporate some of these thoughts about the present volumes' methodological shortcomings.

DEAN GRIMES FARRER
University of New Orleans

The Urban Wilderness: A History of the American City *by Sam Bass Warner, Jr. New York, Harper & Row, 1972.—xvii, 303 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $4.95.*

Any book by Sam Bass Warner, Jr., is worth reading, but *The Urban Wilderness* surely constitutes his most ambitious and provocative work so far. It proposes both a framework for analysis of previous urban development and a solution for the current dilemmas of the nation's cities.

Obsession with private property and individual pursuit of wealth has, in Warner's view, been the root of the urban problem. The rapid growth and pervasive change in the development of American cities have been accompanied by "the ceaseless exploitation" of the less powerful. Cities are "disordered, inhumane, and restricted." This book is essentially an historical brief in support of Warner's argument for "democratic social planning" to humanize and open urban life.

In the first of three "present-oriented historical essays," the author skillfully traces the development of land law and land use in America. A heritage of viewing land as the basis for liberty rather than as a community resource inhibited communal responses to urban problems. When crises in health and safety finally forced governmental intervention in land management, the form was regulation (building codes, zoning, city planning), not the kind of major rebuilding and restructuring that Warner claims was needed.

The impact of transportation and technology upon the nation's cities provides the subject for an essay on urban development. The author shows how the transformation of the American economy from local to regional and then national-international markets was accompanied by the growth of the corpora-

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tion and the refashioning of urban occupational and residential patterns. Warner uses New York City to illustrate the emergence of the big regional city between 1820 and 1870. Chicago and Pittsburgh characterize the sprawling industrial metropolis between 1870 and 1920. And Los Angeles provides the archetypal large city which has appeared since the 1920s.

Warner argues in his third essay that the economic and urban structure in the contemporary megalopolistic society offers an unprecedented opportunity for Americans to create a humane and just society, one which would provide decent jobs, education, housing, and health care for everyone. He suggests that a broad "urban cultural consensus" on the need for these has emerged among Americans of all racial and socioeconomic categories. To achieve these goals, he recommends massive programs by the federal government and giant corporations, which would, specifically, include progressive taxation and national fiscal planning, a national transportation policy coordinated with plans to create full employment and guarantee a "living wage," nonpolluting automobiles, and massive governmental intervention into the housing market through the buying and selling of land and the use of resultant profits to help finance private construction. Through this and governmental regulation of residential quality and subsidization of low-income occupants, Warner hopes that both inadequate housing and racial segregation could be ended.

Warner has, however, left himself open to a variety of criticism. While few would oppose his goal of a humane and just society, many would challenge his strategy for its accomplishment—restriction of mass transit, expansion of centralized planning and control in the housing market, and the combination of corporate and federal power exerted upon local communities. Most important, the author fails to explain how such radical action as he suggests could be achieved politically. His reliance upon a national urban cultural consensus concerning goals is weakened by the dramatic differences which exist over means, as the desegregation conflicts in Boston, Chicago, and other cities have illustrated. Furthermore, Warner has failed to deliver what his subtitle suggests: a history of the American city. His focus on economic topics has led him to neglect such areas as urban politics, education, culture, recreation, and the arts. The reader may also ask whether the cities selected as illustrative are indeed archetypal. The work remains more suggestive than conclusive.

Despite its limitations, however, *The Urban Wilderness* exhibits enormous merit. Based upon research from half a dozen disciplines and including superbly selected maps and photographs, it summarizes and integrates much recent material on urban development with original material on housing and health care since the 1920s. This stimulating book would be a useful supplement to many courses in urban studies or American history, as well as a valuable addition to any scholar's library.

JOHN W. CHAMBERS
Barnard College, Columbia University

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From Colony to Country: The Revolution in American Thought, 1750–1820 *by Ralph Ketcham. New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.—xiv, 318 pp. $9.95.*

In this lengthy and ambitious essay Professor Ketcham offers a schematic account of "the remarkable changes in American thought" (p. 268) that occurred between the middle of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the Jacksonian era. By 1820, he explains, Americans had discarded habits of loyalty to Britain, formulated their own political purposes, and proposed different definitions of what they supposed or wished to be a distinctive American way of life. In its general outlines, particularly for the first few chapters, this is not an unfamiliar story, but Ketcham presents it with a feeling for detail that reflects his experience as an editor of Franklin and a biographer of Madison. The result is a useful, tidily packaged survey that combines the stuff of intellectual history with commentary on the politics of the period.

"I have throughout attended seriously to ideas themselves," Ketcham says, recognizing that he thus exposes himself to the charge of being "abstract or elitist." By way of defense he first cites "the intrinsic value of the study of ideas for their own sake," which is undeniable, and then advances the proposition that study of the ideas themselves is "a *prerequisite* for understanding how they reflected social conditions and how they might in turn have influenced those conditions" (p. x). The latter argument is questionable, as Ketcham's own work shows, since it is almost impossible for a historian to discuss "public" ideas without making assumptions about the role they played in society. Who expounded the ideas that interest Ketcham, and who listened? Once asked, these questions reveal a miscellany of shadowy premises underlying *From Colony to Country*, each of which may be disputed and all of which together do not have quite the coherence that the book initially promises.

Ketcham's understanding of how ideas and society may interact ranges from his assertion that clergymen in "hundreds of pulpits" during the Great Awakening prepared "tens of thousands of Americans" for participation in the revolutionary movement (pp. 44, 39) to his belief that one man—Madison—was "the leading theoretician, and indeed the prime mover of events," in the years 1787–1789 (p. 139). Presumably, Madison was able to influence his society as Jefferson was, by single-mindedly setting in motion "innovating ideas" that would then "prod those in places of power" (p. 100). Elsewhere it is suggested that Jefferson, and Hamilton, may also be thought of as "spokesmen" whose achievement was to have "articulated for their followers" rival theories of society (p. 195). Franklin, in a different context, appears to have been somehow "archetypal" (p. 23), and it is argued that John Adams' mind provides a record "in microcosm" of attitudes—"however subconscious and unarticulated" that pervaded all levels of colonial society (p. 18). There is nothing inherently implausible in any one of these claims, but they are provocative and various enough to call for elaboration.

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Similarly underdeveloped is the judgment Ketcham passes on the ideas he describes. Plainly, he sympathizes with the "compelling, even beautiful conception" of the antifederalists (p. 133), and with Jefferson's "comprehensive, profoundly revolutionary vision" (p. 203), but he declines to challenge the legitimacy of so-called Hamiltonian values. There is something to be said for ideological "coexistence" (p. 269), he indicates, and for the kind of mediating "central insight" of a Madison (p. 148). More or less, the grave "inconsistency" of slavery excepted (p. 243), American ways circa 1820 appear to satisfy Ketcham. One wonders just how hard-nosed his assessment is, however. If he is serious when he says that Hamilton's heir is Nelson Rockefeller and Jefferson's is Eugene McCarthy (p. 212), it may then be worth asking who came out on top, when, and why.

STEPHEN BOTEIN
Harvard University

Essays on the American Revolution *edited by Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press and New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1973.—xi, 320 pp. $12.50.*

This is an extremely useful collection of essays. Originally delivered as papers at a symposium held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in March 1971 under the auspices of the Institute of Early American History and Culture, they are presented both by the authors and the institute "as a serious response to the bicentennial celebration and with the hope that reading and reflecting upon them will inspire others to join us in attempting to comprehend the meaning and importance of our Revolutionary heritage" (viii). In meeting its stated purpose the book is close to an unqualified success, for while some of the essays are more important and original than others they are almost all serious pieces of work: intelligent, knowledgeable, and well written. What becomes clear from reading these essays is that not only is the American Revolution an incredibly complex event, but that unlike the consensus approach to the study of the event that was in vogue during the 1950s and early 1960s or that of the Progressive historians which dominated the profession throughout most of the twentieth century until World War II, no single school or approach controls the way the Revolution is being studied today.

The opening essay by Bernard Bailyn on "The Central Themes of the American Revolution" is an important and revealing piece. The author's purpose is "simply to state in the most general terms my personal understanding of the major themes of the history of the Revolution and to clear up, if I can, confusions that have arisen since these themes were first suggested" (p. 4). In it Bailyn explains why he believes his stress on ideological factors is the primary way to

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understand both the origins and meaning of the Revolution and why this approach is not necessarily incompatible with other interpretations but is a prerequisite for them, and then shows how it can be used to understand and explain the failure of the loyalists. But this is not all Bailyn does. For about mid-way through his essay he turns his attention to the impact of the Revolution and with considerable emphasis warns that the categories he has developed for the pre-1776 years are not applicable to the post-1776 period which are "immensely more complicated" and "cannot be understood in essentially ideological terms," but involved "a complicated interplay between the maturing of Revolutionary ideas and ideals and the involvements of everyday life—in politics, in business, and in the whole range of social activities" (p. 19). He also warns that the significance of the slavery issue for late eighteenth-century politics can easily be overemphasized. Above all else, what this essay reveals is that Bailyn's own view of the meaning of his highly insightful work is in many ways different from that not only of his critics but also of some of his partisans and interpreters.

The most original essay is by John Shy on "The Military Conflict Considered as a Revolutionary War." Carefully thought out, intelligent and persuasive, it effectively links up the findings of those historians who have specialized on the military phase of the Revolution with the work of scholars who have studied its social impact. Heretofore, historians who have been interested in the Revolution's myriad dimensions have focused on the 1760–1776 and 1781–1788 periods and have generally treated the war years, 1776–1781, mainly by extrapolation; by showing how the military conflict may have influenced both the structure of the revolutionary experience and its effects, Shy has written a very significant essay.

William G. McLoughlin's long essay on "The Role of Religion in the Revolution" is a learned and intelligent piece. With great clarity McLoughlin traces the complicated development of such independent but related issues as disestablishment, separation of church and state, freedom of religion, and the significance of public corporations. McLoughlin's own work along with that of Alan Heimert has made it clear that it is not possible to meaningfully understand the Revolution without taking into account its religious dimension. What is less clear is how this affects the highly secular explanation of the Revolution that Bailyn has offered. So far these two views have only intersected with each other on minor points.

Rowland Berthoff and John M. Murrin in a highly speculative and sprawling essay called "Feudalism, Communalism and the Yeoman Freeholder," see the eighteenth century being marked by a feudal revival as small groups of men acquired enormous fortunes and wealth became increasingly unevenly divided. They argue that while this trend was temporarily halted by the social and economic impact of the Revolution it nonetheless continued during the nineteenth century, but the older feudal and communal values that justified social hierarchy were at the same time effectively undercut by the rhetoric of the Revolu-

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tion which replaced it with the exaltation of the virtuous yeoman farmer and egalitarianism. As a consequence, the authors' suggest, "the ultimate impact of the Revolution," was, particularly after 1825, "to divorce power from politics and politics from social reality" (p. 288). Aside from a highly questionable interpretation of the Jacksonian era, the authors' never effectively make the case that what was involved in eighteenth-century American economic and social development was in fact a feudal revival as opposed to mainly the commercialization of some large rural areas. Still, despite these caveats, this is an intriguing essay which raises questions that are both interesting and important.

Although interesting, the remaining essays are somewhat less successful. H. James Henderson makes use of a computer to study "The Structure of Politics in the Continental Congress," and he engages in a sophisticated discussion of his methodology, but all he comes up with is an old-fashioned sectional and regional interpretation that avoids the complicated questions of how and why these alignments came about. Richard Maxwell Brown in a somewhat unfocused essay examines the topic of "Violence and the Revolution," but does not really add much to what was already known on the subject and ends up by torturously trying to relate it to twentieth-century developments. Jack P. Greene's "Analysis of the Preconditions of the American Revolution," although extremely clear in its presentation, does not really go beyond the view of the causes of the Revolution developed by Charles M. Andrews during the mid-1920s.

The final essay is by Edmund S. Morgan. Morgan's *The Birth of the Republic, 1763–1788* is one of the few comprehensive treatments of the Revolutionary era to be written from a consensus point of view. Therefore, in an essay entitled "Conflict and Consensus in the American Revolution," one might expect him to try and confront the growing criticism that has been mounted against a viewpoint he so openly and vigorously espouses. But he does not. Instead he hammers away at the view that the Revolution cannot be explained in terms of class conflict, a view that very few people seriously subscribe to today, and ignores totally the newer, more complex and flexible socioeconomic and ideological categories that historians like Jackson T. Main and Gordon Wood have developed for explaining the post-1776 years. Stressing instead the importance of a general commitment to such vague principles as equality and nationalism, Morgan merely updates the language of his earlier book, but it is the same old ideas. Moreover, when he does discuss conflict he raises the slavery issue in such a way that while it gives his essay a certain topical attractiveness, it greatly exaggerates the significance of that issue during the Revolutionary era. Given the serious level on which the Revolution is being studied today, a level which is reflected in many of the other essays of this volume, Morgan's essay, for all its lucidness and eloquence, is a disappointing finale.

RICHARD E. ELLIS
State University of New York, Buffalo

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The National Urban League 1910–1940 *by Nancy J. Weiss. New York, Oxford University Press, 1974.—xiv, 402 pp. $12.50.*

Nancy J. Weiss, by offering us an organizational history of the first thirty years of the National Urban League, has taken a significant step toward closing the gap between what she characterizes as the two most familiar "peaks" in black history of the first half of the twentieth century: the ideological and tactical conflict between Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Du Bois during the first decade, and the post-World War II origins of the civil rights movement.

The coverage of the organization and work of the local League branches is, perhaps, the most original contribution in *The National Urban League,* and adds considerably to our increased understanding of black history during the first part of the century. Although records of branch work are fragmentary at best, Weiss, through extensive and comprehensive research, has managed to use these existing collections, supplemented by correspondences and periodicals, to explore the services performed by League branches, and the relationship of the National League to its local affiliates.

The most valuable aspect of this case study, however, is the discussion of the League in terms of stability and change, action and reaction, during thrity years of American history. Despite the extraordinary continuity of League personnel, and notwithstanding the consistently accommodationist philosophy of the organization, the League was able to periodically redirect its activities to meet the changing needs of city blacks. In fact the basic conflict between George Edmund Haynes, the League's first executive secretary, and Eugene Kinckle Jones, his assistant and then successor, arose from Haynes's rather fixed view of the League as an organization for "the professionalization of social services" and the "scholarly investigation" of the urban conditions of blacks (p. 29), and Jones's flexibility in adapting to the more practical needs of blacks for social services and employment, particularly during the Great Migration.

The study is organized chronologically into roughly ten-year periods. It begins by placing the origins of the League squarely in the progressive era, discussing extensively the socioeconomic background of the early League supporters and staff, and comparing the League and the NAACP as products of the two major orientations of black reform movements, the Washington accommodationist orientation and the Du Bois protest orientation, respectively. In the context of the urban reform period of the 1910s, the Urban League made little headway, and its efforts to "redress the repressive effects of urban life" (p. 86) had limited and piecemeal results. The Great Migration of thousands of southern blacks to the urban North, however, created an immediate and pressing need for local branches which could focus on social service activities while the National League concentrated on black employment opportunities.

The League's success at developing employment opportunities for the new black urban working class during the war years, however, was in no way an

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unqualified victory. In adhering to a philosophy of accommodation, in following the conservative bias of its financial supporters, and in directing its organizational energies toward the immediate problems of urban blacks, the League failed to challenge the basically racist structure of the economy, and the treatment by American capitalism of blacks as a perpetual marginal labor force. The pragmatic flexibility that enabled the League to readjust its programs to a changing economy during the Great Migration, the years of "normalcy," the depression, and finally the New Deal, was limited to shifts in the targets of League employment efforts. In fact the endurance and "success" of the League can probably be attributed to its refusal to challenge or espouse alternatives to the marginal position of blacks in the economic system.

Studies of organizations generally are marked by two severe limitations, which this book shares. They accept rather than question the nature and purpose of the organization, and they have a tendency to treat the subject as an object, a dependent variable, reacting to the economic and political events of the period. Having acknowledged that the Urban League "could not prevent the transformation of black Americans from an enslaved agricultural peasantry to an oppressed urban proletariat," Weiss can only conclude that "had it not existed . . . the plight of blacks in cities might well have been even worse" (p. 309). There remains the need to go beyond the organizational monograph to analyze the dynamics of race history, and to treat various forms and types of black activities as independent and interrelated variables that have an effect of their own on the history of race relations in America.

MARSHA HURST
John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
The City University of New York

Robert L. Vann of the *Pittsburgh Courier*: Politics and Black Journalism *by Andrew Buni. Pittsburgh, Pa., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974. —xv, 410 pp. $12.95.*

This biography gives belated recognition to Robert Lee Vann (1879–1940) as a black editor and publisher, politician, lawyer, and above all, an exemplar of American dreams, myths, and realities. In Horatio Alger fashion, Vann worked his way north from the tobacco fields of Hertford County, North Carolina, to Richmond's Virginia Union University and Pittsburgh's Western University of Pennsylvania Law School. As a struggling criminal lawyer, his career turned upward in 1910 when he joined a group of blacks in founding *The Pittsburgh Courier*, which would become perhaps the best black newspaper of the twentieth century.

Professor Buni attributes Vann's acceptance of the *Courier*'s editorship to his "passion for journalism." Yet the weight of the author's impressive evidence

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suggests that Vann was singularly lacking in passion, commitment, or ideology in the pursuit of any goal that did not contribute to his own personal success. Unlike his idol, Booker T. Washington, who consistently proposed self-help as the way to gain respect and support from whites, Vann was ideologically erratic as he sought ways of boosting his newspaper's circulation. To this end, he formed fragile alliances with the NAACP and the radical Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and though rabidly opposed to Marcus Garvey's Back-to-Africa movement, he gave the Jamaican a chance to tell his story in the *Courier*.

In the 1930s, the *Courier*'s exhaustive coverage of the Ethiopian-Italian war and Joe Louis' rise to the heavyweight championship helped Vann to make the newspaper a financial success during the Depression and to surpass the *Chicago Defender* as his race's most widely circulated national newspaper. While the *Defender*'s Robert S. Abbott had carbon copied William Randolph Hearst's *Chicago American* in its crude appeal for mass readership, Vann's *Courier* was a unique journalistic creation. In typography, style, and substance, Vann more fully recognized the emergence of literate blacks in American cities. The *Courier*'s sprightly coverage of social and sporting events and its weekly reportage of events and issues ignored by white dailies were like a revelation and a tonic in black churches and barber shops. The newspaper was as sleek, urbane, and unpredictable as its publisher.

Vann was the rare black professional or business man who placed no limitations on his options in a plainly discriminatory American society. With his journalism enhancing his law practice, Vann took a fling at banking and importing before settling on politics as the third facet of his varied career. He was handicapped politically by the fact that the black population of industrial Pittsburgh never approached the numbers reached in such comparable centers as Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit, yet as a Republican loyalist in a Republican state he carved out a fair niche of recognition and patronage.

It was not until after the 1932 presidential election when he turned to the Democrats and national politics that his allegiance to the American political system received its severest test. Urging blacks to employ a "liquid vote," he explained that "liquid assets are those that you can turn over and make use of"—at a profit, presumably. In political terms, Vann meant that blacks should bargain their votes to the Republicans and Democrats who offered them the most patronage and best legislation. But as Buni writes, the reality is that "the average voter is not flexible enough to weigh all the issues pertinent to himself in an election year and choose rationally the candidates offering the fairest deal." Nor, it might be added, would any minority block of "liquid" votes be given much consideration except in the likelihood of a close election.

Being one of the first national black leaders to switch to the Democrats before the subsequent stampede of blacks from the Republican party to Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, Vann was appointed by Roosevelt as Assistant U. S. Attorney General. For Vann, a black lawyer, this amounted to a fancy title

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with no power or meaningful responsibilities. As Roosevelt and the Pennsylvania Democrats enjoyed increasing majorities, Vann was pushed into the background, partly because black votes were lost in the landslides. Approaching sixty, Vann could have rested on his journalistic laurels, but in 1940 he bolted to Wendell Wilkie and the Republicans. He died of cancer in October of that election year, believing to the end that he could make a place for himself in American politics.

Practitioners and students of political science may be disappointed that Buni did not take a harder look at Vann's "liquid vote" theory, especially since the black vote has been historically taken for granted, first by Republicans, and since Roosevelt, by Democrats. How to make both parties more responsive to black votes is as big a problem for a new generation of black leaders as it ever was in Vann's time. The resolution of that ageless problem is far beyond the purview of this illuminating success story of an American prototype who just happened to be black.

LUTHER P. JACKSON, JR.
Columbia University

Accounting for United States Economic Growth, 1929–1969 *by Edward F. Denison. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1974.—xviii, 355 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $5.50.*

Readers familiar with Denison's earlier work on growth (*The Sources of Economic Growth and the Alternatives Before Us*, Committee on Economic Development, 1962; *Why Growth Rates Differ; Postwar Experience in Nine Western Countries*, The Brookings Institution, 1967) will find in the present study numerous refinements of estimating procedures and an extension of time coverage to 1969. Beyond that, the author undertakes to use the analysis of growth determinants to estimate potential output, with the object of employing the difference (gap) between actual and potential output to give policy guidance more reliable than what is provided by present estimates.

On the determinants of growth, the study's conclusions do not vary significantly from what had previously been reported. For the period 1964–1965, for example, Denison "explains" the average annual growth rate of 4.54 percent as follows, in percentage points:

Employment	2.26	Improved resource allocation	0.34
Advances in knowledge	1.15	Hours	−0.27
Capital	0.93	Age-sex composition	−0.31
Economies of scale	0.56	Identity of demand	−0.61
Education	0.40	Other factors (net)	0.09

But it is the gap analysis that is the study's most intriguing feature, since Denison's estimates of differences, plus or minus, between actual and potential out-

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put differ from those of the Council of Economic Advisors for precisely those times when such guidance as gap analysis can give would have been most useful. Thus, he has the economy slightly overemployed in 1955, whereas the council's present estimates (there were none in 1955–1956) show significant underemployment. And he seems to have been more nearly right than the council for 1964: he has the economy fully employed; the council has it significantly underemployed. But this reader would count him wrong for estimating a significant gap to have existed in 1969. Obviously, more work must be done before the gap concept can be a reliable guide to the policy maker.

Denison's book should be must-reading for all serious students of economics. In certain respects it is in a class with what Kuznets did for the gross national product and what Morris Copeland and Raymond Goldsmith did for the flow of funds. Denison is right in believing that, as was ultimately done with these earlier statistical undertakings, the time is ripe to have the growth determination task "institutionalized," that is, taken over by the federal government.

RAYMOND J. SAULNIER
Barnard College, Columbia University

Urban Economics and Public Policy *by James Heilbrun. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974.—xviii, 380 pp. $10.95.*

The current interest in urban economic problems is not likely to disappear even in the face of the classical type of inflation-depression worries which now envelop us. An enormous nonsystematic literature has merged in the area of urban economics. Much of this deals with important problems, but there is an absence of linkage between the parts and a failure to indicate the manner in which the problems are analyzed outside of the very specialized literature in the field. The specialized literature deals to an extraordinary extent with the building of logical models which cannot be applied to current problems. This is a major deficiency since economics is ordinarily given a central, if not *the* central role, in understanding the contemporary urban malaise.

James Heilbrun of Fordham University has attempted to fill this void with notable success. Using the tools of the economist in dealing with the economic aspects of urbanism he has provided the undergraduate with a systematic readable volume. His wide-ranging interest in the field is apparent in the first section of the volume where he gives an historical description and economic explanation of the "growth of cities." The cornerstone of the volume is the second section where Heilbrun provides a theoretical analysis of the location, form, and structure of cities. The third section follows along the more conventional path of analyzing urban problems: poverty, housing, and metropolitan finances. The connecting themes are the influence of technological innovation,

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rising living standards, and changing population size on the spatial organization of cities and metropolitan areas.

The major focus of the volume is on the older, larger metropolitan areas and their central cities. One difficulty of this volume, as in many other volumes in the field, is in the interchangeable manner in which the concepts of city, urbanism, and metropolitanism are used. This permits a number of problems to escape systematic analysis or to be analyzed in an incomplete manner. The complexity and nonuniformity of the American scene are also in part hidden by the use of very broad brush techniques of analysis.

This is most apparent in dealing with the issues associated with organizing and financing what is called the "metropolitan public sector." Major developments are bypassed, such as the enormous growth of state governments during the period from the end of World War II to the present and their implications for local government. Thus, public welfare, which is viewed as the quintessential local fiscal problem, has increasingly become a function directly provided by state governments and counties, not by cities, but the general presumption continues that it is a city government type of problem.

One of the major areas of current concern is the property tax. Heilbrun has written extensively on the real estate tax and urban housing, but this volume fails to include some of the current thinking in this field. The *Serrano* and *Rodriguez* decisions, both recognized by the author, did not have quite the consequences which their proponents imagined because of a failure to recognize the actual distribution of property values. The manner in which the property tax is analyzed in this volume indicates the extent to which, as Dick Netzer has shown in the case of the property tax, "older ideas held by economists become incorporated into public policy long after the arguments have been shown to be erroneous."

The volume nevertheless deals with the major issues. The complexity and interrelatedness of the forces involved are recognized by Heilbrun. The book is not only valuable for an undergraduate course, but to others who wish to see how urban economic problems are viewed by an economist whose principal interest for a long period of time has been in this area.

SEYMOUR SACKS
Syracuse University

The Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century *by Carl N. Degler. New York, Harper & Row, Inc., 1974.—392 pp. $10.00.*

Carl Degler set a difficult task for himself when he undertook to write a history of white southern dissent in the nineteenth century. The lines of continuity between different manifestations of resistance to the reigning order are not obvious or easy to establish; furthermore the origins and motivation of the dis-

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senters of each period were diverse and sometimes obscure. Then there is the problem of attempting to estimate the size and outer limits of each dissenting group; there were often gray areas where heresy shaded into orthodoxy. It is to Degler's credit that he does full justice to the complexity and variability of "the other South" and still manages to make some general points that shed considerable light on the character and development of southern society and politics.

Degler considers four principal groups of dissenters—the antebellum opponents of slavery, the Unionists of the war period, the "scalawag" Republicans of Reconstruction, and the Populists of the 1890s. He makes a number of perceptive observations about the special characteristics of each movement. Of broader significance, however, are the features that he finds common to all these groups. He argues that virtually all the dissenters were influenced significantly by the culture against which they seemed to be rebelling. Degler believes that the South was (and has remained) truly different from the North and that this cultural distinctiveness was reflected in the peculiar nature of southern dissent. Southern antislavery was more moderate than its northern counterpart; southern Unionism was usually more conditional than the national commitment represented by Lincoln; southern Republicans were less prepared to accept drastic change, especially in race relations, than "carpetbag" radicals from the North; and southern Populism was much less radical than its rhetoric has led some historians to suppose. Degler attributes this persistent cautiousness and spirit of moderation to a southern ethos that made the region as a whole more conservative than the North in the sense that it was more respectful of tradition and more fearful of innovation; even the most radical southerners were unwilling to embrace the utopian and perfectionist doctrines that often inspired nineteenth-century northern reform movements. Degler does not attempt a full explanation of this cultural difference, but given the limitations of his study he was probably wise not to do so. A more serious problem with the cultural emphasis is that it may not give due weight to the effect of sheer repressiveness—the barrier to radical dissent raised by the denial of civil liberties, as described for example by the historian Clement Eaton, or the massive pressure for ideological conformity summed up by W. J. Cash in his concept of "the savage ideal." It is at least possible that some southern dissenters would have been as radical as their northern counterparts if they had enjoyed the same freedom of expression. To call the nineteenth-century South a totalitarian society, as some historians have done, is a gross misuse of terms and a distortion of historical reality, but it can hardly be denied that an extreme form of (white) majority tyranny usually prevailed.

Degler's other general point is that the fatal flaw in southern dissent was its vulnerability on the race issue. Here he is on very firm ground. Southern dissenters usually accepted their region's commitment to white supremacy but differed from the majority in their willingness to sacrifice caste rigidity to gain

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some objective they deemed more important. Southern antislavery men were willing to jettison slavery to promote regional economic development, even though in most instances they were unsympathetic to blacks and hoped to colonize them abroad as part of the emancipation process. Republicans and Populists found it expedient to cooperate with black voters in their electoral struggles against white conservatives but tried to maintain an artificial and tenuous distinction between "social equality" (which they opposed) and political rights. But despite their consistent refusal to endorse full racial equality, they provided their opponents with the opening they need to arouse white tribalism and turn it against the reform impulse. When southern dissenters attempted to appeal to the class interests of a segment of the white population, their efforts invariably miscarried, because to "most white southerners . . . race was always more fundamental than class" (p. 7). I have some doubts as to whether "race" and "class" can really be disentangled and differentiated in such an apparently neat and definitive fashion. But it is certainly true that the differing economic interests dividing the white South were never allowed to undermine the basic solidarity of the dominant socioracial group.

This is an important and insightful book on a neglected subject in American political and social history. It adds not only to our understanding of "the other South" but also contributes to our awareness of the other America which the nineteenth-century South represented.

GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON
Northwestern University

Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1973 *by Philip S. Foner. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.—xi, 489 pp. $15.00.*

This book is an ambitious effort by a very productive if controversial historian. The author's goals were to examine the unions' exclusionary policies, to tell "the story of the continuing struggle of black workers to achieve equality as members of organized labor . . .;" and as "the minor theme" to present the history of "black-white unity" (p. ix).

Philip Foner (now professor of history at Lincoln University) has touched on these topics before in earlier works—and he has written many. He is an industry unto himself—the prodigious producer of articles, monographs, and collections of documents and letters. These works flow from his typewriter unceasingly; the page opposite the title credits him with over thirty books. But although he writes easily, readably, and without fear, Foner has a very idiosyncratic point of view that often results in his highlighting minutiae, emphasizing the odd, and promoting an extreme left-of-center view in variance with the facts he has so carefully unearthed.

The book is marred by these problems. It is highly unlikely that anyone in

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the foreseeable future will write a more detailed overview of "the policy and practice of organized labor" (p. ix) toward black working men and women across the span of American history. And certainly that record is a far from honorable one. But Foner's history could have been more valuable had he used a little more care and a little less distortion and polemicism. Nowhere is this problem more evident than in his treatment of the unemployed organizations and the blacks during the 1930s. New Deal relief efforts are given short shrift. The emphasis is on the organizations of the unemployed and welfare recipients. Quite correctly Foner highlights the role of the Communist-controlled Unemployed Councils in organizing and assisting the unemployed of all races during the first year of the Depression. But he fails to point out that the once-flourishing councils rapidly lost their effectiveness and numbers because of the party leadership's insistence upon adherence to "third period" ideology —a policy which alienated the councils' membership, for "pot and pan" demonstrations were understandable but not attacks on Tammany Hall relief stations or marches in support of Afghan rebels. After 1930 despite well-publicized but poorly attended "National Hunger Marches" on Washington, D. C., the councils were nothing more than paper organizations. And any attempt to treat the councils as anything else is either a misreading of the facts or a rewriting of history. Moreover, not only does Foner play up the councils, he ignores the efforts of other organized unemployed groups such as the Socialist-sponsored Workers Alliance—which goes unmentioned until 1936, after it was taken over by the Communists.

There are also, unfortunately, some other drawbacks to this book—for some of which the publisher must assume responsibility. The title is a misnomer; the date 1619 is an unnecessary exaggeration. There obviously was no such thing as organized labor in the early colonial days, even if occasionally, as Richard Morris points out, groups of men did try by temporarily acting together to improve their lot. Moreover, the bulk of the book deals with the twentieth century; indeed, nearly 40 percent of it is concerned with the post-World War II era. The bibliography is limited and leaves out such important works as "the Racial Policy in American Industry" series. And there are occasional errors of fact. It was in 1942, not 1941, that "Little Steel" gave "in to industrial unionism"—the contracts were signed during the summer of 1942.

Foner's book is marred by its various deficiencies but not seriously disfigured. *Organized Labor and the Black Worker* does fill a large gap for those interested in American labor history and as such serves a real purpose. He has chronicled lovingly, winningly, and movingly such little-known aspects of that history as The Colored National Labor Union and The National Negro Labor Council. In so doing he may have erred in being too detailed at times, but he has pulled together into one volume much information which heretofore was scattered in disparate and often out-of-print sources. And his footnotes, though uneven in quality, can be of inestimable service to anyone wishing to follow

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up various of the topics touched on in this work. In fine, *Organized Labor and the Black Worker* is marred by a variety of shortcomings. For this reason, it should be used with some care. At the same time, it is an interesting account, which will and should be used by anyone concerned with the subject.

DANIEL J. LEAB
Seton Hall University

The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century *by Immanuel Wallerstein. New York, Academic Press, 1974.—xiv, 409 pp. $16.50.*

In this volume, the first of a projected series of four, the author sets himself the ambitious task of reinterpreting the rise of European capitalism within the context of an emerging world economy. He argues that the sixteenth-century dawn of the new capitalist system of social and economic relations must be understood in terms of the Western European core areas in their interplay with the American, West African, and East European periphery and the largely Mediterranean semiperiphery. He attempts to provide, in the words of the dean of French historiography, Fernand Braudel, no less than "a new framework for the subject of European history."

Writing from a broadly neo-Marxist perspective, but also deeply beholden to the French tradition of socioeconomic history of the *Annales* school, and drawing upon the resources not only of American, French, and English but also of Spanish, Italian, Polish, Russian, and other European historians, Wallerstein has provided what can only be called a major work of analytical and synthetic sociological history. I am in no position to evaluate the details of this interpretation—it will undoubtedly give rise to debate among specialists—but I do not hesitate to say that I consider this the first major American work in a neo-Marxist vein since the publication of Barrington Moore's seminal *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* eight years ago. It shows that a flexibly handled Marxian methodology provides a tool of analysis at least equal to the Weberian-Parsonian framework used by S. N. Eisenstadt in his path-breaking *The Political Systems of Empires.*

Wallerstein's major argument runs as follows: by the middle of the fifteenth century the stage was set for the creation of a capitalist world economy based on a "worldwide" division of labor, with formally free labor at the core and forced labor on the periphery. Free-labor capitalism could develop only because it was backed by coerced labor. This division of labor in turn went together with the rise of bureaucratic state machineries in the core areas, but the emergent system was not a world empire with a single political system; it was a relatively integrated world economy made up of a variety of political entities.

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This system provided a structural base for capitalism to maneuver freely because it allowed the economy to operate in an area that was larger than that controlled by any political entity.

This bare skeleton of the argument cannot do justice to the wealth of instructive detail that the author provides about many factors. He spells out for example the economic changes that followed the influx of American bullion; makes a comparative analysis of the relation between the bourgeoisie, the nobility, and the state in France and England, and describes the impact of the development of the Netherlands on the older Italian trading cities.

Subsequent debate is likely to show that the pattern painted here is probably too neat. For example, if, as the author admits (p. 305), the Polish wheat exports to the Western core area were a small proportion of the total European economy, one could ask why Poland is nevertheless ranked as a key peripheral area in the "world" division of labor. But this is not the place for such detailed discussion. I can only reiterate that Wallerstein's work is indispensable to those who wish to understand the background from which the contemporary world has emerged.

LEWIS A. COSER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Lion Rampant: Essays in the Study of British Imperialism *by D. A. Low. London, Frank Cass, 1973.—x, 230 pp. $12.50.*

In this the first volume of a new series from the University of London's Institute of Commonwealth Studies, edited by Dennis Austin and W. H. Morris-Jones, D. A. Low vigorously tries to draw historians of the British Empire away from their preoccupation with the impetus of the West toward imperialism. That he contends is only part of the larger problem of the structure of colonial authority, cultural interaction in the colonial situation, and the impact of the West on non-Western societies. To be sure these are questions which area historians of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific are addressing. Yet the gap remains. Far too few attempts have been made to subject the conclusions of area specialists to comparative analysis by means of the common yardstick, the colonial (or informal imperial) past. Synthesis is the task for which imperial historians are uniquely fitted, but they are sadly neglecting it.

Low has not attempted to redress the balance in this single slim volume. Instead, drawing on his previous important work in East Africa and India he has produced six wide-ranging and thoughtful essays. These suggest the kind of problems which less adventurous colleagues might pursue.

Four of these essays examine the "nexus" between traditional and imperial authority which (given the limited personal and financial resources of the latter) was so ubiquitous in the colonial situation. Low constructs a typology of

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initial engagement and, in "Empire and Traditional Rulership," analyzes the struggle for survival in two crises. Some traditional authorities, the Ndebele in Rhodesia for instance, were overthrown in the first crisis of the early years of conquest. Those who survived generally persisted to confront a second crisis of ballot-box politics after independence. Had the colonial era strengthened or weakened traditional authority? Indian princes fell at once; the Kabaka of Buganda lost out after a period of uneasy balance with Dr. Obote, who fell in time; the Northern Nigerial emirs and the Malayan sultans, not to mention the shieks of the Persian Gulf, are still there. Low argues that the main variable is not the religious base of traditional authority but the degree of "administrative reach" that it enjoyed under colonialism. "Sequence in the Demission of Power" argues that the transfer of power in Africa cannot be understood except as a "black sequel" to a "brown struggle" to extend the principles of the white commonwealth, a conflict in which the adept government of India had won all the battles but lost the war. In contrast West Africa and East Africa where the imperial government still maintained control had no crucial debate: the Labour government and important governors had been through it all before. Yet the aftermath has been very different. India's political stability (at least at the center) contrasts sharply with East African instability. Low concludes that the key factors are India's unifying cultural tradition and the solid, hierarchical, rational-legal administrative structure evolved during 150 years of British rule: East Africa had nothing remotely comparable. Thus, he maintains, the colonial past *is* an important determinant of postindependence politics.

Sandwiched between these four essays on phases of colonial political authority are two others on very different themes. "Empire and Social Engineering" looks at the debate between those who would maintain and those who would transform colonial society, finding once again echoes of the Indian debate in the African sequel. "Empire and Christianity" asks why Christianity did so much better from a later start in Africa than in Asia. Not surprisingly he concludes that Christianity made few breakthroughs into the Indian elite; that in most of tropical Africa it did not have to contend with an intellectually competitive "world religion"; that Christianity's success in Africa depended on its close association with the overwhelming military and technological supremacy of the colonial regimes.

These two nonpolitical essays are the least developed part of the book, yet they are the most suggestive in support of Low's plea for a shift in emphasis. One might indeed hope that the net will be cast still wider. There is nothing here about the impact of imperialism on traditional economies and land-tenure systems; about disease or the increase in witchcraft and religious fanaticism; about migration, urbanism, or labor systems; and only a taste of intellectual history. Low is one of the premier historians of the British Empire,

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and his argument for a broadening of the range of inquiry, ably supported as it is in this book, is very welcome.

JOHN W. CELL
Duke University

Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930's *by Stanley Hoffmann. New York, The Viking Press, 1974.—xiii, 529 pp. $15.00.*

Few authors can resist the temptation of bringing together their various essays into a single volume, although the justifications for such an undertaking are most often unconvincing. They see unifying threads and themes where few, if any, exist. Stanley Hoffmann's volume is an exception. This collection of essays, of which all but two were published separately over the past two decades, is an important contribution to the study of French politics and society. The reader will find here essays (some, like the one published as early as 1956 on "The Vichy Circle of French Conservatives," have become classics) dealing with Vichy, Guallism, the events of May 1968, nationalism, the relationship between state and society. All of them have as their central theme the problem of change. Professor Hoffmann proposes no single thesis to account for the transformation of French political and social institutions over the past thirty years. Instead, he offers complex, subtle, and lucid analyses of the evolution—and its attendant problems and frustrations—of the French political community.

Although Hoffmann coined the term "stalemate society," he recognizes the profound transformation that France has undergone and now maintains that there has been a "gradual liquidation of the stalemate society since 1945" (p. 133). France, he observes, has become an industrialized state, and the elements of the stalemate society—a limited state, hierarchy, separation between social strata, a large peasant population, the isolation of workers—are fast disappearing. Nevertheless, he maintains that major divisions remain within French society, and that an agreement on the merits of economic progress "is neither an agreement on common values nor an agreement on the structures and institutions of a new society" (p. 470). Hoffmann sees change occurring, but he also sees that the institutions which are responsible for inducing change are most often incapable of reforming themselves.

Although Hoffmann warns us at the outset that his book is not an "exercise in political science" and that subjectivity and contradictions are present (p. x), he does not write without a theoretical base. He has, to be sure, no patience for theoretical constructs that do not reflect or illuminate the functioning of society. But he does lean on a theory that, according to him, "is so powerful it sometimes seems to explain everything" (p. viii). It is the celebrated theory advanced by Michel Crozier. Briefly put, Crozier's theory holds that citizens

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prefer to leave decisions to a higher authority, and that while the citizen abdicates his participatory role, he nevertheless sets limits to the state's authority. He guards against arbitrariness by establishing rigid bureaucratic rules that limit the authority of those in power. Each group works out its freedom within a system of rigid rules and manages to preserve a degree of liberty, or freedom to protest, and of legal equality. Thus hierarchy and centralization coexist with fragmentation. Consequently, change can only come about through crises, but even then change requires a return to the previous equilibrium. As Hoffmann puts it, crisis leadership is "both the agent of social change *in* the system, and the preservor *of* the system" (p. 72).

How does this theory, upon which Hoffmann relies so heavily, square with reality? It is hard to say, because its empirical foundations are by no means as solid as they might be. One obvious weakness is that it puts an almost exclusive emphasis on sociological explanations, such as fear of face-to-face relations, and ignores the *political* context of conflicts. Although Hoffmann wholly embraces Crozier's theory, it does not constrain his own wide-ranging analyses. Also, he recognizes every now and then that its application is not without problems. In his excellent concluding essay, for example, he notes, after describing the "blocages" of the society, that "we have to remember that if this picture were the whole truth, the changes in French society could be explained only by assuming that the state is neither so indispensable nor so much a cause of paralysis as Crozier's analysis suggests" (pp. 471–472). An equally serious problem with the Crozier thesis stems from its ethnocentric nature. It sees France as a unique case, and it ignores how similar in many instances are its problems to those of other industrial societies. Hoffmann too places by far the greater emphasis on the specifity of the French case. Yet, if my own reading of his book is correct, it suggests that he is tending gradually to see that France may not be as unique as he once thought. He notes toward the end of the book that "many of the problems France faces, which some of the French tend to blame on the idiosyncracies of French traditions, habits, and style, are problems that plague other societies as well" (p. 499).

All this does not mean that there is little that is distinctive about France. The weight of its history is heavy, and no essay in Hoffmann's book is without a profound and often dazzling grasp of this history. His erudition accounts for his balanced judgments on some of the more traumatic and emotionally charged aspects of the country's past. In the three opening chapters, all dealing with Vichy and the collaboration, he shows the complexity of the Vichy phenomenon. Few writers could discuss the various strands of Vichy, talk of the "pluralistic dictatorship" of this regime, distinguish between "collaboration with Germany" and "collaborationism with the Nazis" without seeming to engage in semantic play. Yet, not for one moment can one miss Hoffmann's condemnation of the regime even as he attempts to assess its various strands, its policies, its relationship to and impact on the French people, as well as the complex reac-

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tion of the French people to it. Hoffmann is forthright about his own values and opinions, and yet he succeeds in being objective. This same combination of personal involvement with a subject and learned analyses of it can be found in Hoffmann's treatment of his "hero," General de Gaulle. The discussion on de Gaulle, on Gaullism and on Gaullist policies, occupies over one-third of the book. Henceforth, it will no longer be possible to talk about Gaullism, and particularly its foreign aspects, without a close reading of these essays. All the essays are rich in sources so that it is all the more regrettable that the publisher tucked away the footnotes at the back of the book.

Hoffmann has done all students of French history, politics, and society a service by bringing these essays together in a single volume. They will all come to regard *Decline or Renewal?* as an indispensable work.

EZRA N. SULEIMAN
University of California, Los Angeles

Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–1973, 2d Edition *by Adam B. Ulam. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.—vi, 797 pp. $15.95.*

This is the second edition of Ulam's history of Soviet foreign policy published in 1968, not reedited but prolonged. The two chapters covering the post-Khrushchev period are new, 82 of 776 pages of text, but even here much is taken from the earlier edition. In addition, there are insertions, on pp. 495 and 530, of information on the Soviet military presence in Communist China, both derived from a Soviet account of dubious reliability. Otherwise, not even misprints are corrected, and references to 1968 as the present remain. This is unfortunate, because much has been learned about many topics, such as Sino-Soviet relations and the cold war, since 1968, and Ulam might well have given readers of this book the benefit of some of the insights developed in his *Stalin*. Perhaps production costs outweigh scholarly desiderata.

We have, however, a long, detailed, and now updated history of Soviet foreign policy. There is more emphasis on expansion, the "pushful" character of Soviet policy than on coexistence; and continuity of basic purposes, despite the decay of world revolution from a dream to an advertising slogan or less, is a principal theme. Another theme is the failure of the West to understand the Bolshevik state, the lack of purpose, the scruples and weariness of the West which gave many victories to the Russians. The Leninists, on the other hand, are seen as skilled propagandists, rather cagey and realistic in their diplomacy, however crude in domestic politics, able in promoting the differences of other powers, blessed with elasticity based on confidence in ultimate victory. Many interesting, sometimes unconventional points are made. The Bolsheviks were

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nationalists de facto from 1917 on. The Western powers were not very unhappy to see the Bolsheviks in power because the latter, it was assumed, could not possibly make a strong Russian state. The differences of Stalin and Trotsky were slight until blown up by polemics. From 1928 to 1934 the primary aim of the Comintern was the destruction of European socialism. Even after Hitler came to power, Stalin was probably not eager to see him overthrown. After the August 1939, Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviets offered war materiel to Poland. After the German victory over Poland, they had to advocate what they most feared, a peaceful settlement in the West. The cold war was inevitable because of victory, more specifically because the USSR represented "a movement that seeks security through constant expansion" (p. 377). We are several times reminded of the old Russian motto, "That which stops growing begins to rot" (p. 408). But possession of nuclear weapons, contrary to frequent opinion, weakened American pressures against the Soviet Union because it gave a false sense of security. In 1946, Stalin wanted to divide China between Chiang and the Communists. As Nixon-led detente comes along, this may be serious and long lasting or only tactical; Ulam seems to incline somewhat toward the latter on grounds that external hostility is essential for the Soviet system.

The story is told with verve, imagination, and insight, and its faults are mostly minor. There are some careless repetitions, even in almost the same words, as on the Germans in the Crimea (pp. 80 and 85), and the faked photo of Malenkov with Stalin and Mao (pp. 538 and 540). The use of "Op. cit." is sometimes annoying; e.g., to find the citation for the "op. cit." of page 530 one must thumb back to page 495. There are a few factual errors: e.g., Brezhnev is not formally a private person (p. 779) but a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In the absence of much information, there is a great deal of conjecture regarding Soviet motives, at least from Stalin on; it would be miraculous if many conjectures were not questionable. Generally, the Soviets seem to be credited with more perspicacity than supported by the record. Ulam even speaks of their having "a greater historical sophistication of people bred in Marxism" (p. 349), as though a myth endows them with sophistication. It would require truly unusual acumen if the Russians were to foresee in advance that a Jewish state would cause conflict between the Arabs and the West (p. 584). When Soviet moves came out well, it is ascribed to their sharpness; their luck should probably be credited quite as often.

The book is more bold than careful, more suggestive and stimulating than definitive. Well written, with occasional lively figures (e.g., Trotskyism as a "decompression chamber" from Marxism), it speaks with self-assured authority as the principal, practically the only thorough overall history of Soviet foreign policy. It does not have the fire of *Stalin*, and in places Ulam seems to have difficulty in keeping up his interest in the details. It is rather chronicle than analysis; for example, it gives a blow-by-blow account of the Sino-Soviet split but no explicit analysis of its causes and political psychology. But a co-

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herent blow-by-blow guide through Soviet foreign policy from 1917 to 1973 is no small achievement.

ROBERT G. WESSON
University of California, Santa Barbara

A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power *by Donald W. Mitchell, New York, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1974.—xxvii, 657 pp. $15.00.*

Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context *edited by Michael MccGwire. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973.—xvii, 555 pp. $23.50.*

Readers interested in the development of Soviet sea power, having either been suffocating in a vacuum of Western indifference or drowning in a cascade of Soviet propaganda, are now endangered by a rapidly rising tide of hasty research and shallow writings. The suddenly emerging waves of one-sided evaluations and crosscurrents of confusion and controversy have, however, been considerably tempered by the studies by Donald Mitchell and Michael MccGwire. Although both publications deal with the same subject matter from vastly different angles, they share many common features. They represent genuine scholarly efforts supported by thorough research and diversified primary sources. They also offer an uncommonly sweeping scope of investigation either in the form of a telescopic framework, erected by Mitchell, or via a kaleidoscopic review of the multidimensional aspects of the naval "capability and context," presented by MccGwire. While the first reveals a great deal of continuity in the Soviet attempts to obtain sea power, historically, the latter vividly illuminates the complexity of the actual and potential utility of such power, contemporarily. Hence, these publications provide a mutually supplementary and complementary set of tools for examining past and present Soviet sea power. Each book, however, embodies distinct merits and neither is free from deficiencies.

Mitchell, through an enormously vast and detailed account, reveals many trends in the history of Russian-Soviet sea power which may have a bearing on the USSR's contemporary naval expansion. Thus, it is clear that the absence of unilinear evolution of Soviet sea power corresponded with the vicissitudinous continuity of Russian-Soviet naval aspirations. Such aspirations, moreover, were often realized with the assistance of periodic borrowing of technological know-how from the Western world. Also, the Russian weakness and lack of understanding of their sea power along with the absence of naval policy, did not prevent the enthusiastic employment of their feeble forces, scoring some victories at sea and even establishing and maintaining a temporarily credible status as a great sea power. Although the pertinence of these and other lessons of history in the contemporary situation cannot be easily dismissed, the con-

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cept of sea power remains problematic before and after reading Mitchell's book. While the content of the book seems to imply indirectly but correctly, that sea power embodies the merchant marine, fishing fleets, or even geographical discoveries, Mitchell appears oblivious of the need to clarify this basic concept.

He is at his best in introducing forgotten and unexplored details of great and not-so-great naval battles and ventures in the distant past. Fond of providing their most minute descriptions, he carefully selects maps and charts illustrating the position and movement of fleets, quantity of squadrons, quality of weapons, types of naval forces, and even names of Russian commanders and their adversaries. In some instances, numerous daily accounts are followed by hour-by-hour records of changes in the Russian naval strategy and action.

Such a gold mine of information makes the book fascinating and uniquely valuable but not easily digestible by an average reader. For the author offers very meager guidance through the labyrinth of his impressive data and thus fails to provide assistance in distinguishing between the more and the less important Russian naval ventures. It is certain that *A History of Russian and Soviet Sea Power* is an excellent but mostly narrative chronicle of past events. Unfortunately, it is far from certain to what extent, if any, it can be regarded as a selective and interpretative history providing an adequate basis for the understanding of causes and results, and of the relationships between those phenomena pertinent to the evolution of Soviet sea power.

Further, the fragility of Mitchell's elaboration and the limitation of his interpretation, sharply contrasting with the extensive data, depreciate considerably his analytical effort. For, if the wealth of information, painstakingly gathered, represents one of the book's strongest assets, the limited interpretation alone and along with the unequal, or too equal, wealth distribution, constitutes one of its main shortcomings. Granting that some imbalance in the distribution of facts and figures over a period of ten centuries seems inevitable, a greater elucidation, in addition to or in lieu of hard facts, would have helped greatly in restoring the balance.

In addition to the problem of extensive information versus limited interpretation, two other points appear troublesome. One, reflected in the strong emphasis on naval participation in military encounters in pre-Soviet Russia, results in creating a strong impression that the history of naval battles assumes priority over the history of Russian sea power. Although the author discusses many nonnaval-military aspects of sea power, he leaves the reader unsatisfied with his light touch of issues such as the Russian and Soviet attitude to freedom of the seas or the utility of sea power in external politics and diplomacy. This seems, in turn, to be interwoven with the second point. That is, the overriding emphasis placed on internal politics in the evolution of Soviet sea power obscures considerably a similar influence of external factors, as well as the interaction between Soviet sea power and the international milieu. Even in the final part of the analysis, where the author indicates a full awareness of

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the importance of external variables, the scope and substance of his commentary still resemble strongly a "hit-and-run" strategy. In short, the reader is left to his imagination, speculation, or other sources of information, such as MccGwire's study.

This book seems to offer too much and deliver too little. It comprises over thirty essays dealing with an infinity of issues, all spatially confined to a maximum of approximately thirty pages. Many of them provide a refreshing change by focusing on the external-political dimension of Soviet naval power, its capability and application.

Franklyn Griffiths, for example, in a schematic brief manages not only to point out general shortcomings in the contemporary understanding of the relationship between Soviet foreign and naval policy but also supplies interesting hints for further investigation. Another step in a slightly different direction is taken by Thomas W. Wolfe who presents the external political-military-naval linkage from the viewpoint of the United States-USSR interaction and tries to assess its influence on the changing Soviet navy and functions. As explained by Robert G. Weinland, the new functions, or so-called missions, include the protection of the Soviet state interests in the world at large. The Indo-Pakistani crisis is imaginatively treated by James M. McConnell as a case study of the superpowers' naval diplomacy. Other dimensions of Soviet naval capability, receiving attention in this collective work, range from political, economic, and legal to strategic, technical, and military aspects.

The problem of methodology is taken up by MccGwire suggesting that Soviet shipbuilding practice and procedure provides a clue for identifying Soviet naval policy. The value of this suggestion derives not necessarily from its unqualified utility but rather from its thought-provoking quality as well as from the fact that it forces contemplation about its possible limitations as an investigative tool. For in the light of the past practice of sea power politics, gunboat diplomacy, or even in the context of Russian-Soviet naval history, the relevance of both shipbuilding and naval policy to the political application of naval power may well be questioned. The confirmation or moderation of such a doubt, however, requires a careful rereading of Mitchell's study.

Having come full circle in demonstrating the complementary character of both publications, a final word is reserved for MccGwire. One cannot help but regret that the outdated essays have not been updated, some of them expanded, and all of them fully integrated.

Despite these flaws, MccGwire and Mitchell deserve recognition for the assistance rendered to exhausted and frustrated readers struggling in vain and for too long with the problem of Soviet sea power.

HANNAH J. ZAWADZKA
Barnard College, Columbia University

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Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile *edited by Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff. New York and London, Monthly Review Press, 1974.—169 pp. Cloth, $7.50; paper, $3.25.*

The thirteen pieces in this collection describe and analyze the events which occurred in Chile between September 1970 and December 1973, when President Salvador Allende and the *Unidad Popular* coalition he headed tried to implement what they called the "Chilean Way" to socialism. The final article by James Petras describes some of the postcoup schisms among the *golpistas*. All but one of the pieces originally appeared in the independent socialist magazine, *Monthly Review*, and all follow that journal's tradition of rigorous thinking along Marxist lines. The authors, who write from first-hand knowledge of the Chilean process, include Paul M. Sweezy and Harry Magdoff (the editors of *Monthly Review*), Betty Petras, James Petras, Andrew Zimbalist, Barbara Stallings, and three unnamed correspondents writing from Chile. The editors' pieces tend to concentrate on the theoretical aspects of the Chilean situation, while the other articles trace and describe in some detail the events of the Allende years. Thus, the book is satisfying for those who need introductory information as well as for those who seek to deepen their understanding of the complex questions raised by the "Chilean Way" to socialism.

The editors' pieces are especially impressive because of their prescient quality, which arises from general theoretical clarity and familiarity with Chilean politics. In a January 1971 article, for example, at a time when other observers inside and outside of Chile were caught up in the euphoria of the government's early achievements, the editors pointed out some harsh realities: (1) "Private capital is not going to give up its power and prerogatives without a struggle, and the first battleground will naturally be in the enterprises themselves" (p. 38). This meant that the economic situation, while positive in the short run, was bound to deteriorate as the *Unidad Popular* acted on its promises to nationalize key industries. (2) The Chilean military, one of the largest in Latin America relative to population, had intervened decisively in the political life of the country in the past and would do so again if it determined that the interests of the bourgeoisie were threatened. Considering these and other aspects of the situation, the editors concluded, "There can be no socialism in Chile until this bourgeoisie has been decisively crushed" (p. 49).

This insistence on realistically understanding "the problem of power" is a major theme in the book. The writers all agree that the *Unidad Popular*'s plans to transform Chilean society depended on winning the battle for power with the Chilean bourgeoisie. This theme takes on increasing importance in the articles written in 1972 and 1973, when the Right began to wage war against the legally constituted government. At this time, debates began within the UP government over whether to "consolidate" the process or whether to move ahead. For the most part, the authors argue that "consolidation" was im-

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possible and that the government's attempts to "slow down" the process led to a weakening of its position, which facilitated the *golpistas'* work.

Two of the most informative articles in the book discuss these issues in the context of the events of the final months of the UP government in 1973: Andrew Zimbalist and Barbara Stallings' "Showdown in Chile," and Betty and James Petras' "Ballots into Bullets." Zimbalist and Stallings spent many months in Chile studying the procedures for increasing worker participation in factory management and in economic planning, and their article describes these procedures, as well as the workers' response to Rightist provocations. Betty and James Petras' article provides a useful overview of the Allende years. Further this is the only article in the collection to give much information on the United States government's substantial aid to the *golpistas.*

In fact, the collection is generally weak in its treatment of United States opposition to the Allende government. Aside from this weakness, though, the book will be an important source for anyone trying to understand the triumphs and tragedies of the Allende period.

ELIZABETH FARNSWORTH
The North American Congress on Latin America

The Politics of Massacre: Political Processes in South Vietnam *by Charles A. Joiner. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1974.—xiii, 346 pp. $12.50.*

This is a collection of essays written over a period of fifteen years by one of political science's "Old Vietnam Hands." Most of the chapters deal with the period in which South Vietnamese politics was dominated by President Ngo Dinh Diem, a period that already seems long ago, but which Professor Joiner reminds us has left a legacy that still is being played out in Saigon. Only the final three chapters deal directly with the regime of Nguyen Van Thieu. To help tie these essays together and to put them in contemporary perspective, Joiner has added brief introductions to each of the earlier essays. One often wishes that these were considerably fuller.

In a discipline that prides itself on its predictive capacity but that has been notoriously lacking in historical perspective, publishing such a volume of unrevised essays ranging over so long a period takes not a little courage. We need more of these analytical glances back over our shoulders. Joiner could have enhanced the value of this collection and made the "lessons"—analytical, as well as merely policy lessons—clearer had he been more explicit in his detailing of analytical assumptions and errors.

Though the book lacks an explicit hypothesis, it does contend that politics—domestic, not just international—goes on in the midst of the most devastating

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of wars. This is a point that also has been made by Allen Goodman in his interesting study of South Vietnam's legislative assembleymen. Both Goodman and Joiner substantiate this by giving detailed accounts of interest group maneuverings and the rivalries between Vietnamese political personalities. For Joiner there is an essentially *déjà vu* quality about Vietnamese politics; for whether one is making one's observations in the 1950s or 1960s or even back in the 1920s one is compelled to make sense out of the plethora of narrowly based, elitist, mostly urban political groups which rarely achieve the status of a genuine political party with a firm rooting in popular support. Time and again Joiner returns to this phenomenon, seeing it as the critical obstacle to effective "nation building" in South Vietnam. With that in mind, when he turns to the National Liberation Front he focuses on its "genius" in developing what he and Douglas Pike and other American analysts are so prone to calling an "organizational weapon."

The political processes that Joiner refers to in his subtitle are essentially processes of group formation and fragmentation that have gone on in Vietnam since the beginning of the anticolonial nationalist movement in the 1920s. Although the French have been replaced by the Americans, the Viet Minh by the NLF and Diem by Thieu, South Vietnamese politics from this perspective is relatively unchanged. Joiner does, however, see some hope in the emergence of elections, manipulated though they have been, and in the promulgation of a theoretically democratic constitution. Throughout his essays, in fact, the author apparently is caught between, on the one hand, disdain for the hopelessly personalized and elitist character of Vietnamese politics and, on the other hand, hope for a more integrated political future. What the reader finds missing is a more analytically fleshed out underpinning for that hope.

There is an all too likely possibility that political scientists have taken their cue from United States negotiators, rolling up their notebooks as the last American troops ship out. Political scientists paid very little attention to Vietnamese politics before 1960, leaving the field to journalists, historians, and anthropologists. It would be a serious shortcoming in a strictly disciplinary sense for political scientists to desert Vietnam at this point. Not only would we be all the more vulnerable to the charge of being little more than journalists chasing political fire engines; we would also miss the necessary opportunity to test our own and our colleagues' presumptions about (1) what the relationship is between war and politics; (2) what the requisite degree of self-conscious organization is for national integration; and (3) what the impact of foreign intervention is on domestic political development.

CYNTHIA H. ENLOE
Clark University

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The Political Culture of Japan *by Bradley M. Richardson. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.—xi, 271 pp. $12.50.*

Writers on Japanese political culture have tended to start with one or a few postulates about Japanese history, culture, social organization, or "national character" and use them to explain any aspect of Japanese politics that appears odd. Such approaches are often intriguing—the general reader is given an "insight" into Japanese politics and the student an easy handle for a final exam answer—but they invariably oversimplify reality. Bradley Richardson takes the opposite tack. Instead of starting with assumptions he starts with lots of data: the aggregate results of hundreds of surveys conducted by the Fair Election League (Kōmei Senkyo Renmei), locally and nationally, mostly in the early 1960s. He then infers patterns of attitudes along dimensions suggested by cross-national political culture research (involvement, evaluation, participation), and tries to explain them. These interpretations, often enough, draw upon the same peculiarities of Japanese culture and social organization highlighted in earlier studies; indeed, his concluding characterizations—Japanese tend toward formalism, ambivalence, localism, and personalism in their political attitudes—are not altogether unfamiliar to the Japanologist. But the book is unique in its appreciation of the great variety of political orientations and the complexity of individual attitude structures in contemporary Japan.

Four chapters are devoted to descriptive statistics illustrating attitudinal tendencies in the population as a whole, compared at many points with findings from Western countries. Although shortages of equivalent data and the fundamental difficulties of cross-national comparisons—even if the same proportion answers "yes" to the same question in two countries, do they really have the same attitude?—lead Richardson to couch his judgments in appropriately tentative language, it does seem clear that in many important respects, Japanese are as informed as citizens of other industrialized countries, and are as likely to participate and to have positive feelings about politics. Unfortunately for analytic purposes, this observation undercuts the value of some of Richardson's speculations about the meaning of his data, if one assumes that widely found patterns constitute a sort of normal baseline and it is mainly deviant cases that require special explanation. For example, is a long list of "Japanese" reasons for passivity (pp. 97–99) needed when the level is not particularly high?

The author is on firmer (and more fertile) ground when analyzing differences among Japanese subpopulations: urban and rural dwellers, and young, middle-aged, and older citizens. Here he relies on cross-tabulated Fair Election League surveys and multivariate analyses (using the Coleman effect parameter technique, controlling for education, income, and group membership) of his own 1964 urban-rural survey. Findings of relatively high levels of instrumentalist and activist orientations in rural communities are a significant qualification to the more simplistic predictions of some modernization and center-periphery

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theories. In his analysis of age differences, Richardson plausibly infers (though, lacking time-series data, he cannot quite prove) that generational differences stemming from distinct socialization experiences account for most of the variation. The point that Japan resembles West Germany in attitudinal age differentials as well as in historical experience is interesting, and illustrates the advantages (for conceptual richness and methodological validity) of comparing differences among subpopulations or subunits cross-nationally. The concluding chapter includes further multivariate analysis designed to relate attitudes to five types of political participation.

A few quibbles are appropriate. More details on how statistical techniques were used would have been helpful to both methodologically naive and sophisticated readers. It is unfortunate that the period covered by the study was limited to 1958–1967 (an important table on party identification ends in 1961), but even within that period he might have commented on the possibility of "historical" or "adult" attitude change. And I for one would prefer less analysis in some spots and more in others—for example, a discussion of age in the urban-rural section might reveal a clearer structure of attitude groupings, as might a consideration of partisan or ideological attachments. Still, this book both draws upon and contributes to comparative politics theory, it presents new materials intelligently, and fills a major gap for teachers and researchers in Japanese studies. It is an important contribution.

JOHN CREIGHTON CAMPBELL
The University of Michigan

Indira: A Biography of Prime Minister Gandhi *by Krishan Bhatia. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974.—x, 290 pp. $10.00.*

This is an exceedingly well-written biography by one of India's leading journalists, now special correspondent in the United States for the *Hindustan Times.* Those familiar with the many books by and about Mrs. Gandhi's father, Jawaharlal Nehru, will not learn too many new facts in the first four chapters, which trace Indira's childhood, education, and marriage. What stands out in this very readable account is the extraordinary degree to which the life of this entire family (three generations: Motilal, Jawaharlal, Indira) revolved around the freedom struggle. Despite the lavish affection shown her, Indira's childhood was one of considerable insecurity because of the frequent imprisonment of the adults of the family. Chapters 5 and 6 relate her own experience of prison in Naini Central Jail in 1942, and after independence, her years of "apprenticeship" in the prime minister's house as her father's closest friend as well as hostess at official functions.

The remaining five chapters deal with Indira Gandhi's succession to power

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following Shastri's sudden death in early 1966, and the major crises which have tested her as prime minister to the end of 1973. The author has skillfully worked the necessary background information into his account without losing momentum. His political reporting is absorbing as he deftly analyzes the major personalities and factions in the Congress party. He clearly is intrigued by the study of political strategies in New Delhi, and traces them with exceptional clarity. While there is an important element of inference in this enterprise, Bhatia's interpretations are always plausible and usually convincing.

The political scientist will often find himself asking where a particular piece of information came from, but there are, alas, no answers to such questions. There is not a footnote in the book, and we will have to take the author's word for much of what he has written. This book is primarily for the general reader, but it is political reporting of such high quality that the scholar would be ill advised to ignore it.

Indira Gandhi's first years as prime minister, as seen by Bhatia, were marked by great inner uncertainty, and consequently by indecision and vacillation in her leadership. This did not surprise anyone; indeed, it confirmed the general impression that she was inherently a weak person thrust to the center of power by the memory of her father and the divisions among the Congress politicians who survived him. The 1967 elections, in which the Congress lost in eight of the seventeen states, was, according to the author, a turning point in Indira's political career. Through her extensive campaigning she found that she could reach the masses effectively, and that they responded to her much more positively than to any of her rivals. From this point her self-confidence began to develop, and prepared her for the overt struggle for power within the Congress party in 1969.

The author is at his best in the analysis of this struggle with the "Syndicate," the handful of regional Congress leaders who collectively sought to control her. The strategy developed by Mrs. Gandhi, according to Bhatia, was a calculated manipulation of ideological symbols. "The plan that Indira devised with Mishra's help was to continue to try provoking Kamaraj and others into an open fight . . . and to give the battle an ideological slant by presenting the Syndicate as a reactionary element determined to thwart socialism" (p. 223).

The author gives fulsome praise to Mrs. Gandhi for her patient and effective handling of the Bangladesh crisis. The 1971 victory over Pakistan brought her to the pinnacle of her popularity, and her power is unchallenged in New Delhi. However, the book ends on a rather sad note, with a description of a rapidly deteriorating economic situation which seems impervious to Indira's massive political power.

DONALD E. SMITH
University of Pennsylvania

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Reference Books and Source Materials Received

Biographical Directory of American Labor Leaders *edited by Gary M. Fink and Milton Cantor. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1974.—xiv, 559 pp. $19.95.*

European Parliament Digest, Vol. 1: 1973 *edited by Mary Edmund. Totowa, N. J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1974.—vii, 212 pp. $22.50.*

Foreign Relations of the United States 1949, Vol. III: Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Australia *prepared by Department of State. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1974.—xxiv, 1324 pp. $14.55.*

The International Almanac of Electoral History *by Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose. New York, The Free Press, 1974.—xiii, 434 pp. $15.00.*

International Bibliography of the Social Sciences: Political Science, 1972, vol. XXI *compiled by the International Committee for Social Science Information and Documentation. London, Tavistock Publications; Chicago, Ill., Aldine-Atherton, Inc., 1974.—iv, 293 pp. $25.00.*

The Papers of John Marshall, Vol. 1 *edited by Herbert A. Johnson. Chapel Hill, N. C., The University of North Carolina Press in association with Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., 1974.—xlvi, 448 pp. $17.95.*

Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century, rev. ed. *edited by Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine. New York, Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1974.—510 pp. $6.95.*

Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Vol. 4: Dag Hammerskjöld, 1958–1960 *edited by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. New York, Columbia University Press, 1974.—xiv, 659 pp. $22.50.*

The Statesman's Year-Book 1974–1975 *edited by John Paxton. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1974.—xxviii, 1556 pp. $15.95.*

Statistical Abstract of the United States, 95th ed. *prepared under the direction of William Lerner. U. S. Bureau of Census. Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1974.—xx, 1028 pp. Cloth, $10.20; paper, $6.85.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Professor Alexander M. Capron's review of my book, GENETIC FIX (PSQ, Winter, 1974-75), is so unfair that it speaks for itself. Those who read any of the other reviews of the book are aware that it received, with very few exceptions, a very warm welcome. And, the readers themselves can readily discern the many false statements and conclusions by Professor Capron. Allow me to provide but one illustration, which shall stand for all the others.

The focus of the book is an international confrontation of various natural scientists, social scientists and humanists on the moral, social, and legal issues of bio-medicine. Professor Capron writes: "Since a version of the proceedings (edited by Simon Btesh) had been previously published, it is difficult to see what contribution the author thought his book would make." "Published" here is a semantic trick. The proceedings were issued in 300 copies and *are not available in book stores, or all but a small handful of libraries.* And the proceedings provide the text of the papers presented and a very brief version of the exchanges among the participants. My book provides excerpts and summaries of a selected number of the papers, lengthy discussion of their significance, exchanges among the participants, and my personal views. The rest of Professor Capron's observations are equally valid.

AMITAI ETZIONI
Columbia University

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

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

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

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

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

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